“Storms will come…”
Pakistan is in the grip of many storms. Some are nature-driven, others man-made. And the two are not without a nexus. The amount of vitriol that has been expended on President Asif Ali Zardari’s visits to France and Britain beggars belief. Everything in the heavy artillery of that section of the media and public opinion who cannot believe that the president can ever do anything right has been thrown at him. The criticism may be motivated by prejudice and bias that rests on the president’s controversial past, but a pause for breath and reflection may yield some dividends of balance in our riven polity.
First and foremost, the president is accused of not being in tune with the ‘outrage’ felt by this inimical section of opinion about British Prime Minister David Cameron’s remarks while in India regarding Pakistan “looking both ways on terrorism”. The howls of indignation reached such a pitch that a cancellation of at least the British part of his itinerary occupied much airtime, columns of print, and dominated the chatter in myriads of drawing rooms. Now Cameron may at best be accused of being undiplomatic and insensitive regarding the nuanced policy of the west towards Pakistan since 9/11. But did his “plain speaking” contain at least a grain of truth? Is it not common knowledge (although spoken of elliptically and in hushed tones) that our security establishment not only created and nurtured the jihadis who have by now turned on their mentors, but that they continue to support the Afghan Taliban even while taking the field against our own home-grown variety? If this is not ‘looking two ways’, what is? Cameron may also be accused of currying favour with New Delhi while drooling over potential lucrative weapons deals with the west’s newfound ‘strategic partner’ (with a malign eye on China’s rise), but this too falls in the category of the known. President Zardari and the government must have weighed the balance between an emotional response based on false national pride and the critical needs of the country when deciding to go ahead with the visit despite all the criticism. Good statesmanship this, albeit some may consider it bad populist politics.
The second reason for all the angst about the visit was the tragic situation of floods and destruction at home. It seems the critics may be harbouring some secret inadvertent hope that the president could turn back the waters like King Canute or offer a Noah’s Ark for the needy. His presence may have given satisfaction to this lobby, but how much of a difference it would have made to the situation on the ground is a moot question. Nevertheless, to labour a point, good statesmanship, but perhaps bad populist politics.
Of course the president may be accused of poor decisions to visit his father’s chateau in France or allow the speculations about the launch of Bilawal Bhutto at a party rally in Birmingham. Questions are in the air about the château as well as the charge that the British leg was about Bilawal more than Cameron. However, Bilawal has unsportingly pricked that balloon by revealing that he will not be addressing the Birmingham rally and intends to take a law degree next before contemplating an active entry into our bed of thorns called politics.
The French leg has sunk without a trace amidst the ‘storm’ about the British part of the visit. The French were at their diplomatic best in making placating noises that mean little concretely, while the British, despite Cameron and his spokespeople’s public bluster, seem to have attempted a mending of fences with Mr Zardari and Pakistan. Whether the Pakistan-UK relationship is “unbreakable” or not, it is certainly important in the context of the present conjuncture. Both sides need each other vis-à-vis the struggle against terrorism, and Pakistan needs Britain for trade and aid. Pragmatic, but perhaps not good populist politics.
We need a balanced and mature conduct of statecraft, not a buffeting by buffoons who cannot see beyond their emotion-wrought noses. No doubt, now that this ‘storm’ appears to be abating, ‘friends’ will find something else to castigate their favourite punching bag with, as the prime minister woefully put it the other day.
Wednesday, April 27, 2011
Indian Express July 17,2010
Silencing the moderate voice
Rashed Rahman
His death is a grievous blow to the moderate nationalist cause, apart from being a tragedy of great proportions.
Jalib’s assassination is likely to strengthen the appeal of the insurgents and the armed struggle school amongst the Baloch nationalists. If the pattern of disappearances (reports of torture camps and worse have been filtering into the Pakistani media sporadically) and now, assassinations, of prominent Baloch nationalists becomes a fact, even moderate nationalists will be compelled to revisit their faith in parliamentary politics to wrest their rights within the state of Pakistan. Militant trends, including armed struggle, will probably achieve greater resonance amongst the Baloch youth, and separatist sentiment, which was not universally the anthem of the nationalists, may overtake all other political tendencies in the province.
The logic of repression and the inability of the state to address the essentially political problems in Balochistan in a political manner rather than through heavy-handed military means will ensure the destruction of the bonds that still tenuously bind Balochistan to the rest of the country, becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, and all in the name of saving Pakistan. A classic short-sighted case of cutting off the nose to spite the face, this.
The writer is editor-in-chief of ‘Daily Times’, Pakistan
Rashed Rahman
His death is a grievous blow to the moderate nationalist cause, apart from being a tragedy of great proportions.
Jalib’s assassination is likely to strengthen the appeal of the insurgents and the armed struggle school amongst the Baloch nationalists. If the pattern of disappearances (reports of torture camps and worse have been filtering into the Pakistani media sporadically) and now, assassinations, of prominent Baloch nationalists becomes a fact, even moderate nationalists will be compelled to revisit their faith in parliamentary politics to wrest their rights within the state of Pakistan. Militant trends, including armed struggle, will probably achieve greater resonance amongst the Baloch youth, and separatist sentiment, which was not universally the anthem of the nationalists, may overtake all other political tendencies in the province.
The logic of repression and the inability of the state to address the essentially political problems in Balochistan in a political manner rather than through heavy-handed military means will ensure the destruction of the bonds that still tenuously bind Balochistan to the rest of the country, becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, and all in the name of saving Pakistan. A classic short-sighted case of cutting off the nose to spite the face, this.
The writer is editor-in-chief of ‘Daily Times’, Pakistan
Saturday, April 23, 2011
Indian Express March 19, 2011
The demand for a Seraiki province
Rashed Rahman
The long standing incipient, sputtering movement for a Seraiki province encompassing the southern areas of Punjab has received a fillip from an unexpected quarter of late. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani told a rally in Multan the other day that the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) would include in its manifesto for the next elections the demand for a separate Seraiki province.
The prime minister’s announcement took everyone by surprise, since the ruling PPP had never before paid heed to the agitation for a Seraiki province that had been gathering force in recent years. Analysts saw this unexpected turnaround as the PPP’s attempt to kill three birds with one stone. One, it would add something ‘new’ to what the PPP could offer the electorate in its traditional stronghold of southern Punjab (resting on a large landowners’ political base), since its basket of ‘achievements’ during its ongoing tenure was pretty empty. Two, it steals the thunder of the Seraiki nationalists when the largest mainstream party adopts the demand. Three, the reduction of Punjab in area and population as a consequence would weaken the ‘fiefdom’ of its on-again-off again ‘ally’, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N).
Centred on the ancient city of Multan (whose geneology is even older than Lahore), such a province, were it to be carved out of Punjab, would include all the Seraiki-speaking areas, virtually the whole of southern Punjab, including the State of Bahawalpur, which was incorporated into the erstwhile West Pakistan province when One Unit was imposed in 1956. Linguistically, culturally and in terms of political, economic and social deprivation, the proposed Seraiki province would enjoy homogeneity. It would also allow the assertion of these rights in contrast to the perceived discrimination over long years at the hands of Takht Lahore (rule from Lahore). Historically, this contradiction between Takht Lahore and Multan dates back to pre-Mughal times.
The defunct princely Bahawalpur State has never, until recently, been able to garner enough critical mass for the demand of restoration of the state. Since the February 2008 general elections that ushered in the present democratic dispensation, Mr Mohammad Ali Durrani, the former Information Minister under General Pervez Musharraf, has spearheaded this restoration demand. Cynics attribute his departure from the King’s party of the general, the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid), and his embrace of the Bahawalpur State cause to thwarted ambition within the folds of his erstwhile party, rather than a sudden ‘awakening’ to the rights of his mother area vis-à-vis restoration of the dissolved state.
Unlike India, which since independence has seen many new states carved out of larger provinces, this would, if it were to come to pass, be a first for Pakistan. The demand for linguistic, cultural and political redemarcation has come in the past from almost all the provinces of what is now Pakistan, without finding favour with successive rulers, both military and civilian.
For example, the Pashtuns in northern Balochistan (including the provincial capital Quetta) have hankered since independence for merger with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly North West Frontier Province) province to their north, or a Pashtun province separated from the Baloch areas of Balochistan. This demand forms the centre-piece of the manifesto of a regional party based in this area called the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party. However, this demand has remained confined to the party’s circles and failed to find traction within the power structures of Pakistan.
The Hazara division within Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a Hindko speaking area, last year saw a major agitation for a separate province when the North West Frontier Province was renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the latter also a name achieved after a long and twisted history of agitation against the colonially-imposed former title. However, the main political party in the Hazara area, the PML-N, after leading the agitation for a separate Hazara province through its local leadership, had second thoughts at the central leadership level (Nawaz Sharif) and did not press the issue to a successful conclusion.
The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (formerly Muhajir Qaumi Movement) of self-exiled leader Altaf Hussain was accused at one time of seeking to carve out a separate province from the cities/urban areas of Sindh province, including Karachi, a corridor linking Karachi to Hyderabad, and possibly other cities of Sindh where Urdu-speaking migrants from India at the time of partition were in a majority. This new province was dubbed ‘Jinnahpur’. That fancy proposal too sank without a trace and is now history.
Lacking democracy throughout most of its existence since independence, Pakistan has been ruled overwhelmingly by military and civilian dictatorial or authoritarian regimes. In such dispensations, the question of autonomy and rights for the provinces subsumed within One Unit since 1956 and only restored in 1970 (not to mention East Pakistan that is today Bangladesh), assumed the position of a central plank in the struggle for democracy. East Pakistan achieved independence as Bangladesh after much bloodshed and military suppression, Balochistan is currently going through the fifth insurgency since independence, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have a history of struggles for their rights. It was not until the 18th Constitutional Amendment brought in by the current democratic government led by the PPP that the issue of provincial autonomy has been recognised and enshrined in the constitution. The process of devolution of powers to the provinces is ongoing even as these lines are being written.
But in the process of the final success of the provinces on the autonomy issue, the space for further devolution/separation/carving out new provinces does not at present seem promising. Partisan political considerations such as reducing Punjab’s size through the creation of a Seraiki province in its southern reaches to weaken the rival PML-N may inform the PPP’s sudden conversion to that cause, but there is little doubt such a move would bring immense satisfaction to the Seraiki-speaking people of southern Punjab and also correct the present imbalance in the federal structure of the state, in which Punjab alone has more population than all the other three provinces combined (around 60 percent). Whether the Seraiki dream will come true is not certain just yet. It would require an extraordinary altruism above and beyond the call of duty on the part of the entire Pakistani political class to converge on the constitutional amendment required to create a new province, an altruism that has remained conspicuous by its absence in Pakistan’s chequered history.
Rashed Rahman
The long standing incipient, sputtering movement for a Seraiki province encompassing the southern areas of Punjab has received a fillip from an unexpected quarter of late. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani told a rally in Multan the other day that the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) would include in its manifesto for the next elections the demand for a separate Seraiki province.
The prime minister’s announcement took everyone by surprise, since the ruling PPP had never before paid heed to the agitation for a Seraiki province that had been gathering force in recent years. Analysts saw this unexpected turnaround as the PPP’s attempt to kill three birds with one stone. One, it would add something ‘new’ to what the PPP could offer the electorate in its traditional stronghold of southern Punjab (resting on a large landowners’ political base), since its basket of ‘achievements’ during its ongoing tenure was pretty empty. Two, it steals the thunder of the Seraiki nationalists when the largest mainstream party adopts the demand. Three, the reduction of Punjab in area and population as a consequence would weaken the ‘fiefdom’ of its on-again-off again ‘ally’, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N).
Centred on the ancient city of Multan (whose geneology is even older than Lahore), such a province, were it to be carved out of Punjab, would include all the Seraiki-speaking areas, virtually the whole of southern Punjab, including the State of Bahawalpur, which was incorporated into the erstwhile West Pakistan province when One Unit was imposed in 1956. Linguistically, culturally and in terms of political, economic and social deprivation, the proposed Seraiki province would enjoy homogeneity. It would also allow the assertion of these rights in contrast to the perceived discrimination over long years at the hands of Takht Lahore (rule from Lahore). Historically, this contradiction between Takht Lahore and Multan dates back to pre-Mughal times.
The defunct princely Bahawalpur State has never, until recently, been able to garner enough critical mass for the demand of restoration of the state. Since the February 2008 general elections that ushered in the present democratic dispensation, Mr Mohammad Ali Durrani, the former Information Minister under General Pervez Musharraf, has spearheaded this restoration demand. Cynics attribute his departure from the King’s party of the general, the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid), and his embrace of the Bahawalpur State cause to thwarted ambition within the folds of his erstwhile party, rather than a sudden ‘awakening’ to the rights of his mother area vis-à-vis restoration of the dissolved state.
Unlike India, which since independence has seen many new states carved out of larger provinces, this would, if it were to come to pass, be a first for Pakistan. The demand for linguistic, cultural and political redemarcation has come in the past from almost all the provinces of what is now Pakistan, without finding favour with successive rulers, both military and civilian.
For example, the Pashtuns in northern Balochistan (including the provincial capital Quetta) have hankered since independence for merger with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly North West Frontier Province) province to their north, or a Pashtun province separated from the Baloch areas of Balochistan. This demand forms the centre-piece of the manifesto of a regional party based in this area called the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party. However, this demand has remained confined to the party’s circles and failed to find traction within the power structures of Pakistan.
The Hazara division within Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a Hindko speaking area, last year saw a major agitation for a separate province when the North West Frontier Province was renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the latter also a name achieved after a long and twisted history of agitation against the colonially-imposed former title. However, the main political party in the Hazara area, the PML-N, after leading the agitation for a separate Hazara province through its local leadership, had second thoughts at the central leadership level (Nawaz Sharif) and did not press the issue to a successful conclusion.
The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (formerly Muhajir Qaumi Movement) of self-exiled leader Altaf Hussain was accused at one time of seeking to carve out a separate province from the cities/urban areas of Sindh province, including Karachi, a corridor linking Karachi to Hyderabad, and possibly other cities of Sindh where Urdu-speaking migrants from India at the time of partition were in a majority. This new province was dubbed ‘Jinnahpur’. That fancy proposal too sank without a trace and is now history.
Lacking democracy throughout most of its existence since independence, Pakistan has been ruled overwhelmingly by military and civilian dictatorial or authoritarian regimes. In such dispensations, the question of autonomy and rights for the provinces subsumed within One Unit since 1956 and only restored in 1970 (not to mention East Pakistan that is today Bangladesh), assumed the position of a central plank in the struggle for democracy. East Pakistan achieved independence as Bangladesh after much bloodshed and military suppression, Balochistan is currently going through the fifth insurgency since independence, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have a history of struggles for their rights. It was not until the 18th Constitutional Amendment brought in by the current democratic government led by the PPP that the issue of provincial autonomy has been recognised and enshrined in the constitution. The process of devolution of powers to the provinces is ongoing even as these lines are being written.
But in the process of the final success of the provinces on the autonomy issue, the space for further devolution/separation/carving out new provinces does not at present seem promising. Partisan political considerations such as reducing Punjab’s size through the creation of a Seraiki province in its southern reaches to weaken the rival PML-N may inform the PPP’s sudden conversion to that cause, but there is little doubt such a move would bring immense satisfaction to the Seraiki-speaking people of southern Punjab and also correct the present imbalance in the federal structure of the state, in which Punjab alone has more population than all the other three provinces combined (around 60 percent). Whether the Seraiki dream will come true is not certain just yet. It would require an extraordinary altruism above and beyond the call of duty on the part of the entire Pakistani political class to converge on the constitutional amendment required to create a new province, an altruism that has remained conspicuous by its absence in Pakistan’s chequered history.
Daily Times editorial June 3, 2010
SBP third quarter report
The State Bank of Pakistan’s (SBP’s) report for the third quarter of FY10 paints a rather gloomy picture of the economy despite bright spots here and there. GDP growth is expected at 4.1 percent, up from the niggardly 1.2 percent last year, mainly owed to above-target growth of livestock, large scale manufacturing (LSM) and the services sector, and despite the below-target performance of agriculture because of water shortages and unfavourable weather conditions. Even the expectation that the switchover to minor crops over a large area would return strong growth figures was belied, most of the minor crops too suffering from a rainfall deficit during the winter. Although agricultural produce contributed significantly to exports, the domestic prices of even surplus harvest crops suffered a steep incline. After a modest recovery in the first half of FY10, LSM growth accelerated in the year’s third quarter. With consumer financing by commercial banks making a reappearance from the trough it had fallen into when the recession hit, demand for consumer durables, particularly automobiles, strengthened despite rising costs.
The overall external account picture would remain vulnerable according to the SBP, despite the sharp decline in the current account deficit from the earlier forecast of 3.2-3.8 percent of GDP and last year’s 5.7 percent to 2.2-2.8 in FY10. This is because external financing receipts plummeted despite improved exports and workers’ remittances.
The fiscal deficit seems poised to exceed earlier estimates and may come in at 5.1-5.6 percent of GDP, adding further impetus to the anticipated inflationary pressures from the second half of FY10. Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation would exceed the estimates, arriving in the range of 11.5-12.5 percent. Needless to say, the core inflationary contribution of food items leads the list of factors producing such pressures. Despite the ballooning fiscal deficit, contributed to in no small measure by the diversion of funds to Pakistan’s own war on terror, the SBP reports that government borrowings from it have been less than in previous years. It is not clear whether the same applies to government borrowings from the commercial banks. And even if it does, that would suggest that the fiscal deficit has been financed by monetary means despite the continuing attempts by the SBP to keep monetary policy tight through the base rate and other measures. The SBP has identified the main factors behind pressures on fiscal accounts as increasing current expenditure and a low tax-to-GDP ratio. Whereas the war on terror expenditures, and their delayed reimbursement by the US because of audit concerns may be a heavy contributor to such increasing current expenditures (the defence budget for next fiscal is expected to go up by 31 percent), there is little doubt that the people in power show no signs of belt tightening to reflect the country’s economic and financial woes, flouting even the SBP’s advice in this regard. The princely style of the political class in power has by now become a permanent fact of life in the Islamic Republic, and one in deep dissonance with our straitened economic circumstances.
As far as our abysmal tax-to-GDP ratio is concerned, as long as large parts of the economy remain outside the tax net (e.g. the agricultural and informal sectors), squeezing more taxes out of the narrow base of direct taxpayers may turn out in the end to be a case of killing the goose that lays the golden eggs. Apart from widening the tax net to include all incomes irrespective of source, a tax paying culture, conspicuous by its absence at present, needs to be encouraged and developed. But to be effective, this effort would have to be accompanied by a real adherence by the political class in power to austerity in public and private life and an honest taxpayers’ profile in order to set an example for society at large. Asking for the moon?
The State Bank of Pakistan’s (SBP’s) report for the third quarter of FY10 paints a rather gloomy picture of the economy despite bright spots here and there. GDP growth is expected at 4.1 percent, up from the niggardly 1.2 percent last year, mainly owed to above-target growth of livestock, large scale manufacturing (LSM) and the services sector, and despite the below-target performance of agriculture because of water shortages and unfavourable weather conditions. Even the expectation that the switchover to minor crops over a large area would return strong growth figures was belied, most of the minor crops too suffering from a rainfall deficit during the winter. Although agricultural produce contributed significantly to exports, the domestic prices of even surplus harvest crops suffered a steep incline. After a modest recovery in the first half of FY10, LSM growth accelerated in the year’s third quarter. With consumer financing by commercial banks making a reappearance from the trough it had fallen into when the recession hit, demand for consumer durables, particularly automobiles, strengthened despite rising costs.
The overall external account picture would remain vulnerable according to the SBP, despite the sharp decline in the current account deficit from the earlier forecast of 3.2-3.8 percent of GDP and last year’s 5.7 percent to 2.2-2.8 in FY10. This is because external financing receipts plummeted despite improved exports and workers’ remittances.
The fiscal deficit seems poised to exceed earlier estimates and may come in at 5.1-5.6 percent of GDP, adding further impetus to the anticipated inflationary pressures from the second half of FY10. Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation would exceed the estimates, arriving in the range of 11.5-12.5 percent. Needless to say, the core inflationary contribution of food items leads the list of factors producing such pressures. Despite the ballooning fiscal deficit, contributed to in no small measure by the diversion of funds to Pakistan’s own war on terror, the SBP reports that government borrowings from it have been less than in previous years. It is not clear whether the same applies to government borrowings from the commercial banks. And even if it does, that would suggest that the fiscal deficit has been financed by monetary means despite the continuing attempts by the SBP to keep monetary policy tight through the base rate and other measures. The SBP has identified the main factors behind pressures on fiscal accounts as increasing current expenditure and a low tax-to-GDP ratio. Whereas the war on terror expenditures, and their delayed reimbursement by the US because of audit concerns may be a heavy contributor to such increasing current expenditures (the defence budget for next fiscal is expected to go up by 31 percent), there is little doubt that the people in power show no signs of belt tightening to reflect the country’s economic and financial woes, flouting even the SBP’s advice in this regard. The princely style of the political class in power has by now become a permanent fact of life in the Islamic Republic, and one in deep dissonance with our straitened economic circumstances.
As far as our abysmal tax-to-GDP ratio is concerned, as long as large parts of the economy remain outside the tax net (e.g. the agricultural and informal sectors), squeezing more taxes out of the narrow base of direct taxpayers may turn out in the end to be a case of killing the goose that lays the golden eggs. Apart from widening the tax net to include all incomes irrespective of source, a tax paying culture, conspicuous by its absence at present, needs to be encouraged and developed. But to be effective, this effort would have to be accompanied by a real adherence by the political class in power to austerity in public and private life and an honest taxpayers’ profile in order to set an example for society at large. Asking for the moon?
Daily Times editorial Nov 26, 2009
Reactions to Balochistan package
Some Baloch nationalists had delivered themselves of a rejectionist message even before the Balochistan package was presented in a joint session of parliament the other day. The rest have now joined the chorus. In case anyone is jumping to any conclusions, it needs to be stressed that negative or indifferent reactions to the package are not confined to those from the province. The main opposition party, the PML-N, sat stoically throughout the presentation, clarifying later that it considered the package only a set of proposals and would respond when debate gets under way at another joint session after Eid. Other parties too have reacted rather less than enthusiastically. The only positive sounds have come, unsurprisingly, from the government, from President Asif Ali Zardari downwards. But is this divide unexpected? If not, why not?
While there should be little quarrel with the government’s intent, the package either leaves out or misconstrues some vital issues that go to the heart of the conundrum in Balochistan. All the fine sentiments in the package of seeking reconciliation with our “Baloch brothers” and offering them at least some relief on many of their long-standing demands cannot hide one glaring fact. The government has behaved like in the parable about not seeing the elephant in the room. That ‘elephant’ is none other than the military and paramilitary operations being conducted in the province since at least 2002, which accelerated in quantity and intensity after 2006. Interior Minister Rehman Malik can go blue in the face denying that any military operation is in progress, but that does not change things a jot. If the military operation is a nationalist fiction, why has the package conceded the withdrawal of the army and a halt to cantonment construction? It is another matter that the idea of replacing the army with the FC is like jumping from the frying pan into the fire, such is the universal hatred for the FC in Balochistan. The bitter truth is that both the federal and the provincial government in Balochistan are helpless before the military’s view of the situation and what needs to be done. So far, the military has not given any indication that it agrees with the reconciliation thrust. The ‘elephant’ therefore, continues to rampage unchecked.
The package’s strange and unclear wording on who would benefit from the ‘amnesty’, i.e. all those who do not have terrorism or other serious charges against them, would be humorous if the situation were not so dire. This formulation effectively excludes just about anyone who matters in the estranged Baloch nationalist milieu, including not only moderate parties within the province, but most definitely those who have chosen exile to lead the armed struggle from abroad. The government has slipped up in not accepting the sane advice to take the “real leaders” of Balochistan into confidence before announcing the package. If the nationalists at home and abroad do, by some stretch of the imagination, decide to engage the government despite their reservations, they are likely to adopt a hard stance for two reasons. One, the Baloch nationalist sentiment is weary of broken promises stretching back more than sixty years. There is a perception amongst the most radical elements in their ranks (whose number is growing) that further ‘talk’ is useless. They are therefore holding out for the maximalist position of independence. Two, there is a bottomless pit called a credibility and trust deficit on implementation of high sounding proposals between the nationalists and the authorities. Precisely for that reason, without an intelligent engagement of the extreme sentiment as well as the more moderate nationalists, any hope of bringing our estranged “brothers” back into the mainstream is only so much pie in the sky.
Some Baloch nationalists had delivered themselves of a rejectionist message even before the Balochistan package was presented in a joint session of parliament the other day. The rest have now joined the chorus. In case anyone is jumping to any conclusions, it needs to be stressed that negative or indifferent reactions to the package are not confined to those from the province. The main opposition party, the PML-N, sat stoically throughout the presentation, clarifying later that it considered the package only a set of proposals and would respond when debate gets under way at another joint session after Eid. Other parties too have reacted rather less than enthusiastically. The only positive sounds have come, unsurprisingly, from the government, from President Asif Ali Zardari downwards. But is this divide unexpected? If not, why not?
While there should be little quarrel with the government’s intent, the package either leaves out or misconstrues some vital issues that go to the heart of the conundrum in Balochistan. All the fine sentiments in the package of seeking reconciliation with our “Baloch brothers” and offering them at least some relief on many of their long-standing demands cannot hide one glaring fact. The government has behaved like in the parable about not seeing the elephant in the room. That ‘elephant’ is none other than the military and paramilitary operations being conducted in the province since at least 2002, which accelerated in quantity and intensity after 2006. Interior Minister Rehman Malik can go blue in the face denying that any military operation is in progress, but that does not change things a jot. If the military operation is a nationalist fiction, why has the package conceded the withdrawal of the army and a halt to cantonment construction? It is another matter that the idea of replacing the army with the FC is like jumping from the frying pan into the fire, such is the universal hatred for the FC in Balochistan. The bitter truth is that both the federal and the provincial government in Balochistan are helpless before the military’s view of the situation and what needs to be done. So far, the military has not given any indication that it agrees with the reconciliation thrust. The ‘elephant’ therefore, continues to rampage unchecked.
The package’s strange and unclear wording on who would benefit from the ‘amnesty’, i.e. all those who do not have terrorism or other serious charges against them, would be humorous if the situation were not so dire. This formulation effectively excludes just about anyone who matters in the estranged Baloch nationalist milieu, including not only moderate parties within the province, but most definitely those who have chosen exile to lead the armed struggle from abroad. The government has slipped up in not accepting the sane advice to take the “real leaders” of Balochistan into confidence before announcing the package. If the nationalists at home and abroad do, by some stretch of the imagination, decide to engage the government despite their reservations, they are likely to adopt a hard stance for two reasons. One, the Baloch nationalist sentiment is weary of broken promises stretching back more than sixty years. There is a perception amongst the most radical elements in their ranks (whose number is growing) that further ‘talk’ is useless. They are therefore holding out for the maximalist position of independence. Two, there is a bottomless pit called a credibility and trust deficit on implementation of high sounding proposals between the nationalists and the authorities. Precisely for that reason, without an intelligent engagement of the extreme sentiment as well as the more moderate nationalists, any hope of bringing our estranged “brothers” back into the mainstream is only so much pie in the sky.
Daily Times Editorial Dec 20, 2009
PPP prepares to fight back
The PPP-led government appears to have been rocked back by the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) verdict. For those baying for the NRO beneficiaries’ blood, it must come as a surprise, nay even shock, that far from rolling over and playing dead, the PPP seems to have decided to take on its detractors and come out of its corner fighting. The prime minister is well known for a soft and gentle disposition. Yet Yousaf Raza Gilani too seems to have decided it is time the gloves came off. Part of the fallout of the NRO verdict may have nothing to do with the letter and spirit of the court’s judgement. Whatever unintended consequences are flowing from that verdict, reflect the over-zealousness of some members of the bureaucracy and other officials. A case in point is the stopping of Defence Minister Ahmed Mukhtar from proceeding on an official visit to China. The circumstances surrounding the incident persuaded even mild-mannered Gilani to suspend the interior secretary and three FIA officials for misleading the minister and acting beyond their own authority and even the mandate of the verdict. It turns out that Mukhtar’s name was not on the exit control list now or on October 4, 2007, the date to which all things have reverted after the striking down of the NRO.
The proper thing that has followed the verdict is the notices and summons issued by the accountability courts to those whose cases stand revived. Draconian actions such as arrests were not justified when the accused were prepared to face the courts. The rumour mills ground overtime, but in the process some sections of the media did not even hesitate to issue unsubstantiated stories, for example of the interior minister’s arrest. Journalism requires responsibility, not subjective wish fulfillment. The judicial process of accountability has begun, and the ‘militant’ media must wait for judicial verdicts, not jump the gun. That process includes the possibility of bail, which in one high profile case of Salman Farooqui, has been granted. Meanwhile the monitoring cells suggested in the SC’s verdict have been set up at SC and High Court levels.
Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani mounted a vigorous defence of President Asif Ali Zardari during an interaction with the media. His thrust was that all the cases against the president were politically motivated and, despite spending 12 years in jail, nothing had been proved against him. As far as the Swiss case is concerned, the prime minister clarified that the Swiss government has conveyed that it cannot proceed in a case that the Pakistan government itself has not revived because of the immunity enjoyed by the office of president. The prime minister questioned why the authors of the NRO, Musharraf, Shauqat Aziz and his cabinet were not being mentioned whereas his government was neither responsible for promulgating the NRO nor had it defended it. Contrary to the expressed wishes of the SC that former FIA director Tariq Khosa be restored to office, Mr Gilani seems bent on protecting executive privilege where such appointments are concerned.
Party consultations in the presidency and with allies, as well as the PPP’s executive committee meeting in progress while these lines are being written seem to convey the impression that the PPP has decided there will be no resignations because such a course night open a Pandora’s box whose ultimate victim could well be the president. Those opposed to Mr Zardari or the PPP may want to go beyond the remit of the SC verdict, but they are on thin constitutional and legal ground here. Now that the PPP seems to have girded up its loins, the danger of political confrontation (with the PML-N first and foremost) and between the executive and judiciary cannot be ruled out. The best advice to all players would be to exercise restraint in the straitened circumstances in which the country finds itself, let politics be conducted in a civilised and democratic spirit and let each institution of state function within its own orbit, not on others’ turf.
The PPP-led government appears to have been rocked back by the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) verdict. For those baying for the NRO beneficiaries’ blood, it must come as a surprise, nay even shock, that far from rolling over and playing dead, the PPP seems to have decided to take on its detractors and come out of its corner fighting. The prime minister is well known for a soft and gentle disposition. Yet Yousaf Raza Gilani too seems to have decided it is time the gloves came off. Part of the fallout of the NRO verdict may have nothing to do with the letter and spirit of the court’s judgement. Whatever unintended consequences are flowing from that verdict, reflect the over-zealousness of some members of the bureaucracy and other officials. A case in point is the stopping of Defence Minister Ahmed Mukhtar from proceeding on an official visit to China. The circumstances surrounding the incident persuaded even mild-mannered Gilani to suspend the interior secretary and three FIA officials for misleading the minister and acting beyond their own authority and even the mandate of the verdict. It turns out that Mukhtar’s name was not on the exit control list now or on October 4, 2007, the date to which all things have reverted after the striking down of the NRO.
The proper thing that has followed the verdict is the notices and summons issued by the accountability courts to those whose cases stand revived. Draconian actions such as arrests were not justified when the accused were prepared to face the courts. The rumour mills ground overtime, but in the process some sections of the media did not even hesitate to issue unsubstantiated stories, for example of the interior minister’s arrest. Journalism requires responsibility, not subjective wish fulfillment. The judicial process of accountability has begun, and the ‘militant’ media must wait for judicial verdicts, not jump the gun. That process includes the possibility of bail, which in one high profile case of Salman Farooqui, has been granted. Meanwhile the monitoring cells suggested in the SC’s verdict have been set up at SC and High Court levels.
Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani mounted a vigorous defence of President Asif Ali Zardari during an interaction with the media. His thrust was that all the cases against the president were politically motivated and, despite spending 12 years in jail, nothing had been proved against him. As far as the Swiss case is concerned, the prime minister clarified that the Swiss government has conveyed that it cannot proceed in a case that the Pakistan government itself has not revived because of the immunity enjoyed by the office of president. The prime minister questioned why the authors of the NRO, Musharraf, Shauqat Aziz and his cabinet were not being mentioned whereas his government was neither responsible for promulgating the NRO nor had it defended it. Contrary to the expressed wishes of the SC that former FIA director Tariq Khosa be restored to office, Mr Gilani seems bent on protecting executive privilege where such appointments are concerned.
Party consultations in the presidency and with allies, as well as the PPP’s executive committee meeting in progress while these lines are being written seem to convey the impression that the PPP has decided there will be no resignations because such a course night open a Pandora’s box whose ultimate victim could well be the president. Those opposed to Mr Zardari or the PPP may want to go beyond the remit of the SC verdict, but they are on thin constitutional and legal ground here. Now that the PPP seems to have girded up its loins, the danger of political confrontation (with the PML-N first and foremost) and between the executive and judiciary cannot be ruled out. The best advice to all players would be to exercise restraint in the straitened circumstances in which the country finds itself, let politics be conducted in a civilised and democratic spirit and let each institution of state function within its own orbit, not on others’ turf.
Daily Times Editorial Dec 21, 2009
PPP CEC’s fighting stance
The ruling PPP’s Central Executive Committee (CEC) has come out with a fighting stance, but in moderate terms and language that does the party credit in a situation where it could easily have been provoked into retaliating in like manner to some of the accusations and demands thrown at it since the Supreme Court’s verdict on the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO). The CEC announced its decisions in interaction with the media at the end of the daylong CEC meeting in Islamabad. The main points of the CEC’s deliberations and decisions include a resolution of solidarity and complete confidence in President Asif Ali Zardari, who is also the co-chairperson of the party; facing the cases against the party’s leaders in the courts and defending these leaders to the fullest extent in what are described by the CEC as politically motivated cases of victimisation; no resignations by ministers under pressure of blackmail from any quarter; and using “democracy and constitutionalism” as the weapons of choice to face their adversaries and foil all conspiracies against the mandate of the PPP to rule for its full term.
The PPP’s secretary general Jahangir Badar and information secretary Fauzia Wahab said the PPP believes in the rule of law, supremacy of the constitution, respects the institutions of state and hopes that all institutions will remain within their ambit. Badar stated that the PPP could have given a befitting response to its opponents and detractors but it refrained because it wanted to maintain the policy of reconciliation. He said the party had faced accountability in the past (the only party to be so victimised, he asserted) and was not afraid to face it in the future. He went on to stress that democracy was the only system that could be successful in Pakistan in the prevailing geo-political environment. Solidarity could only be strengthened and progress ensured through democracy, he reiterated.
Badar pointed to the scandal of billions of rupees worth of written off loans that have not been brought into the net of accountability. This loot and plunder must be reversed and such written off loans repaid, was his demand. He said the wealth looted in the name of privatisation during the previous regime should also be recovered. In answer to a question, Badar reminded his audience that the late Benazir Bhutto had rejected the NRO and asked for all the false cases against the PPP leaders to be wound up. He said the NRO was the brainchild of Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and Shaukat Aziz and the party or its government neither promulgated it nor defended it in court.
The reference to using “democracy and constitutionalism” to wage a political struggle against its opponents and detractors places the PPP in the category of extraordinary restraint. It has not retaliated in the language or tone of its critics. So much so, when the angry Khursheed Shah openly advocated using the Sindh card to defend the PPP, others, including the president, rejected the notion and stressed the politics of the federation and democracy as the consistently preferred path of the PPP throughout its history. The president went so far as to say that he did not want to become another Sheikh Mujeebur Rehman (implying secessionism), although to be historically fair, Sheikh Mujeebur Rehman was no secessionist but a victim of a military dictatorship that refused to transfer power to an Awami League led by him and which had won the 1970 elections fair and square. Nevertheless, the thrust of the president’s remarks were in line with the role he played just after Benazir’s assassination, when he helped put out the fire of violent protest in Sindh with his slogan of “Pakistan Khappay”.
One need not hold any brief for the besieged president or the PPP-led government under attack by its opponents to see that the country cannot afford any destabilisation at this critical juncture. Within the ambit of the constitution and law, there is no threat to either the presidency or the government should they choose to continue in office. And one hopes that thought does not trigger any extra-constitutional ideas in any quarter.
The ruling PPP’s Central Executive Committee (CEC) has come out with a fighting stance, but in moderate terms and language that does the party credit in a situation where it could easily have been provoked into retaliating in like manner to some of the accusations and demands thrown at it since the Supreme Court’s verdict on the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO). The CEC announced its decisions in interaction with the media at the end of the daylong CEC meeting in Islamabad. The main points of the CEC’s deliberations and decisions include a resolution of solidarity and complete confidence in President Asif Ali Zardari, who is also the co-chairperson of the party; facing the cases against the party’s leaders in the courts and defending these leaders to the fullest extent in what are described by the CEC as politically motivated cases of victimisation; no resignations by ministers under pressure of blackmail from any quarter; and using “democracy and constitutionalism” as the weapons of choice to face their adversaries and foil all conspiracies against the mandate of the PPP to rule for its full term.
The PPP’s secretary general Jahangir Badar and information secretary Fauzia Wahab said the PPP believes in the rule of law, supremacy of the constitution, respects the institutions of state and hopes that all institutions will remain within their ambit. Badar stated that the PPP could have given a befitting response to its opponents and detractors but it refrained because it wanted to maintain the policy of reconciliation. He said the party had faced accountability in the past (the only party to be so victimised, he asserted) and was not afraid to face it in the future. He went on to stress that democracy was the only system that could be successful in Pakistan in the prevailing geo-political environment. Solidarity could only be strengthened and progress ensured through democracy, he reiterated.
Badar pointed to the scandal of billions of rupees worth of written off loans that have not been brought into the net of accountability. This loot and plunder must be reversed and such written off loans repaid, was his demand. He said the wealth looted in the name of privatisation during the previous regime should also be recovered. In answer to a question, Badar reminded his audience that the late Benazir Bhutto had rejected the NRO and asked for all the false cases against the PPP leaders to be wound up. He said the NRO was the brainchild of Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and Shaukat Aziz and the party or its government neither promulgated it nor defended it in court.
The reference to using “democracy and constitutionalism” to wage a political struggle against its opponents and detractors places the PPP in the category of extraordinary restraint. It has not retaliated in the language or tone of its critics. So much so, when the angry Khursheed Shah openly advocated using the Sindh card to defend the PPP, others, including the president, rejected the notion and stressed the politics of the federation and democracy as the consistently preferred path of the PPP throughout its history. The president went so far as to say that he did not want to become another Sheikh Mujeebur Rehman (implying secessionism), although to be historically fair, Sheikh Mujeebur Rehman was no secessionist but a victim of a military dictatorship that refused to transfer power to an Awami League led by him and which had won the 1970 elections fair and square. Nevertheless, the thrust of the president’s remarks were in line with the role he played just after Benazir’s assassination, when he helped put out the fire of violent protest in Sindh with his slogan of “Pakistan Khappay”.
One need not hold any brief for the besieged president or the PPP-led government under attack by its opponents to see that the country cannot afford any destabilisation at this critical juncture. Within the ambit of the constitution and law, there is no threat to either the presidency or the government should they choose to continue in office. And one hopes that thought does not trigger any extra-constitutional ideas in any quarter.
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