Afghan peace
shift
General John
Nicholson, the US commander in Afghanistan, has confirmed reports in the US
media that Washington is ready to hold direct talks with the Taliban. The US
has stated that it is exploring all avenues to advance the peace process in
close consultation with the Afghan government. This follows reports that the
Trump administration has asked its diplomats to seek such direct talks, which
represents a shift from Washington’s earlier long standing policy of no direct
talks with the Taliban. Despite the policy shift, and perhaps to prevent the
impression of the bypassing of the Afghan government of President Ashraf Ghani,
the US State Department has found it necessary to reiterate that any negotiations
over the political future of Afghanistan have to be conducted between the
Taliban and the Kabul government, with the US playing a supportive role.
Although this reiteration downplays the US role and maintains the centrality of
an Afghan-owned, Afghan-led negotiations process in principle, the conceding of
the possibility of direct talks between Washington and the Taliban answers the
long standing insistence of the latter that it will only talk to the US and not
the Kabul government, which they characterise as a puppet unable to settle
anything. It may be recalled that various efforts at indirect or back channel
talks between Washington and the Taliban represent a lengthy road littered with
abortive gambits. The Qatar office of the Taliban was once often cited in
reports as the possible conduit or even venue for such talks. All these efforts
in the past, including the 2015 parleys that ended almost as soon as they
began, have failed. So what, if anything is new in this latest development?
First and foremost, it needs underlining that Washington has taken the risk of
abandoning its strict insistence on the Taliban negotiating with the Kabul
government without seeming to throw Ashraf Ghani under the bus. Two, it seems
the Eid temporary ceasefire and its concomitant open mingling of Taliban
fighters and the Afghan security forces and people on the streets of the
capital and elsewhere inspired Washington to explore the possibility of direct
talks. Three, it is obvious by now that the Afghan conflict is a stalemate
likely to persist for the foreseeable future and fresh ideas and initiatives
are necessary to break the logjam. It may be noted that of Afghanistan’s 407
districts, 229 are under the control or influence of the Afghan government, 59
are with the Taliban, and the remaining 119 are contested. It may be considered
encouraging that the Qatar office of the Taliban has welcomed the signs of a
new approach that meets their long standing demand for direct talks at least
halfway.
Amidst the
growing speculation surrounding the shift in US policy, it may nevertheless be
advisable to take stock of the ground situation and the roadblocks in the path
of peace. The Taliban reportedly are no longer as internally cohesive as in the
past, with local commanders exercising more autonomy in decision making and the
Quetta Shura unable to simply have its orders obeyed by all its units inside
Afghanistan. Then the Haqqani Network is not part of the negotiations effort
and therefore has no incentive to give up its deadly attacks. Nevertheless, if
the Taliban can be neutralised or brought into a future setup in Kabul through
talks, this would weaken the recalcitrant groups’ hand and may act as an
incentive to explore the path (if chosen) taken by the Taliban. As these ground
realities suggest, while the shift in US policy is to be welcomed as the
dividends of peace will not only help the long suffering Afghan people, they
will also bring huge benefits to Pakistan, the region and the world, the road
ahead is not without bumps and pit holes. One only hopes that the Washington
policy shift, a recognition of necessity, does not turn out to be a case of too
little too late, having missed the bus on this account so many times over the
last 17 years.
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