Business Recorder Editorial January 24, 2019

The Afghan conundrum

After US Special Envoy for Peace and Reconciliation Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad’s failure to clinch a meeting with the Afghan Taliban in Islamabad, the two sides have resumed their talks in Doha. The Islamabad meeting did not come about because, according to the Taliban, the US resiled from the agreed agenda for the talks that revolved around foreign forces’ withdrawal, release of Taliban prisoners and preventing Afghanistan from being used against other countries in future (an obvious reference to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda using Afghanistan as a base to attack the US mainland on 9/11). But the real reason the Islamabad venue proved unfruitful is because Pakistan was reportedly pressuring the Taliban to meet Afghan government representatives, which they rejected once again. The arrest of Taliban leaders in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was views as a ploy towards that end. From the Taliban point of view, Doha offered a far more salubrious climate free of pressure. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid revealed a further demand added by the US: an unconditional ceasefire and the release of US professor Kevin King, captured after an attack on the American University in Kabul in August 2016 and in Taliban captivity ever since. While there was a pregnant silence from the US on these issues, it should be noted that Zalmay Khalilzad extended his stay in Islamabad in the hope the Taliban would come round. Both sides jockey for positions on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, in a classic talking-while-fighting strategy. And talking of fighting, a devastating attack on an Afghan National Directorate of Security training facility in Maidan Shahr in central Afghanistan killed and wounded dozens of the security forces. Although casualty figures trotted out by different sources varied widely (12-126 killed, 20-35 wounded), the complex attack on a highly secured base underlines the heavy pressure on the security forces as an increasingly confident Taliban press home their incremental advantage and initiative in the battlefield. The attackers used captured US Humvees laden with explosives to ram the gate of the facility, followed by three gunmen who sprayed the area with gunfire before being killed. The casualty toll was the highest since the Taliban overran Ghazni province in August 2018, an episode that resulted in 150 security forces, 95 civilians and hundreds of Taliban fighters being killed.

The run of play on the battlefield and at the negotiating table points in the direction of the Taliban being increasingly convinced that although they cannot defeat the US-backed Afghan security forces outright at present, nibbling away at their credibility feeds into the frustration and impatience that informs Washington’s approach to the US’s longest running foreign war. They therefore feel they have time on their side and only have to stand steadfast to achieve their first goal: the withdrawal of foreign (mostly US) forces. Most informed analysts are convinced that if and when the US withdraws, the Afghan government and security forces will not be able to withstand the Taliban’s expected redoubled efforts for an outright military victory. Starting with former US president Barack Obama’s surge and then major withdrawal of troops, the US has been twisting and turning to find a way out of the Afghan quagmire, especially under President Trump. Presently, the intriguing thought presents itself that since the initial aim of the US was to target al Qaeda in Afghanistan and not the Taliban, something they were ‘forced’ to do after the latter refused to give up Osama bin Laden in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, could Washington consider some ‘guarantee’ by the Taliban that Afghan soil would never again be allowed to be used to attack the US sufficient face-saving to rid itself of the Afghan swamp it is bogged down in? Of the options on the table, this may be the best the US can presently hope for. Of course the implications for Afghanistan and the region of any such agreement are frightening. The US may have blundered into Afghanistan with its usual hubris, but its retreat with its tail between its legs 18 years later will spell the death knell for the Afghan government, a fresh wave of refugees fleeing the fighting (which may nevertheless continue even if the Taliban capture power) into Pakistan and other neighbouring countries, and the unforeseen impact on Pakistan’s security if the Afghan Taliban pay back our hospitality with covert support to the Pakistani Taliban ensconced on their soil. The Afghan mess looks like it is about to get messier.