Shahbaz Taseer’s kidnapping
In a startling development, slain Governor Punjab Salmaan Taseer’s son Shahbaz Taseer was abducted from Lahore in broad daylight yesterday morning. Shahbaz was on his way to his office when he was intercepted by a group of armed men in cars and motorcycles and whisked away along with a friend who was riding with him. The friend was later released, but there is no word where and why Shahbaz was taken away by his abductors. So far there has been no claim of responsibility, therefore conjecture as to the possible perpetrators and their motives must lie in the realm of speculation. There appear at first glance to be three likely suspects: ‘friends’ of Mumtaz Qadri, the self-confessed assassin of Salmaan Taseer, with the possible motive of pressurising the authorities to release the murderer; fanatics who think the Taseer family is fair game for their unwanted attentions in the light of the warped perception that Salmaan Taseer’s criticism of the misuse and abuse of the blasphemy law was itself tantamount to blasphemy; and criminals of the kidnapping for ransom variety. A joint investigation team has been set up, all exits from Lahore have been sealed, and the incident has attracted the notice of the president, prime minister and the Punjab chief minister. Condemnations of the kidnapping have flown in thick and fast, including statements from Human Rights Watch and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. We pray that Shahbaz is returned to his distraught family well and safe.
Having said that, there are some unanswered questions and suspicions surrounding the whole affair. Whoever is behind this heinous crime seemed to know Shahbaz’s routine, timing and route every day to his office, etc. That gives rise to the suspicion that either the perpetrators had been watching Shahbaz’s movements for some time, or they had insider information. Suspicion is further aroused by the fact that, contrary to Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah’s repeated statement on television that Shahbaz had been provided a security detail but was in the habit of sometimes not taking the detail with him (a patent distortion of the truth), on the day of the occurrence, the security detail failed to turn up. Let us not forget that it was one of Salmaan Taseer’s own official security guards who shot him down in cowardly fashion and in cold blood in broad daylight. The rest of the security detail that day did not even twitch in response. Mumtaz Qadri’s lionisation by the right wing and religious extremists, including sadly sections of the lawyers community, focused minds on how far the influence of such warped ideas runs, including questions about how far the police and security forces are themselves imbued with extremist notions. The Taseer family, including Shahbaz, had been receiving threats since Salmaan Taseer’s assassination. That should have been enough to alert our somnolent security forces to take greater care. Even if, for the sake of argument, the mea culpa put forward by Rana Sanaullah and the high ups of the Punjab police that Shahbaz refused to take the security detail with him is accepted, why, in the light of the obtaining circumstances, were the security people so lax as to ‘surrender’ their clearly defined responsibility and duty? In the light of the above, there must remain questions whether Shahbaz Taseer’s kidnapping is merely a security lapse or a deep conspiracy.
The law and order and security situation in Punjab has given rise to concerns across the board in recent days. Not only is crime increasing, including kidnapping for ransom, a phenomenon to be expected when economic hardship is producing incremental desperation amongst the marginalised, the security situation is far from satisfactory, a result perhaps of the Punjab government’s acknowledged ‘soft’ approach to extremists and terrorists. In Punjab at least, such forces have been emboldened by the ruling PML-N’s kid gloves attitude to them, if not active collusion in some instances. It is a sad comment on the justice system that the Supreme Court’s suo motu notice produced a death sentence for the Rangers involved in the Sarfaraz Shah murder in Karachi within a month, but in Salmaan Taseer’s open and shut case with a self-confessed murderer, seven months have passed but the case is not being dealt with with any despatch. Had Salmaan Taseer’s murderer been administered swift and deserved justice by now, perhaps the right message would have gone out to Mumtaz Qadri’s ilk that such blatant murderous intent and actions would invite the full sanction of the law. Instead, the tardy pace of the proceedings in that case may well have encouraged such elements into believing they can get away with it. That view may be reinforced by the lack of closure in Federal Minister Shahbaz Bhatti’s assassination as well. It is now incumbent on the Punjab government and the provincial and federal law enforcement authorities to ensure the safe and unharmed recovery of Shahbaz Taseer. His family has already suffered grievously. We need to apply balm to their wounds, not sprinkle salt on them.
Friday, August 26, 2011
Monday, July 18, 2011
Daily Times Editorial July 19, 2011
The beginning or the end?
As 600 US troops prepare to leave Afghanistan as the first contingent of withdrawing troops and 3,000 Canadian troops end their combat mission in Kandahar, the province of Bamiyan witnessed one of the first transitions from foreign security forces to the Afghan army and police. Relatively secure and peaceful though it is, Bamiyan’s transition was handled secretively and even local media were not permitted to cover it. President Karzai was not there, nor were any government leaders or officials of note. This ‘discretion’ can only be a reflection of the fears surrounding the Afghan Taliban’s stated intent to target all transition ceremonies. Panjsher, the base of the redoubtable late Ahmed Shah Masoud and his Northern Alliance militia, has already moved considerably in its transition to Afghan control, but this was made easy by the fact that there has hardly been any fighting in that area for years. Bamiyan will be followed by seven districts up for a transition. It may be recalled that Bamiyan hit the headlines in 2001 when the then ruling Taliban blew up the ancient giant Buddha statues. Since the overthrow of the Taliban by the invading US forces, it has remained relatively quiet, but the transition has sparked off fears amongst local officials and people that their district could become the focus of the Taliban’s sabotage campaign against the indigenisation process.
The point to reflect on is if Bamiyan, despite being relatively peaceful, can generate such anxiety around the transition process, what about the restive south, southeast and east of Afghanistan, where the Taliban are still a formidable insurgent enemy? Kandahar has been left headless after the assassination of the president’s brother Ahmad Wali Karzai. The vacuum his death has left behind is difficult to fill, and attempts to do so may engender rivalries and even conflict between aspirants to succeed him. And if anyone is under the illusion that the Taliban strongholds in the south and east are the only dangerous areas, the killing of the president’s ally Jan Mohammad Khan in Kabul the other day betrays the state of insecurity even in the capital and the reach of the Taliban. A former governor of Uruzgan province (Mulla Omar’s home), Jan Mohammad Khan’s death within days of Ahmad Wali Karzai’s assassination may be the beginning of a targeted campaign against the Karzai regime’s Pashtun members. Naturally it would suit the Taliban if they can decapitate the Pashtun element of the Karzai regime, leaving it a non-Pashtun entity. The Taliban could then reassert their claim to represent all Pashtuns.
Reservations about the withdrawal per se as well its pace are not confined to local Afghan officials. Voices are being heard even in the US that the withdrawal may be premature and poorly designed to ensure no vacuum is left behind that could be exploited by the insurgents. If this argument is taken on board, the planned phase-wise withdrawal to culminate in 2014 could very well presage a disaster if the Taliban, emboldened by the prospect of having to fight the weaker Afghan forces and arguably backed by ISI, decide to go for broke as far as capturing power in Afghanistan is concerned, unlike the hope not so long ago that they may agree to a compromise negotiated political settlement of post-withdrawal Afghanistan. This time round though, the Taliban may well be in for a surprise. The Karzai regime, with all its faults and warts, does enjoy the support of a considerable anti-Taliban Pashtun element that will fight shoulder to shoulder with the non-Pashtun groups to the bitter end to prevent a return of Taliban rule. Were the Taliban to push the envelope too far, the benighted country may well see the beginning of another civil war that could easily last 20-30 years, with a devastating spillover into Pakistan, given the Tehreek-i-Taliban’s newfound safe havens across the border on Afghan soil, as confirmed by ISPR the other day. Afghanistan and Pakistan, let alone the region as a whole, is unlikely to see peace unless the policy of gaining control in Kabul through extremist proxies is abandoned. And in the quest for the elusive Holy Grail of ‘strategic depth’, Pakistan itself may suffer incalculable damage. It is still not too late to realign Pakistan’s policies in Afghanistan with the interests of peace in the region by letting the Afghan people decide their own fate, without outside interference, of which there has been all too much for decades.
As 600 US troops prepare to leave Afghanistan as the first contingent of withdrawing troops and 3,000 Canadian troops end their combat mission in Kandahar, the province of Bamiyan witnessed one of the first transitions from foreign security forces to the Afghan army and police. Relatively secure and peaceful though it is, Bamiyan’s transition was handled secretively and even local media were not permitted to cover it. President Karzai was not there, nor were any government leaders or officials of note. This ‘discretion’ can only be a reflection of the fears surrounding the Afghan Taliban’s stated intent to target all transition ceremonies. Panjsher, the base of the redoubtable late Ahmed Shah Masoud and his Northern Alliance militia, has already moved considerably in its transition to Afghan control, but this was made easy by the fact that there has hardly been any fighting in that area for years. Bamiyan will be followed by seven districts up for a transition. It may be recalled that Bamiyan hit the headlines in 2001 when the then ruling Taliban blew up the ancient giant Buddha statues. Since the overthrow of the Taliban by the invading US forces, it has remained relatively quiet, but the transition has sparked off fears amongst local officials and people that their district could become the focus of the Taliban’s sabotage campaign against the indigenisation process.
The point to reflect on is if Bamiyan, despite being relatively peaceful, can generate such anxiety around the transition process, what about the restive south, southeast and east of Afghanistan, where the Taliban are still a formidable insurgent enemy? Kandahar has been left headless after the assassination of the president’s brother Ahmad Wali Karzai. The vacuum his death has left behind is difficult to fill, and attempts to do so may engender rivalries and even conflict between aspirants to succeed him. And if anyone is under the illusion that the Taliban strongholds in the south and east are the only dangerous areas, the killing of the president’s ally Jan Mohammad Khan in Kabul the other day betrays the state of insecurity even in the capital and the reach of the Taliban. A former governor of Uruzgan province (Mulla Omar’s home), Jan Mohammad Khan’s death within days of Ahmad Wali Karzai’s assassination may be the beginning of a targeted campaign against the Karzai regime’s Pashtun members. Naturally it would suit the Taliban if they can decapitate the Pashtun element of the Karzai regime, leaving it a non-Pashtun entity. The Taliban could then reassert their claim to represent all Pashtuns.
Reservations about the withdrawal per se as well its pace are not confined to local Afghan officials. Voices are being heard even in the US that the withdrawal may be premature and poorly designed to ensure no vacuum is left behind that could be exploited by the insurgents. If this argument is taken on board, the planned phase-wise withdrawal to culminate in 2014 could very well presage a disaster if the Taliban, emboldened by the prospect of having to fight the weaker Afghan forces and arguably backed by ISI, decide to go for broke as far as capturing power in Afghanistan is concerned, unlike the hope not so long ago that they may agree to a compromise negotiated political settlement of post-withdrawal Afghanistan. This time round though, the Taliban may well be in for a surprise. The Karzai regime, with all its faults and warts, does enjoy the support of a considerable anti-Taliban Pashtun element that will fight shoulder to shoulder with the non-Pashtun groups to the bitter end to prevent a return of Taliban rule. Were the Taliban to push the envelope too far, the benighted country may well see the beginning of another civil war that could easily last 20-30 years, with a devastating spillover into Pakistan, given the Tehreek-i-Taliban’s newfound safe havens across the border on Afghan soil, as confirmed by ISPR the other day. Afghanistan and Pakistan, let alone the region as a whole, is unlikely to see peace unless the policy of gaining control in Kabul through extremist proxies is abandoned. And in the quest for the elusive Holy Grail of ‘strategic depth’, Pakistan itself may suffer incalculable damage. It is still not too late to realign Pakistan’s policies in Afghanistan with the interests of peace in the region by letting the Afghan people decide their own fate, without outside interference, of which there has been all too much for decades.
Daily Times editorial July 17, 2011
Pasha’s fence-mending visit
After a flying visit to Washington, where he met the acting head of the CIA and other intelligence officials, ISI chief Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha seems to have been successful in mending fences with the US. From the sparse reports emanating from Washington and elsewhere, it is being claimed that the intelligence relationship is back on track, while other contentious issues have been discussed in a good atmosphere and are heading for resolution. It is necessary to remind ourselves of the low relations had hit over the last few months through a series of events causing extreme tensions and ending with the unilateral raid on Abbottabad on May 2 to take out Osama bin Laden without so much as informing the Pakistani authorities.
The agenda for the talks included repairing the ruptured intelligence sharing arrangements between the ISI and CIA, which had nosedived during outgoing CIA chief Leon Panetta’s tenure. Incoming incumbent at the CIA General Petraeus is on the verge of taking over, Panetta having moved to Defence. Also, General Pasha sought assurances of no repetition of the unilateral action of May 2, which proved highly embarrassing to the military top brass and the ISI, prompting a rare appearance by the ISI chief before parliament where he proffered an even more unprecedented apology for the lapses exposed by the May 2 raid and even went so far as to offer to resign. Our parliamentarians, perhaps motivated by a sense of the beleaguered state of Pakistan’s sovereignty and not willing to put the boot in when the military and ISI were down, bailed Pasha and his own and parent organisation out. Nevertheless, public and parliamentary opinion veered towards an assertion of Pakistan’s independence and sovereignty, prompting the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs to assert on Friday that while good relations with the US were important, these could not be at the cost of infringements of the country’s sovereignty, particularly singling out drone strikes in this regard.
General Pasha was also reassured in Washington on another bone of contention that has arisen of late in the Pak-US relationship: the perceived bypassing of Pakistan (read the ISI) in the reported US efforts to talk to the Taliban. Since the ISI had been manoeuvring to remain centre-stage in these delicate negotiations on the eve of the US troops withdrawal, the reported ‘independent’ contacts between Washington and the Taliban caused a great deal of angst in Rawalpindi. General Pasha was administered the palliative of an assurance that the US understood and underlined Pakistan’s interests and concerns in Afghanistan and saw it as very important in the negotiating process with the Taliban. Whether these are just soothing words or genuinely meant will only be revealed over time.
The suspended $ 800 million in military aid was apparently not discussed in Washington since, it is said, it is already on the discussion table in Islamabad. However, an explanatory note sought to put the issue in perspective by pointing out that $ 500 million of the withheld aid was for the US trainers who have been withdrawn on Pakistan’s behest. The balance $ 300 million is Coalition Support Fund reimbursements that are touted to be released ‘soon’. Again, the proof of the pudding…
The issue of visas for American personnel was also reportedly dealt with, but no details are so far available of just how this problem was sorted out.
The visit may or may not have sorted out all the contentious issues bedevilling relations between the US and Pakistan, but on the face of it, the two intelligence services have managed to smooth each other’s ruffled feathers and promised ‘good behaviour’ with each other and all round. Even this much forward movement is a reflection, despite recent tensions in the relationship, of the huge stakes for both sides in the run up to endgame in Afghanistan. What the visit also highlights is the advantage of quiet conversations away from the glare of publicity and in which the two sides have talked to, rather than at, each other. How far this obvious exercise in pulling back from the brink of a complete breakdown and mending fences has removed the cankers in the relationship and how smooth the running will be from now on are all matters to be revealed in the fullness of time. However, the question, in the midst of the convergence in Washington, remains what the two allies intend or can do about the divergences on Afghanistan and the war against terrorism.
After a flying visit to Washington, where he met the acting head of the CIA and other intelligence officials, ISI chief Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha seems to have been successful in mending fences with the US. From the sparse reports emanating from Washington and elsewhere, it is being claimed that the intelligence relationship is back on track, while other contentious issues have been discussed in a good atmosphere and are heading for resolution. It is necessary to remind ourselves of the low relations had hit over the last few months through a series of events causing extreme tensions and ending with the unilateral raid on Abbottabad on May 2 to take out Osama bin Laden without so much as informing the Pakistani authorities.
The agenda for the talks included repairing the ruptured intelligence sharing arrangements between the ISI and CIA, which had nosedived during outgoing CIA chief Leon Panetta’s tenure. Incoming incumbent at the CIA General Petraeus is on the verge of taking over, Panetta having moved to Defence. Also, General Pasha sought assurances of no repetition of the unilateral action of May 2, which proved highly embarrassing to the military top brass and the ISI, prompting a rare appearance by the ISI chief before parliament where he proffered an even more unprecedented apology for the lapses exposed by the May 2 raid and even went so far as to offer to resign. Our parliamentarians, perhaps motivated by a sense of the beleaguered state of Pakistan’s sovereignty and not willing to put the boot in when the military and ISI were down, bailed Pasha and his own and parent organisation out. Nevertheless, public and parliamentary opinion veered towards an assertion of Pakistan’s independence and sovereignty, prompting the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs to assert on Friday that while good relations with the US were important, these could not be at the cost of infringements of the country’s sovereignty, particularly singling out drone strikes in this regard.
General Pasha was also reassured in Washington on another bone of contention that has arisen of late in the Pak-US relationship: the perceived bypassing of Pakistan (read the ISI) in the reported US efforts to talk to the Taliban. Since the ISI had been manoeuvring to remain centre-stage in these delicate negotiations on the eve of the US troops withdrawal, the reported ‘independent’ contacts between Washington and the Taliban caused a great deal of angst in Rawalpindi. General Pasha was administered the palliative of an assurance that the US understood and underlined Pakistan’s interests and concerns in Afghanistan and saw it as very important in the negotiating process with the Taliban. Whether these are just soothing words or genuinely meant will only be revealed over time.
The suspended $ 800 million in military aid was apparently not discussed in Washington since, it is said, it is already on the discussion table in Islamabad. However, an explanatory note sought to put the issue in perspective by pointing out that $ 500 million of the withheld aid was for the US trainers who have been withdrawn on Pakistan’s behest. The balance $ 300 million is Coalition Support Fund reimbursements that are touted to be released ‘soon’. Again, the proof of the pudding…
The issue of visas for American personnel was also reportedly dealt with, but no details are so far available of just how this problem was sorted out.
The visit may or may not have sorted out all the contentious issues bedevilling relations between the US and Pakistan, but on the face of it, the two intelligence services have managed to smooth each other’s ruffled feathers and promised ‘good behaviour’ with each other and all round. Even this much forward movement is a reflection, despite recent tensions in the relationship, of the huge stakes for both sides in the run up to endgame in Afghanistan. What the visit also highlights is the advantage of quiet conversations away from the glare of publicity and in which the two sides have talked to, rather than at, each other. How far this obvious exercise in pulling back from the brink of a complete breakdown and mending fences has removed the cankers in the relationship and how smooth the running will be from now on are all matters to be revealed in the fullness of time. However, the question, in the midst of the convergence in Washington, remains what the two allies intend or can do about the divergences on Afghanistan and the war against terrorism.
Friday, July 8, 2011
Daily Times Editorial July 10, 2011
Karachi’s mini-civil war
For the fourth day running, Karachi remained in the grip of large scale ethnic bloodletting on Thursday. Although at the time of writing these lines the city by and large appeared deserted since markets did not open and transport was off the roads on MQM’s declared day of mourning on Friday, in the troubled areas coinciding with the well known ethnic fault lines that run through the metropolis, the sound of gunfire was almost a constant. The toll of this virtual mini-civil war is rising, with widespread dissatisfaction being voiced by Karachi’s affected citizens that the government and law enforcement agencies are conspicuous by their absence. The gunmen have abandoned individual targeted killings that had been the bane of the city even before the parting of the ways of the MQM and the PPP-led coalition and instead taken to ‘positional’ warfare and indiscriminate killings of innocent citizens on buses and even within their houses. In the absence of any meaningful response by the law enforcement agencies to halt this unfettered massacre, Karachi too is witnessing its own version of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the shape of desperate citizens being forced to abandon their homes and flee to safer areas with the minimum wherewithal to survive. For all intents and purposes, in the areas of intense fighting by means of their menacing presence, and in the rest of the city because of spreading fear, the gunmen rule the roost. It would come as no surprise if within their ranks could be counted land and drug mafias trying to take advantage of the unrest.
MQM’s day of mourning on Friday remained just that, mourning for the city of lights and the dire straits to which it has been condemned. Mercifully, the MQM postponed its planned march, which could have invited more trouble. Nevertheless, as we have said before in this space, the MQM, since leaving the government, has resorted to its time-tested usual terrorist-political tactics. It is difficult to believe that its hand is not detectable in the worst violence to wrack the city for years. That does not mean that there are not other actors who are equally to blame for the descent into open warfare along ethnic lines. The Urdu-speaking and Pashtun people of Karachi are the worst affected communities. The apprehension now is that the concentration of the violence in north-western Karachi may spill over into the rest of the city with a vengeance.
The government claims 235 perpetrators of violence arrested in the last four days. This is the result of a conscious decision not to launch a generalised operation a la the military offensive in 1992, which failed to leave any indelible mark on the circumstances of the city, but instead to gather intelligence and information and then conduct targeted operations against the miscreants. According to Federal Law Minister Maula Bux Chandio, an army action in Karachi would mean the collective failure of the political forces to manage the affairs of the country satisfactorily. He could also have added that it could pose a threat to the continuation of civilian rule once again. While Interior Minister Rehman Malik has once more dashed to Karachi to help out, promising the induction of 1,000 personnel of the Frontier Constabulary to bolster the police and Rangers in the city, the Sindh government has issued shoot on sight orders to quell the violence.
Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani has appealed for calm and peace in Karachi, but his voice sounds more like a plaint than that of an authoritative chief executive, punctuated as the appeal is by the crackle of almost constant gunfire in the streets and alleyways of many areas of the city. In essence, the PPP’s strategy after the 2008 elections to “keep your friends close, and your enemies even closer” seems to have now run its course. It is MQM’s well known and demonstrated track record that it always resorts to the gun when it wants to dictate its own terms to rivals or the power structure. If it is unable to win the day through its habitual tactics of intimidation and at the same time anointing itself as the victim, Karachi is in for bad times, and with it, the country as a whole.
For the fourth day running, Karachi remained in the grip of large scale ethnic bloodletting on Thursday. Although at the time of writing these lines the city by and large appeared deserted since markets did not open and transport was off the roads on MQM’s declared day of mourning on Friday, in the troubled areas coinciding with the well known ethnic fault lines that run through the metropolis, the sound of gunfire was almost a constant. The toll of this virtual mini-civil war is rising, with widespread dissatisfaction being voiced by Karachi’s affected citizens that the government and law enforcement agencies are conspicuous by their absence. The gunmen have abandoned individual targeted killings that had been the bane of the city even before the parting of the ways of the MQM and the PPP-led coalition and instead taken to ‘positional’ warfare and indiscriminate killings of innocent citizens on buses and even within their houses. In the absence of any meaningful response by the law enforcement agencies to halt this unfettered massacre, Karachi too is witnessing its own version of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the shape of desperate citizens being forced to abandon their homes and flee to safer areas with the minimum wherewithal to survive. For all intents and purposes, in the areas of intense fighting by means of their menacing presence, and in the rest of the city because of spreading fear, the gunmen rule the roost. It would come as no surprise if within their ranks could be counted land and drug mafias trying to take advantage of the unrest.
MQM’s day of mourning on Friday remained just that, mourning for the city of lights and the dire straits to which it has been condemned. Mercifully, the MQM postponed its planned march, which could have invited more trouble. Nevertheless, as we have said before in this space, the MQM, since leaving the government, has resorted to its time-tested usual terrorist-political tactics. It is difficult to believe that its hand is not detectable in the worst violence to wrack the city for years. That does not mean that there are not other actors who are equally to blame for the descent into open warfare along ethnic lines. The Urdu-speaking and Pashtun people of Karachi are the worst affected communities. The apprehension now is that the concentration of the violence in north-western Karachi may spill over into the rest of the city with a vengeance.
The government claims 235 perpetrators of violence arrested in the last four days. This is the result of a conscious decision not to launch a generalised operation a la the military offensive in 1992, which failed to leave any indelible mark on the circumstances of the city, but instead to gather intelligence and information and then conduct targeted operations against the miscreants. According to Federal Law Minister Maula Bux Chandio, an army action in Karachi would mean the collective failure of the political forces to manage the affairs of the country satisfactorily. He could also have added that it could pose a threat to the continuation of civilian rule once again. While Interior Minister Rehman Malik has once more dashed to Karachi to help out, promising the induction of 1,000 personnel of the Frontier Constabulary to bolster the police and Rangers in the city, the Sindh government has issued shoot on sight orders to quell the violence.
Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani has appealed for calm and peace in Karachi, but his voice sounds more like a plaint than that of an authoritative chief executive, punctuated as the appeal is by the crackle of almost constant gunfire in the streets and alleyways of many areas of the city. In essence, the PPP’s strategy after the 2008 elections to “keep your friends close, and your enemies even closer” seems to have now run its course. It is MQM’s well known and demonstrated track record that it always resorts to the gun when it wants to dictate its own terms to rivals or the power structure. If it is unable to win the day through its habitual tactics of intimidation and at the same time anointing itself as the victim, Karachi is in for bad times, and with it, the country as a whole.
Sunday, July 3, 2011
Daily Times Editorial July 4, 2011
‘Grand’ opposition alliance
PML-N chief Nawaz Sharif has come out swinging against the government, advocating the formation of a grand opposition alliance to unseat the incumbents. And what is it that has persuaded the leader of the hitherto ‘friendly’ opposition to part ways irredeemably with the ruling PPP? Basically, Nawaz Sharif feels betrayed by the PPP leadership, in particular President Asif Ali Zardari, for a series of failures: not living up to its promises to him over the last three years of incumbency, no hope or relief to offer the suffering people of the country, no solution to the sufferings of Balochistan and, last but not least, and arguably the straw that broke the camel’s back, the alleged rigging in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) recent elections.
Talking to journalists in Lahore, Nawaz Sharif recalled how he had signed the Charter of Democracy with the PPP, only to be disappointed at every step. After repeatedly experiencing the PPP’s broken promises, playing of tricks and failure to resolve any problems, the conclusion had become inescapable that there was now a need to forge a grand opposition alliance to get rid of the PPP-led government. This time round, Nawaz asserted, he would no longer be taken in by the oft-repeated PPP mantra of a policy of ‘reconciliation’.
The government’s ill-conceived policies, Nawaz argued, were responsible for widespread poverty and unemployment, with some 70 percent of the people below the poverty line. He criticised the government for violating the spirit of the 18th Amendment by transferring the responsibilities of the devolved ministries to the provinces but holding on to their resources. He said it was a priority of the PML-N to provide relief and succour to Balochistan, whose people were being subjected to extreme repression, including extra-judicial killings and the government’s failure to provide justice for the murder of Nawab Akbar Bugti and hundreds of ‘missing’ Baloch nationalists.
On the AJK elections, Nawaz asserted that brigades of rigging had been unleashed and government funds for people’s relief or flood rehabilitation had been diverted to winning the election by the PPP through fraud and manipulation. It may be recalled that the AJK elections have got bogged down in controversy, with the MQM parting ways with the ruling coalition over the issue and Sardar Attique’s defeated Muslim Conference (MC) demanding a fresh election under the supervision of the army. Although it is part of our political history that every election is inevitably followed by charges of rigging by the defeated parties, this time, whatever the weight of the accusations, it has produced a mini-crisis for the ruling coalition by losing the MQM, raising fears of a repeat of the MQM making trouble in the cities of Sindh while in the opposition. One manifestation of the ‘reconciliation’ mantra is the rumoured offer of the AJK presidency to Sardar Attique to keep him sweet and away from the emerging opposition alliance, while another is the efforts by President Zardari to woo the MQM chief Altaf Hussain on his current visit to London. While the first gambit’s fate is so far unknown, the second appears not to be succeeding in the face of what appears to be an irrevocable parting of the ways by the MQM finally.
The cast of usual suspects for any opposition alliance seem therefore to include the PML-N, MQM, Jamaat-i-Islami, JUI-F (still in negotiation) and the splinter groups from mainstream parties such as the PML-Q’s breakaway Likeminded caucus. Of course there is still many a slip between the cup and the lip and it remains to be seen how far Nawaz Sharif’s desire to have a ‘grand’ opposition alliance with the rest of the parties estranged from or in fundamental conflict with the PPP can be realised. It must be remembered that the tendency of the PML-N since the 2008 elections to ‘go it alone’ and spare none of the now being wooed parties from strident criticism makes the task now harder. However, in politics generally, and in Pakistani politics in particular, there are no permanent friends or enemies; it all boils down to interests. If the opposition alliance becomes a reality, whatever its final composition, it can potentially give the government a tough time inside and outside parliament and make life difficult for it in the run up to the Senate elections next year and the general elections whenever they are held, but no later than 2013. Clearly, in the middle of grave challenges facing the country such as terrorism and the tanking economy, the political cleavage opening up promises a rough time ahead for all and sundry.
PML-N chief Nawaz Sharif has come out swinging against the government, advocating the formation of a grand opposition alliance to unseat the incumbents. And what is it that has persuaded the leader of the hitherto ‘friendly’ opposition to part ways irredeemably with the ruling PPP? Basically, Nawaz Sharif feels betrayed by the PPP leadership, in particular President Asif Ali Zardari, for a series of failures: not living up to its promises to him over the last three years of incumbency, no hope or relief to offer the suffering people of the country, no solution to the sufferings of Balochistan and, last but not least, and arguably the straw that broke the camel’s back, the alleged rigging in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) recent elections.
Talking to journalists in Lahore, Nawaz Sharif recalled how he had signed the Charter of Democracy with the PPP, only to be disappointed at every step. After repeatedly experiencing the PPP’s broken promises, playing of tricks and failure to resolve any problems, the conclusion had become inescapable that there was now a need to forge a grand opposition alliance to get rid of the PPP-led government. This time round, Nawaz asserted, he would no longer be taken in by the oft-repeated PPP mantra of a policy of ‘reconciliation’.
The government’s ill-conceived policies, Nawaz argued, were responsible for widespread poverty and unemployment, with some 70 percent of the people below the poverty line. He criticised the government for violating the spirit of the 18th Amendment by transferring the responsibilities of the devolved ministries to the provinces but holding on to their resources. He said it was a priority of the PML-N to provide relief and succour to Balochistan, whose people were being subjected to extreme repression, including extra-judicial killings and the government’s failure to provide justice for the murder of Nawab Akbar Bugti and hundreds of ‘missing’ Baloch nationalists.
On the AJK elections, Nawaz asserted that brigades of rigging had been unleashed and government funds for people’s relief or flood rehabilitation had been diverted to winning the election by the PPP through fraud and manipulation. It may be recalled that the AJK elections have got bogged down in controversy, with the MQM parting ways with the ruling coalition over the issue and Sardar Attique’s defeated Muslim Conference (MC) demanding a fresh election under the supervision of the army. Although it is part of our political history that every election is inevitably followed by charges of rigging by the defeated parties, this time, whatever the weight of the accusations, it has produced a mini-crisis for the ruling coalition by losing the MQM, raising fears of a repeat of the MQM making trouble in the cities of Sindh while in the opposition. One manifestation of the ‘reconciliation’ mantra is the rumoured offer of the AJK presidency to Sardar Attique to keep him sweet and away from the emerging opposition alliance, while another is the efforts by President Zardari to woo the MQM chief Altaf Hussain on his current visit to London. While the first gambit’s fate is so far unknown, the second appears not to be succeeding in the face of what appears to be an irrevocable parting of the ways by the MQM finally.
The cast of usual suspects for any opposition alliance seem therefore to include the PML-N, MQM, Jamaat-i-Islami, JUI-F (still in negotiation) and the splinter groups from mainstream parties such as the PML-Q’s breakaway Likeminded caucus. Of course there is still many a slip between the cup and the lip and it remains to be seen how far Nawaz Sharif’s desire to have a ‘grand’ opposition alliance with the rest of the parties estranged from or in fundamental conflict with the PPP can be realised. It must be remembered that the tendency of the PML-N since the 2008 elections to ‘go it alone’ and spare none of the now being wooed parties from strident criticism makes the task now harder. However, in politics generally, and in Pakistani politics in particular, there are no permanent friends or enemies; it all boils down to interests. If the opposition alliance becomes a reality, whatever its final composition, it can potentially give the government a tough time inside and outside parliament and make life difficult for it in the run up to the Senate elections next year and the general elections whenever they are held, but no later than 2013. Clearly, in the middle of grave challenges facing the country such as terrorism and the tanking economy, the political cleavage opening up promises a rough time ahead for all and sundry.
Saturday, June 18, 2011
Daily Times Editorial June 19, 2011
End of the love affair?
Perusing the statements of high officials and legislators in the US and Pakistan simultaneously, there is the inescapable feeling of a love affair gone sour. Not so long ago, US officials were carrying out a self-critique of past attitudes towards Pakistan, vowing to move forward from a purely transactional to a strategic relationship promising long term mutual benefits. How quickly things have changed. Starting with the ‘contributions’ of Raymond Davis and perambulating through the fiasco of the May 2 unilateral US raid that killed Osama bin Laden, taking in along the way the embarrassment and humiliation meted out to the military and intelligence services of Pakistan and their ‘infallible’ image in the Mehran base attack and the accusations regarding picking up CIA facilitators in the Osama raid and tipping off terrorist bomb makers, it is easy to conclude that there has been an irretrievable breakdown in trust and confidence between the two sides, always a somewhat precarious and threatened species.
While there are increasingly loud calls in the US Congress to cut off or curtail aid to Pakistan (the House of Representatives has just adopted a bill to withhold 75 percent of the $1.1 billion in the pipeline for Pakistan), reinforced by the American media and public opinion, the Obama administration and the Pentagon are still bending their backs to persuade the sceptics that the relationship, albeit difficult, is essential for the interests of both sides. Admiral Mullen is of the view that the Pakistani military (smarting from the recently inflicted wounds and humiliation) needs time and space to go through a period of “introspection”. Outgoing defence secretary Robert Gates too underlines the importance of the relationship with Pakistan, not only in the context of Pakistan’s crucial help during the withdrawal from Afghanistan, but also in terms of regional stability and Central Asia. What exactly does that mean?
In terms of the ‘region’, we can surmise that Mr Gates is talking about the Gulf and peripheral regions. In the 1960s and 70s, Iran’s Shah had been anointed the ‘policeman of the Gulf’ on behalf of US and western interests. When his US-built-up army crumbled along with his regime in the 1979 revolution, the only other candidate available to fill the ensuing void was Pakistan with its half a million-man professional and battle-hardened army. If Saudi Arabia in years past needed this army’s help against its own home-grown religious jihadi extremists, many smaller states of the Gulf could make do with recruiting retied armed forces personnel from Pakistan for their security forces (Oman and recently Bahrain come to mind). A friendly and cooperative Pakistani army is therefore crucial to Washington’s aims to keep the Gulf from tipping over into chaos, thereby threatening the smooth flow of oil from what is still one of the world’s premier oil supplying regions.
As far as Central Asia is concerned, it is the rising star of the 21st century’s energy supply scenario. Its vast and relatively untapped reserves of oil and gas could lubricate what will continue to be a fossil fuel based technology economy for the foreseeable future. Here, a contradictory picture emerges. Russia’s traditional hold in the region was weakened after the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991. After a period of turmoil and hardship in the transition from communism to capitalism, Russia is regaining its economic and military muscle and combining with China and other Central Asian countries in the SCO to ensure two things. One, to stop any further spillover of terrorism from the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre, and two, to pose an alternative to NATO as the security organisation for the Eurasian landmass. To this end, SCO is extending its membership incrementally to include observer countries such as Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka and even contemplating opening its doors to Ukraine and Belarus. Although SCO denies any ambition to evolve into a military alliance a la NATO, its increasing emphasis on economic and security cooperation amongst its members, present and future, could mean the weakening if not elimination in the future of any thoughts of Pax Americana dominating this vast region stretching from countries west of Russia to the Indian Ocean.
Although SCO hopes the expected entry of Pakistan and India will also facilitate their mutual amity, the question of what will remain of the much touted strategic relationship between the US and Pakistan seems moot.
Many in Pakistan would say good riddance. If there are alternative friends like China and the SCO available, why linger in the American or even western basket alone? Every state has the right to exercise options in its own best interests. The fly in the ointment though could be the souring relationship between the erstwhile ‘lovers’ provoking a breakdown in the negotiated political settlement in post-withdrawal Afghanistan, leading possibly to another 20-30 year civil war in that benighted country, with its inevitable fallout for neighbouring countries, the region, and the world at large.
Perusing the statements of high officials and legislators in the US and Pakistan simultaneously, there is the inescapable feeling of a love affair gone sour. Not so long ago, US officials were carrying out a self-critique of past attitudes towards Pakistan, vowing to move forward from a purely transactional to a strategic relationship promising long term mutual benefits. How quickly things have changed. Starting with the ‘contributions’ of Raymond Davis and perambulating through the fiasco of the May 2 unilateral US raid that killed Osama bin Laden, taking in along the way the embarrassment and humiliation meted out to the military and intelligence services of Pakistan and their ‘infallible’ image in the Mehran base attack and the accusations regarding picking up CIA facilitators in the Osama raid and tipping off terrorist bomb makers, it is easy to conclude that there has been an irretrievable breakdown in trust and confidence between the two sides, always a somewhat precarious and threatened species.
While there are increasingly loud calls in the US Congress to cut off or curtail aid to Pakistan (the House of Representatives has just adopted a bill to withhold 75 percent of the $1.1 billion in the pipeline for Pakistan), reinforced by the American media and public opinion, the Obama administration and the Pentagon are still bending their backs to persuade the sceptics that the relationship, albeit difficult, is essential for the interests of both sides. Admiral Mullen is of the view that the Pakistani military (smarting from the recently inflicted wounds and humiliation) needs time and space to go through a period of “introspection”. Outgoing defence secretary Robert Gates too underlines the importance of the relationship with Pakistan, not only in the context of Pakistan’s crucial help during the withdrawal from Afghanistan, but also in terms of regional stability and Central Asia. What exactly does that mean?
In terms of the ‘region’, we can surmise that Mr Gates is talking about the Gulf and peripheral regions. In the 1960s and 70s, Iran’s Shah had been anointed the ‘policeman of the Gulf’ on behalf of US and western interests. When his US-built-up army crumbled along with his regime in the 1979 revolution, the only other candidate available to fill the ensuing void was Pakistan with its half a million-man professional and battle-hardened army. If Saudi Arabia in years past needed this army’s help against its own home-grown religious jihadi extremists, many smaller states of the Gulf could make do with recruiting retied armed forces personnel from Pakistan for their security forces (Oman and recently Bahrain come to mind). A friendly and cooperative Pakistani army is therefore crucial to Washington’s aims to keep the Gulf from tipping over into chaos, thereby threatening the smooth flow of oil from what is still one of the world’s premier oil supplying regions.
As far as Central Asia is concerned, it is the rising star of the 21st century’s energy supply scenario. Its vast and relatively untapped reserves of oil and gas could lubricate what will continue to be a fossil fuel based technology economy for the foreseeable future. Here, a contradictory picture emerges. Russia’s traditional hold in the region was weakened after the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991. After a period of turmoil and hardship in the transition from communism to capitalism, Russia is regaining its economic and military muscle and combining with China and other Central Asian countries in the SCO to ensure two things. One, to stop any further spillover of terrorism from the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre, and two, to pose an alternative to NATO as the security organisation for the Eurasian landmass. To this end, SCO is extending its membership incrementally to include observer countries such as Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka and even contemplating opening its doors to Ukraine and Belarus. Although SCO denies any ambition to evolve into a military alliance a la NATO, its increasing emphasis on economic and security cooperation amongst its members, present and future, could mean the weakening if not elimination in the future of any thoughts of Pax Americana dominating this vast region stretching from countries west of Russia to the Indian Ocean.
Although SCO hopes the expected entry of Pakistan and India will also facilitate their mutual amity, the question of what will remain of the much touted strategic relationship between the US and Pakistan seems moot.
Many in Pakistan would say good riddance. If there are alternative friends like China and the SCO available, why linger in the American or even western basket alone? Every state has the right to exercise options in its own best interests. The fly in the ointment though could be the souring relationship between the erstwhile ‘lovers’ provoking a breakdown in the negotiated political settlement in post-withdrawal Afghanistan, leading possibly to another 20-30 year civil war in that benighted country, with its inevitable fallout for neighbouring countries, the region, and the world at large.
Daily Times Editorial June 17, 2011
Post-raid pique?
The New York Times (NYT) has published a story that says our ISI has arrested five alleged informers of the CIA who facilitated the raid in Abbottabad that killed Osama bin Laden. Amongst them says the NYT, was an army major who is accused of recording the licence plates of cars visiting the al Qaeda leader’s compound. The army, however, categorically denies any major was amongst those arrested. They say some 30-40 people were arrested in connection with the raid, some of whom have since been released and the others are still under interrogation. A senior security official ducked the question whether those arrested were CIA informers, diplomatically using the umbrella of an ongoing investigation that did not allow any answer at this point.
Outgoing CIA director Leon Panetta is said to have raised the arrests with military and intelligence officials on his recent visit to Pakistan, the NYT reported. Ambassador Hussain Haqqani put his finger on the renegotiated terms of engagement between the CIA and the ISI that are a work in progress. The Obama administration tried to put the best face on what appear to be tough negotiations after the Abbottabad raid by calling relations with Pakistan “complicated” but extremely important. Outgoing defence secretary Robert Gates dismissed the arrests as a “harsh reality”, reflecting the truth of our world that “most governments lie to each other”, sometimes arrest people and sometimes spy on each other. State Department spokesman Mark Toner also adopted a soft tone by pointing to the intense engagement with Pakistan since the May 2 raid, adding, “We have strong relations with our Pakistani counterparts, we work through issues when they arise.”
Diplomatic and strategic considerations may be imposing restraint on the statements both sides make about each other, but it is an inescapable fact that the terms of military and intelligence engagement between Pakistan and the US have yet to get to the stage of pressing the reset button. The military, and ISI in particular, have been stung by the embarrassment and humiliation of the May 2 debacle. In their pique, they may have decided to go after the CIA informers/facilitators of the raid. The new and aggressive tone our military establishment has adopted since that fiasco so close to the Kakul Military Academy reflects an aggressive stand against US unilateralism and the unauthorised expansion of the CIA’s footprint in Pakistan. At the same time, it must be conceded that the military and ISI opted for the lesser charge of incompetence to save further embarrassment surrounding the more serious allegation of complicity in harbouring bin Laden. The raid not only angered the military establishment because of the blatant lack of trust it reflected, but also because of the strategic vulnerability it exposed.
The military has taken some retaliatory steps in the aftermath of the embarrassment. It has pared, if not totally sent back, the American trainers working with the Frontier Corps on anti-terrorism techniques. On the question of distrust, another recent event has only deepened suspicions about the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment. Apparently the CIA tipped off Pakistan about the existence of two bomb-making factories in FATA. Within 24 hours of the tip-off, the militants were detected by US surveillance satellites fleeing the sites. Panetta raised this too on his recent visit, but it is not known what, if any, purchase he got.
By striking a fiercely nationalist pose, the military and intelligence establishment may be trying to reverse the pressure of adverse opinion about their readiness and competence that has overtaken public perception of late, reflected in the barrage of criticism unleashed against these institutions in the media. That barrage of criticism invited the attention of the recent Corps Commanders conference, whose subsequent statement issued what could only be read between the lines as a blunt warning to the critics to cease and desist. Even were the critics to comply, that would not change the reality that the divergence in the goals of the US and Pakistan in Afghanistan and elsewhere is now fully on display, with uncertainty clouding the future of this often fraught relationship.
The New York Times (NYT) has published a story that says our ISI has arrested five alleged informers of the CIA who facilitated the raid in Abbottabad that killed Osama bin Laden. Amongst them says the NYT, was an army major who is accused of recording the licence plates of cars visiting the al Qaeda leader’s compound. The army, however, categorically denies any major was amongst those arrested. They say some 30-40 people were arrested in connection with the raid, some of whom have since been released and the others are still under interrogation. A senior security official ducked the question whether those arrested were CIA informers, diplomatically using the umbrella of an ongoing investigation that did not allow any answer at this point.
Outgoing CIA director Leon Panetta is said to have raised the arrests with military and intelligence officials on his recent visit to Pakistan, the NYT reported. Ambassador Hussain Haqqani put his finger on the renegotiated terms of engagement between the CIA and the ISI that are a work in progress. The Obama administration tried to put the best face on what appear to be tough negotiations after the Abbottabad raid by calling relations with Pakistan “complicated” but extremely important. Outgoing defence secretary Robert Gates dismissed the arrests as a “harsh reality”, reflecting the truth of our world that “most governments lie to each other”, sometimes arrest people and sometimes spy on each other. State Department spokesman Mark Toner also adopted a soft tone by pointing to the intense engagement with Pakistan since the May 2 raid, adding, “We have strong relations with our Pakistani counterparts, we work through issues when they arise.”
Diplomatic and strategic considerations may be imposing restraint on the statements both sides make about each other, but it is an inescapable fact that the terms of military and intelligence engagement between Pakistan and the US have yet to get to the stage of pressing the reset button. The military, and ISI in particular, have been stung by the embarrassment and humiliation of the May 2 debacle. In their pique, they may have decided to go after the CIA informers/facilitators of the raid. The new and aggressive tone our military establishment has adopted since that fiasco so close to the Kakul Military Academy reflects an aggressive stand against US unilateralism and the unauthorised expansion of the CIA’s footprint in Pakistan. At the same time, it must be conceded that the military and ISI opted for the lesser charge of incompetence to save further embarrassment surrounding the more serious allegation of complicity in harbouring bin Laden. The raid not only angered the military establishment because of the blatant lack of trust it reflected, but also because of the strategic vulnerability it exposed.
The military has taken some retaliatory steps in the aftermath of the embarrassment. It has pared, if not totally sent back, the American trainers working with the Frontier Corps on anti-terrorism techniques. On the question of distrust, another recent event has only deepened suspicions about the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment. Apparently the CIA tipped off Pakistan about the existence of two bomb-making factories in FATA. Within 24 hours of the tip-off, the militants were detected by US surveillance satellites fleeing the sites. Panetta raised this too on his recent visit, but it is not known what, if any, purchase he got.
By striking a fiercely nationalist pose, the military and intelligence establishment may be trying to reverse the pressure of adverse opinion about their readiness and competence that has overtaken public perception of late, reflected in the barrage of criticism unleashed against these institutions in the media. That barrage of criticism invited the attention of the recent Corps Commanders conference, whose subsequent statement issued what could only be read between the lines as a blunt warning to the critics to cease and desist. Even were the critics to comply, that would not change the reality that the divergence in the goals of the US and Pakistan in Afghanistan and elsewhere is now fully on display, with uncertainty clouding the future of this often fraught relationship.
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