Link to "Rashed Rahman: Fragments of a life of struggle – Ep-06" the sixth of a series of 13 episodes on YouTube of my interviews by my son Dr Taimur Rahman on my life and political struggles: https://youtube.com/watch?v=38deEojzZdw
Rashed Rahman
Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)
Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) (on Facebook)
My column as written.
Security insecure
Rashed Rahman
Even a casual glance at the instances of attacks on the security forces in the country would indicate that a significant uptick in such incidents has occurred of late. Take for example the five soldiers killed and four wounded in a terrorist attack from across the Afghan border on the Angoor Tangi check post in Kurram tribal district on the night of February 6-7, 2022. From 8:00 pm onwards, there was a three-hour battle. That indicates the attackers came in strength, although even this did not allow them to succeed in repeated attempts to damage or uproot the border fence. The Pakistani authorities have once again called on the Afghan Taliban government in Kabul to ensure Afghan soil is not used for such attacks. But the Afghan Taliban government bald facedly continues to deny the firing came from their side.
What this indicates is that the Afghan Taliban’s assurances regarding the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) that has enjoyed safe havens on Afghan soil with the help of their Afghan Taliban brothers mean nothing. When Pakistan earlier pressed the Afghan Taliban government to take action against the TTP, they facilitated instead a ceasefire and negotiations. These came to naught since the core demand of the TTP for a sharia-based system (according to their interpretation) meant undoing the Constitution and the democratic (however flawed) political system that emanates from it. Since this extreme demand was completely unacceptable, the talks broke down and TTP attacks resurfaced.
One cannot ignore the fact that there has been a sharp increase in attacks by the TTP, both cross-border and in-country, since the Afghan Taliban takeover last year. The Afghan Taliban, despite having enjoyed Pakistani ‘hospitality’ and support during the 10-year war against the occupying US forces, have refused to unequivocally recognize the Durand Line as the international border. Instances of attempts by the Afghan Taliban to demolish the border fence were downplayed by the Pakistani authorities until recently as localised incidents. Now, after the latest TTP attacks, the Pakistani authorities are reportedly becoming impatient with their erstwhile Afghan Taliban proxies regarding their inability to halt such attacks and their denials of their origin from Afghan soil.
Down south, the Balochistan nationalist insurgency front has also heated up. On January 28, 2022, the insurgents attacked a Frontier Corps (FC) post in Kech and killed 10 troops. On February 2, 2022, two simultaneous attacks on FC camps were carried out in Panjgur and Nushki. Reports in our media of the casualties seem to rely wholly on ISPR handouts, rather than any independent reporting (which in any case is ‘forbidden’ in Balochistan). These handouts speak of some 20 insurgents killed, with not more than 13 soldiers dead and half a dozen wounded. However, these statistics fly in the face of the fact that the Majeed Brigade of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) attacked in strength (approximately 50 strong), managed to break into the Nushki camp and hold security personnel and their families hostage. This standoff lasted five days and nights. The BLA has claimed 170 soldiers killed, other sources say 100 dead. Even allowing for the usual exaggeration, any discounted number would still be alarming, indicating perhaps a new stage of the nationalist insurgency.
Since 9/11, all over the world and in Pakistan, all non-state movements of insurgency have been lumped into the terrorist basket (including, ironically, the Kashmir struggle). While this may be a convenient one-size-fits-all description, it runs the risk of losing the thread of nuance and difference in disparate situations, which then inevitably gravitates towards the same approach: repression. The distinction between religious fanatical terrorist movements and politically motivated nationalist and similar insurgencies is lost in the process. And with it a differentiated, more nuanced approach.
Interestingly, despite the recent TTP attacks after the ceasefire and talks broke down, Federal Interior Minister Sheikh Rashid insists that the door to negotiations with the TTP cannot be closed. With due respect, would it be out of place then to ask the worthy minister whether the door to negotiations with the Baloch nationalist insurgency cannot be opened? Between the extremes of separation and the state’s heavy-handed repression (including the epidemic of enforced disappearances) lies considerable middle ground on which talks could conceivably be based. The fifth Baloch nationalist insurgency since Independence has veered more and more towards separation because successive governments since its outbreak in 2002 have opted for the knout rather than the negotiating table. Unlike the TTP and others of their ilk, the Baloch nationalist insurgents are not religious fanatics who cannot be reasoned with.
The policy of repression alone has stoked the fires of the nationalist insurgency that began in embryonic form in 2002 after a new generation finally tired of the demonstrated futility of pursuing their long standing grievances and demand for rights within the system during the 25 years between the end of the fourth nationalist insurgency in 1977 and the start of the fifth in 2002. Along the way, the brutal killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2006 further widened the insurgency to include, for the first time, a section of the Bugti tribe. The growth of the middle class in Balochistan yielded nationalists such as Allah Nazar, a doctor tortured in custody, who became a guerrilla leader after release. Today, the appeal of the guerrillas is spreading through the length and breadth of Balochistan.
The almost clichéd, knee-jerk response of the security establishment to pin the (entire?) blame on the ubiquitous ‘foreign hand’, does little else except further muddy the waters and thinking. Even if such involvement exists, dousing the fire in one’s own home seems the wisest course to deny any such ‘mischief makers’ the troubled waters to fish in.
But such a turn, dealing with terrorism as irreconcilable and therefore not open to a negotiated political solution, and with the Baloch nationalist insurgency as a long standing political problem requiring negotiations, possible give-and-take and a political solution, would require a rethink in the security establishment of which there are so far few if any signs.
rashed-rahman.blogspot.com
And as published by the paper.
Security insecure
Rashed Rahman
Even a casual glance at the instances of attacks on the security forces in the country would indicate that a significant uptick in such incidents has occurred of late. Take for example the five soldiers killed and four wounded in a terrorist attack from across the Afghan border on the Angoor Tangi check post in Kurram tribal district on the night of February 6-7, 2022. From 8:00 pm onwards, there was a three-hour battle. That indicates the attackers came in strength, although even this did not allow them to succeed in repeated attempts to damage or uproot the border fence. The Pakistani authorities have once again called on the Afghan Taliban government in Kabul to ensure Afghan soil is not used for such attacks. But the Afghan Taliban government bald facedly continues to deny the firing came from their side.
What this indicates is that the Afghan Taliban’s assurances regarding the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) that has enjoyed safe havens on Afghan soil with the help of their Afghan Taliban brothers mean nothing. When Pakistan earlier pressed the Afghan Taliban government to take action against the TTP, they facilitated instead a ceasefire and negotiations. These came to naught since the core demand of the TTP for a sharia-based system (according to their interpretation) meant undoing the Constitution and the democratic (however flawed) political system that emanates from it. Since this extreme demand was completely unacceptable, the talks broke down and TTP attacks resurfaced.
One cannot ignore the fact that there has been a sharp increase in attacks by the TTP, both cross-border and in-country, since the Afghan Taliban takeover last year. The Afghan Taliban, despite having enjoyed Pakistani ‘hospitality’ and support during the 10-year war against the occupying US forces, have refused to unequivocally recognize the Durand Line as the international border. Instances of attempts by the Afghan Taliban to demolish the border fence were downplayed by the Pakistani authorities until recently as localised incidents. Now, after the latest TTP attacks, the Pakistani authorities are reportedly becoming impatient with their erstwhile Afghan Taliban proxies regarding their inability to halt such attacks and their denials of their origin from Afghan soil.
Down south, the Balochistan nationalist insurgency front has also heated up. Since 9/11, all over the world and in Pakistan, all non-state movements of insurgency have been lumped into the terrorist basket (including, ironically, the Kashmir struggle). While this may be a convenient one-size-fits-all description, it runs the risk of losing the thread of nuance and difference in disparate situations, which then inevitably gravitates towards the same approach: repression. The distinction between religious fanatical terrorist movements and politically motivated nationalist and similar insurgencies is lost in the process. And with it a differentiated, more nuanced approach.
Interestingly, despite the recent TTP attacks after the ceasefire and talks broke down, Federal Interior Minister Sheikh Rashid insists that the door to negotiations with the TTP cannot be closed. With due respect, would it be out of place then to ask the worthy minister whether the door to negotiations with the Baloch nationalist insurgency cannot be opened? Between the extremes of separation and the state’s heavy-handed repression (including the epidemic of enforced disappearances) lies considerable middle ground on which talks could conceivably be based. The fifth Baloch nationalist insurgency since Independence has veered more and more towards separation because successive governments since its outbreak in 2002 have opted for the knout rather than the negotiating table. Unlike the TTP and others of their ilk, the Baloch nationalist insurgents are not religious fanatics who cannot be reasoned with.
The policy of repression alone has stoked the fires of the nationalist insurgency that began in embryonic form in 2002 after a new generation finally tired of the demonstrated futility of pursuing their long standing grievances and demand for rights within the system during the 25 years between the end of the fourth nationalist insurgency in 1977 and the start of the fifth in 2002. Along the way, the brutal killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2006 further widened the insurgency to include, for the first time, a section of the Bugti tribe. The growth of the middle class in Balochistan yielded nationalists such as Allah Nazar, a doctor tortured in custody, who became a guerrilla leader after release. Today, the appeal of the guerrillas is spreading through the length and breadth of Balochistan.
The almost clichéd, knee-jerk response of the security establishment to pin the (entire?) blame on the ubiquitous ‘foreign hand’, does little else except further muddy the waters and thinking. Even if such involvement exists, dousing the fire in one’s own home seems the wisest course to deny any such ‘mischief makers’ the troubled waters to fish in.
But such a turn, dealing with terrorism as irreconcilable and therefore not open to a negotiated political solution, and with the Baloch nationalist insurgency as a long standing political problem requiring negotiations, possible give-and-take and a political solution, would require a rethink in the security establishment of which there are so far few if any signs.
rashed-rahman.blogspot.com
Link to "Rashed Rahman: Fragments of a life of struggle – Ep-05" the fifth of a series of 13 episodes on YouTube of my interviews by my son Dr Taimur Rahman on my life and political struggles: https://youtu.be/EOSdC5AymZw
Rashed Rahman
Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)
Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) (on Facebook)
The February 2022 issue of Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) is out. Link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com
Contents:
1. Rashed Rahman: The National Question in Marxism – VII.
2. Zahra Shah: Book Review of Manan A Asif's The Loss of Hindustan: The Invention of India.
3. Dr Charles Amjad-Ali: The Historical and Contemporary State of Minorities in Pakistan.
Rashed Rahman
Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)
Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) (on Facebook)
Link to "Rashed Rahman: Fragments of a life of struggle – Ep-04" the fourth of a series of 13 episodes on YouTube of my interviews by my son Dr Taimur Rahman on my life and political struggles: https://youtu.be/DFIOaaFmQI8
Rashed Rahman
Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)
Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) (on Facebook)
Link to "Rashed Rahman: Fragments of a life of struggle – Ep-03" the third of a series of 13 episodes on YouTube of my interviews by my son Dr Taimur Rahman on my life and political struggles: https://youtu.be/U3aH0Jz7pJM
Rashed Rahman
Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)
Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) (on Facebook)
‘Punishing’ Russia
Rashed Rahman
The US-led west and Russia have been at loggerheads over Ukraine since 2014. Of late, the former has used escalating rhetoric and military deployments and weapons supplies to Eastern European countries (some former parts of the Soviet Union) in response to what it says are Russian plans to invade Ukraine. The west’s argument is based on the military exercises Russia has been conducting on its own soil across the Ukrainian border. The US Congress is discussing a sanctions bill to ‘crush’ Russia’s economy. The UK, always a loyal follower of the US, is preparing its own sanctions package, described by British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss as a move that would leave Russia with ‘nowhere to hide’. Although talks and a diplomatic solution to the crisis are still hoped for, the situation is arguably the tensest since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, when Ukraine and other ex-Soviet countries declared their independence.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov says Russia wants good, equal, mutually respectful relations with the US but does not want to remain in a position where Russia’s security is infringed daily. Citing the NATO encroachment near its border, often referred to as ‘NATO-creep’, Russia has demanded that NATO not admit new members, especially Ukraine, the US refrain from establishing new military bases in ex-Soviet countries, and NATO forces deployed to Eastern European and ex-Soviet countries that joined the western alliance after the Cold War ended be pulled back. Lavrov pointed out that NATO’s line of ‘defence’ continues moving eastward, has come very close to Ukraine, which he asserted, was not ready to join NATO.
The crisis has produced a flurry of diplomatic activity amongst the western allies and with Russia. Not all the European allies are as gung-ho about pillorying Russia as the US and UK because they are on the verge of completing the gas pipeline from Russia that will allay their energy shortages. Germany is quoted as the main sceptic in this regard. Ukraine is resorting to mixed messaging, with its President Volodymyr Zelensky calling on the west to avoid stirring ‘panic’ in the face of the alleged Russian troops buildup while his Foreign Minister, Dmytro Kuleba, says it is important to remain ‘firm’ in talks with Moscow.
How have things reached such a pass? After all, the world expected after the Soviet Union’s collapse and the end of the Cold War that the west and Russia no longer would be at loggerheads. Russia had taken the turn from socialism (howsoever flawed) to capitalism. After the disastrous years under Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin has succeeded in putting Russia back on its feet. In fact, astute observers argued that since the US, as the leader of the western alliance, exhibited more and more of the characteristics of a Colossus with feet of clay, a reference to the dominant military might but faltering political and economic perception of the US, the world was witnessing a tectonic shift of power from the west to a newly restored alliance between recovered Russia and a China rising after embracing capitalism. To the naïve and uninformed, it seemed that since all three of these major global centres of power were wedded to capitalism, their mutual relations would be friendly and smooth from now on.
However, history teaches that conflicts between established powers and new, rising (or restored) powers are the pattern in mankind’s past. Add to this version of the Thucydides trap the inherent competition between major capitalist powers that led to two world wars in the 20thcentury and you have the strange spectacle of China’s rise through an embrace of capitalism and Putin’s restoration of Russia’s pre-eminent position evoking, as time went by, the kind of hostility that we thought had been buried with the end of the Cold War. Since military conflict between the contending parties is now overshadowed by the presence on both sides of nuclear weapons, the ‘rivalry’ or competition is fought out through proxies or indirectly.
In this general context, Ukraine’s crisis is a case of Russia’s angst at the US-led west reneging on its promises and commitments to refrain from NATO’s eastward expansion after the Soviet collapse. Instead, ‘NATO-creep’ has been at work ever since, which essentially rests on including Eastern European and ex-Soviet countries in the military alliance that seems an anomaly after the end of the Cold War, while western intelligence services indulge in subversive activities in those countries (dubbed the ‘colour’ revolutions) to wean them away from Russian influence and attach them to western aims. These aims are essentially to prevent the centres of global power in Russia and China from competing with the dominant US-led west. This western hegemony is sought in political, economic and strategic terms.
The Ukraine crisis dates from 2013-14, when a ‘popular’ protest movement against pro-Moscow leader Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to resist an agreement that would bring Ukraine into the European Union’s orbit resulted in his ouster and the installation of the present pro-western regime. Two immediate consequences followed. One, Russia, that had ceded Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 (Khrushchev), invaded and occupied it, later holding a referendum confirming the largely Russian population of Crimea endorsed the move. Of course the west rejected the referendum for having been held under the shadow of the occupying Russians’ guns. Crimea’s strategic importance to Russia lies in its providing access to warm water seas. Two, the Russian populated eastern Ukrainian areas of Donetsk and Luhansk (known as the Donbas), allegedly with backing from Russia, declared their ‘independence’. Conflict has been simmering ever since between the current pro-western Ukrainian government and the Donbas self-proclaimed republics. It has so far taken a toll of 14,000 people killed, with regular breaches of the ceasefire under Russian-Ukrainian agreements signed in Minsk in 2014 and 2015.
‘NATO-creep’ is the inherent logic of aggressive capitalism and imperialism, even against competing rival capitalist powers like Russia (and China). The result is the world being treated to the spectacle of what has been dubbed a new Cold War. The world needs peace and development, tackling the planet’s ecological crisis, providing a better future for humanity as a whole. If capitalist imperialism is allowed to hold sway once again, humanity stands threatened.
rashed-rahman.blogspot.com
