And miles to go…
Rashed Rahman
The terrorist
attack in D I Khan on July 21, 2019 reinforces this writer’s repeated cautions
since the military campaigns against terrorist groups in erstwhile FATA in 2016
that the terrorist hydra has been rocked back, expelled from Pakistani soil (to
Afghanistan), but not scotched. The D I Khan attack had all the hallmarks of a
well thought out, planned manoeuvre. First, gunmen on four motorcycles opened
fire on policemen manning a check post early morning, killing two policemen. As
soon as the dead bodies of the policemen reached District Headquarters
Hospital, a suicide bomber detonated himself, killing six people, two of them
policemen, and wounding 28. Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) Khorasani group claimed
responsibility. Its spokesman said the attack was in retaliation for the
killing of two Taliban commanders by counter-terrorism police about a month
ago. Police later arrested 16 suspects and seized some weapons.
When TTP and its
affiliates in erstwhile FATA fled across the border into Afghanistan after
coming under pressure from the military’s offensives, it became clear they had
found safe havens there. Suspicion landed on the Haqqani Network hosting them
in areas across the border under their control. The possibility of cross-border
attacks persuaded the military to fence the border, something DG ISPR Major
General Asif Ghafoor alluded to in Washington DC on the day of the D I Khan
attack as one of the major factors in the decline of terrorism in Pakistan
since 2016. But given the length and poorly policed character of the Pak-Afghan
border, even fencing (expensive, only partially completed) could not guarantee
Pakistan freedom from the TTP infiltrating back into the country and continuing
its attacks. Nor could the possibility of sleeper cells left behind by the TTP
after its exodus resurrecting themselves be ruled out. The D I Khan attack
suggests both phenomena are in operation. After all, the presence of gunmen on
four motorcycles and the lone (burqa-clad) suicide bomber suggests a support
infrastructure without which such operations would be difficult, if not impossible.
The police
arrests single out suspects belonging to banned organisations. Whether there
remains a nexus between the TTP and such organisations is not known but cannot
be ruled out. The police naturally hope some leads can be obtained (by the
‘usual’ methods) from the ‘interrogation’ of these suspects.
Ritual
condemnations from the top leadership of the country were to be expected. But
the incident may mar Prime Minister Imran Khan’s efforts to convince US
investors to look favourably at Pakistan as a destination for their dollars. The
DG ISPR also stressed the improved security situation in Pakistan and said the
military is now focusing on Balochistan, the province being key to the success
of CPEC. Whether the D I Khan attack’s timing was coincidental or deliberately
aimed at queering the ‘all is well’ pitch in Washington DC is not known. But it
will certainly resurrect the concerns of US investors regarding safety and
security in Pakistan. Such incidents provide the TTP with relatively low cost
effectiveness in creating problems of image and perception regarding Pakistan.
The D I Khan
incident cannot be viewed in isolation from the strategic/tactical situation
that has emerged since 2016. While the US and Pakistan seem entwined in a
symbiotic embrace whose sole focus currently is finding a face saving way for
the US to retreat from its strategic defeat in Afghanistan, Imran Khan’s visit
to the US (claimed in media reports to have been swung by Saudi Crown Prince
Mohammad bin Salman) carries a broader agenda of US investment, trade
enhancement, and, if COAS General Bajwa’s efforts bear fruit, restoring
relations (and military aid) between GHQ and the Pentagon. In a few days the
results of these efforts will be known. Washington and Islamabad may have
exchanged ‘favours’ before the visit to improve the atmospherics before Imran
Khan meets Trump. The US designated the Balochistan Liberation Army a global
terrorist group, and Pakistan ‘reciprocated’ by arresting Hafiz Saeed. These
two ‘gifts’ may have lubricated the wheels of the troubled Pak-US relationship
somewhat, but essentially the whole gamut of relations depends on Imran Khan’s
ability to convince Trump that Pakistan is sincere in helping the US get out of
Afghanistan with as much face as possible. It should not be forgotten that the
US blames Pakistan for its defeat in Afghanistan because of the duality of
policy of giving the overthrown Afghan Taliban safe haven on Pakistani soil to
continue their guerrilla struggle, while making noises about being with the US
(and gleefully pocketing the aid thrown in its direction).
The battle
against terrorism is reduced, but far from over. The TTP and other terrorist
groups can still revive and cause havoc on a greater or lesser scale. One
terrorist attack, given the history of terrorism in Pakistan, can undo years of
patient confidence building in the perception of Pakistan being terror-free. That
militates against according to Pakistan the status of a destination of choice
for investment dollars. While Pakistan from time to time makes noises about
welcoming US and other foreign investment in CPEC, the Chinese have been discreetly
silent on the issue.
Chinese interest
in CPEC can arguably be best served by a more nuanced policy in Balochistan,
through which the western corridor of CPEC passes and where the port of Gwadar
is located. Such nuance would involve abandoning the ‘one size fits all’ approach
towards non-state actors. While the TTP and other religious extremist terrorist
groups owe their origins and trouble making capacity to the misdirected efforts
of the military to use jihadi groups in Afghanistan, Balochistan is an old and
festering political problem that cries out for a political settlement. Since
the armed resistance groups and their leaders in exile do not at present seem
inclined towards any such dialogue (thereby betraying the deep mistrust between
the two sides), the Balochistan National Party-Mengal’s (BNP-M) efforts for the
rights of Balochistan will be watched keenly. If the politically risky alliance
with the incumbent Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf does not work out, it will not be
a very different pattern to what has repeatedly happened post-Musharraf. If the
BNP-M gambit does not come up to expectations vis-à-vis missing persons,
reconciliation and peace in Balochistan, the low level insurgency seems
destined not only to continue but target CPEC even more.
rashed-rahman.blogspot.com
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