Tuesday, July 14, 2026
Filmbar screening of Hong Sang-soo' "On the Beach at Night Alone" (2017) at Research and Publication Centre (RPC) on Friday, July 17, 2026 at 5:00 pm
Business Recorder Column July 14, 2026
Operation Shaban
Rashed Rahman
The nationalist insurgency in Balochistan is assuming a heightened character that fits in with classic guerrilla war strategy and tactics. The tipping point between scattered small attacks by the guerrillas and the current spate of widespread, even simultaneous attacks, appears to have been reached when the Jaffer Express was waylaid. In that incident, dozens of hostages were taken by the guerrillas. When they retreated in the face of heavy reinforcements, the recovered constituted dead bodies, according to the authorities. This was disputed by the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC), arguing the dead bodies purportedly belonging to the hostages were of people already in the custody of the authorities. There was an attempt, successful in three or four cases, of seizing the bodies from the hospital they were being kept in by the dead persons’ families. This seems to have tipped the scales of the government’s already intolerant stance towards the peaceful BYC, leading eventually to the arrest and sentencing to life imprisonment of the BYC leader Dr Mahrang Baloch.
Of the recent attacks in Balochistan, the one in which some 27 policemen were killed in the Mangi Dam area speaks of the ground situation more clearly than others. According to press reports, the policemen defended themselves but were eventually taken hostage when they ran out of ammunition, and in the absence of expected reinforcements. The latter arrived in force (including air power) when it was too late to save the beleaguered policemen. Some families of the slain policemen are holding a protest sit-in against the fate meted out to their loved ones.
This dilemma underscores the nature of guerrilla warfare and on the other side the classic counterinsurgency efforts. The guerrillas strike and retreat swiftly, circumventing thereby the arrival of reinforcements sent to help their targets. The government therefore presents the consistent picture of pursuing a reactive strategy, leaving the battlefield initiative in the hands of the highly mobile, and increasingly deadly in effect, guerrillas.
A perusal of the recent statistics of casualties on either side will confirm the picture, particularly if one sustains a healthy dose of scepticism regarding the security forces’ claims of guerrillas killed in retaliation. It is difficult to judge the truth of the claim by the security forces’ ongoing Operation Shaban against the guerrillas that they have killed 109 militants in one week. The question arises, if they were aware of the presence and identity of so many nationalist guerrillas, why were they not pre-emptively eliminated? Why only after the guerrillas had struck?
The indigestible fact is that the security forces are fighting a reactive strategy while the guerrillas increasingly hold the battlefield initiative.
The history of insurgencies suggests that without a political side to their efforts, reliance by the security forces on force alone to quell insurgencies has seldom worked. Unfortunately, the weakest part of the counterinsurgency campaign in Balochistan is precisely its politics. The Pakistan People’s Party’s (PPP’s) anointed Chief Minister Sarfraz Bugti is arguably an illegitimate appointee, given that he was a caretaker federal minister during the last elections and therefore could not be appointed Chief Minister after the elections according to constitutional and legal constraints. It does not take much to understand who chose Sarfraz Bugti for this controversial appointment, and why the PPP resurrected its past inglorious role in Balochistan by hurrying to appoint him. The fact is that Sarfraz Bugti does not even enjoy the support of his own tribe (at best this support may be confined to the Massouri clan of the Bugtis), let alone the wider polity of Balochistan. The other worthy the PPP has picked in Balochistan is Shafiq Mengal, notorious for running a ‘death squad’ in the province. That clearly is why his house was recently attacked, leaving 17 of his supporters dead although Shafiq Mengal himself was unharmed.
The PPP’s political profile in Balochistan reminds the Baloch people of the role of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto during the 1970s, when he launched a major army offensive to crush the opposition in Balochistan. It seems the PPP has chosen to return to those roots once again. They should be cautioned that the 1970s policy did not do Zulfikar Ali Bhutto much good (arguably quite the contrary) and is unlikely to do today’s PPP leadership much good either.
Meanwhile the moderate nationalist parties have been sidelined and marginalised, leaving no one to conduct a political dialogue with. Force alone does not work, will not work. In the process of reliance on force alone, and in the absence of a credible provincial government able to engage the moderate nationalists, Pakistan is rapidly losing the hearts and minds of the people of Balochistan.
rashed-rahman.blogspot.com
Monday, July 6, 2026
Filmbar screening of Satyajit Ray's "Devi" (1960) at Research and Publication Centre (RPC) on Friday, July 10, 2026 at 5:00 pm
Wednesday, July 1, 2026
The July 2026 issue of Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) is out
The July 2026 issue of Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) is out. Link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com
Contents:
1. Vijay Prashad: Could Capialism have thrived without Colonialism? – II: The Limits of Political Marxism.
2. Sara Kazmi: The Marxist Punjabi Movement: Language and Literary Radicalism in Pakistan: Post-colonial continuities –II.
3. Tricontinental: Nothing is more precious than Independence and Freedom.
4. Yinhao Zhang: The Material Basis of a Spectre: Why China’s Youth are Rediscovering Mao.
5. Changez Ali: Ms Rachel learns about Genocide.
6. Roshaan Khattak: Ash on the Lamps of Learning: How Cambridge blinked.
7. Ishtiaq Ahmed: The Rise and Fall of the Left and the Maoist Movements in Pakistan.
8. Alia Amirali: The War against Islamabad’s Katchi Abadis.
9. Rita Manchanda: How civil society reads India-Pakistan signals amid the West Asia War.
10. Dr Saulat Nagi: Kashmir and the Contradictions of the Neo-Colonial State.
Rashed Rahman
Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)
Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) (on Facebook)
Email: rashed.rahman1@gmail.com
Cells: +92 302 8482737 & +92 333 4216335
Monday, June 29, 2026
Filmbàr screening of Charlie Kaufman's Being John Malkovich (1999) at Research and Publication Centre (RPC) on Friday, July 03, 2026 at 5:00 pm
Wednesday, June 24, 2026
Khirki screening of "Rashed Rahman: Fragments of a Life of Struggle (Episode 5)" at Research and Publication Centre (RPC) on Saturday, July 4, 2026 at 5:00 pm
*Khirki invites you to a screening of “Rashed Rahman: Fragments of a Life of Struggle (Episode 5)” at Research and Publication Centre (RPC) on Saturday, July 4, 2026 at 5.00 pm.
This documentary traces the life and political journey of Rashed Rahman, a Marxist revolutionary from Lahore who became involved in the Baloch national movement during the 1970s.
Episode 5 continues with the story of Rahman's involvement with the Baloch resistance. In particular, it looks at the difficulties of love, marriage and family while involved in an underground revolutionary movement. We also follow along with the international and domestic events of the 1970s and 80s through Rashed Rahman's lens.
Join us for an evening of film, discussion, and collective reflection on history, politics, and the lives shaped by them over tea.
Address: Research & Publication Centre (RPC), 2nd Floor, 65 Main Boulevard Gulberg, Lahore (next to Standard Chartered Bank, above Indesign showroom). Lift is operational.
Tuesday, June 16, 2026
Business Recorder Column June 16, 2026
Peace at last?
Rashed Rahman
Ostensibly, the US and Iran have ironed out their differences sufficiently to allow the signing of a peace agreement in Switzerland on June 19, 2026, according to Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif. However, there still remain some discordant notes. While US President Donald Trump says the agreement is now ‘complete’, Iran has yet to formally confirm this. Trump stated the agreement included the toll-free opening of the Strait of Hormuz and the removal of the US naval blockade of Iran. If so, the agreement, even if it is interim in nature and there are still major issues to be settled, meets the desire of the region as well as the world to restore shipping oil through the Hormuz Strait. Trump railed once again against Israel for continuing its attacks on Lebanon, a spoiler role Israel has yet to abandon, and asked all sides (including Hezbollah) to ‘stand down’. It may be recalled that Iran has made the ceasing of Israeli attacks on Lebanon a firm condition of any agreement, interim or permanent.
In essence the coming together of the warring sides is predicated on a ‘framework’ agreement that posits a ceasing of military actions and reactions and then a negotiating process to take up the weightier issues separating the two sides. According to the Mehr news agency, the details of the Iran-US peace plan are as follows:
· An immediate and permanent end to the “war on all fronts”, including in Lebanon.
· The US and its allies must propose a plan to rebuild Iran with funding of at least $ 300 billion.
· The US commits to refrain from interfering in Iran’s internal affairs.
· The US will completely lift the naval blockade and withdraw its troops from areas adjacent to Iran within 30 days (it is not clear if this includes the US military bases dotted around the Persian Gulf).
· The Strait of Hormuz will be opened within 30 days, subject to Iran’s demands (not spelt out).
· Sanctions on Iranian oil sales will be lifted.
· The parties will then hold negotiations within 60 days to reach a final agreement on the nuclear issue.
· The US must unfreeze $ 24 billion in Iranian assets, half of which should be released with the start of nuclear talks.
· Iran’s missile programme and Tehran’s support for its regional allies are not among the topics of a possible final agreement.
These points, ostensibly forming the framework agreement, already point to difficulties ahead in the negotiations to follow its signing. First and foremost, it remains to be seen, ‘railing’ aside, whether Trump can restrain Israel from continuing its aggression in Lebanon. Second, it is not clear the US has agreed reparations to reconstruct the damage inflicted by it on Iran to the tune of $ 300 billion. Trump is so far uncharacteristically quiet on this issue, since it implies the US committed aggression against Iran unjustifiably. Third, having failed to bring about regime change despite assassinating Iran’s leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, it remains to be seen whether Washington will haul back its and Israel’s covert subversive activities inside Iran. Fourth, the nuclear issue. Trump wants even civilian nuclear activities shut down, and Iran’s enriched uranium passed on to Washington to destroy. This goes far beyond the 2015 Obama agreement with Iran and awaits an agreed outcome, which appears difficult. Fifth, Iran appears to have rejected curbs on its missile programme and support to its ‘Axis of Resistance’ allies Hezbollah, the Yemeni Houthis, and perhaps even Hamas in Gaza. Tel Aviv of course will not be pleased, having been on the receiving end of effective Iranian missiles since 2025.
Although Iran’s position seems secure in the light of the above framework agreement points and the likely Iranian approach to these, Tehran must also look over its shoulder at the hardliners and popular opinion that has already come out in the streets to oppose the framework agreement and the very notion of talks, questioning whether the Iranian rulers have forgotten the blood of Khamenei.
One may be forgiven for posing so many ticklish objections and a critique of the framework agreement given the trajectory of war and peace between the two sides and Trump’s incorrigible constant shifting of the goalposts on virtually a daily basis. Trust is the big missing elephant in the room for both sides. One nevertheless hopes for an end to military hostilities, even difficult negotiations being preferable to further bloodshed and destruction. However, in the light of the above, don’t hold your breath in anticipation of a sincere, lasting peace between the antagonists.
rashed-rahman.blogspot.com