Pakistan-India
tensions
Rashed Rahman
The current
tensions between Pakistan and India in the wake of the Pulwama suicide attack
that killed 44 Central Reserve Police Force (CPRF) personnel are following a
familiar pattern. India, relying on the claim of responsibility by
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), has pointed the finger of accusation at Pakistan.
Pakistan has denied responsibility, arguing that the suicide bomber was an
indigenous Kashmiri radicalised by brutalisation at the hands of the Indian
security forces, the huge amount of explosives used in the attack were locally
procured, and if India can provide actionable intelligence on the perpetrators,
Pakistan will take action against them.
Despite the
rejection of responsibility by Pakistan, the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI)
government has moved to ban Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and its charitable wing
Falah-i-Insaniat, both widely known to be replacements for the
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba banned by Pakistan in 2002. The government has also taken
over the JeM’s headquarters in a mosque in Bahawalpur and a madrassa attached
to it. JeM too was banned in 2002. Banning has proved in practice to be a fig
leaf for reinventing these groups under new names and thereby allowing them to
function freely.
India is
threatening military retaliation, with the Pakistani military, government,
opposition and media giving equal measure to their opposite numbers across the
border. Suspicions abound in Pakistan and even in India that Prime Minister
(PM) Narendra Modi is whipping up anti-Pakistan rhetoric in order to get better
results in the upcoming elections in that country. Sane voices on either side
that counsel restraint seem few and weak, but after the passions of nationalist
rhetoric subside relatively, are proving the only ones worth paying attention
to. The two nuclear-armed South Asian neighbours cannot even conceive of going
to war. It would mean mutual mass suicide and the ruin of both. Alternatives
such as surgical strikes are still in the realm of wishful thinking rather than
feasible reality.
Going by the
track record, passionate denunciations on either side, fuelled by a
hyper-patriotic media at both ends, may persist in its irresponsibility until
after the Indian elections but, afterwards, and God willing in the absence of actual
conflict, are likely to subside. Post-Kargil, the two sides did return to the
negotiating table, although in 1999 this seemed an unlikely possibility. Sooner
or later, even belligerent states return to rational calculation, or at least
we hope so in the current highly dangerous standoff.
India has taken
its case to world opinion, including the UN Security Council (UNSC). The
resolution adopted in the UNSC condemns the Pulwama attack, advises Pakistan to
prevent such incidents, and calls for talks between the two countries to defuse
the increasingly dangerous escalation. US President Donald Trump, not known for
his perspicacity on international issues, has nevertheless raised the alarm and
revealed his administration’s intent to hold meetings with Pakistan with which
Washington’s relations have improved of late since the US-Taliban talks process
started. Pakistan too has been pulling out all the diplomatic stops to argue
its case before world opinion.
Cleaving through
all the propaganda on both sides, some home truths are evident. What we are
witnessing is hybrid warfare at its finest. As DG ISPR Major General Asif
Ghafoor has succinctly summed it up, media is the first line of defence. How
did this concept, practiced with great proficiency by the west in particular in
its forays into the developing world to bring about regime change in its
favour, come to nestle in our bosoms of late? Some background may be useful.
Pakistan’s establishment refined proxy war as an art during the long Afghan
wars. The success of such warfare against the Soviets and communists in
Afghanistan emboldened it to attempt something similar in Indian Held Kashmir (IHK)
from 1989 onwards, the very year the Soviets retreated from Afghanistan. But
our proxy planners and warriors failed to take adequate account of the very
important differences between the two situations. Nevertheless, the insurgency
and protest movement persist to this day and have been met by an overwhelming
Indian military and security forces presence in IHK and extreme repression of
the Kashmiri people. India generally, and the Modi government in particular,
refuse to countenance the historically necessary internal rapprochement with
the Kashmiri people and talks with Pakistan to resolve the long standing
conundrum. With this one-sided heavy-handed approach amidst repression against
Kashmiris all over India in particular and Muslims in general, Modi’s Hindutva
agenda is in action in full force. This tyranny may endure for now, but is unlikely
to quell the Kashmiri spirit of seeking liberation.
While the IHK
pot now simmers now boils, Pakistan now also stands accused by Iran at the very
least of turning a blind eye to the presence of Jaish-e-Adl (JeA) on its soil,
from where previous and the latest attack on the Iranian Revolutionary Guards
was launched. Iran is now making threatening noises of retaliation if Pakistan does
not act itself.
The question is,
can Pakistan, under its nuclear weapons umbrella, continue with this high risk
strategy of three proxy wars with three of its neighbours without suffering some
adverse consequences? The world is watching and listening, and Pakistan’s attempts
at plausible deniability in all three cases are wearing increasingly thin. It
is in our interests to promote a political settlement of the war in
Afghanistan, adopt a policy of persuading India to implement an internal
political settlement with the Kashmiris and an external one with Pakistan, and
desist from even the appearance of condoning terrorist forays across the border
with Iran.
Pakistan has to
live, survive and prosper in today’s interconnected world. Going out on a limb
for dubious strategic gains in the region is not in our best interests. Time to
introspect.
rashed-rahman.blogspot.com
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