Monday, January 14, 2019

Business Recorder Column January 15, 2019

Terrorism and nationalist insurgencies

Rashed Rahman

A grim reminder of the reduced but nevertheless continuing threat from terrorism was provided in recent days by a car bomb in Peshawar and firing from across the Afghan border at Landikotal. Meanwhile two bomb blasts in Pishin and Panjgur districts in Balochistan once again turned the spotlight on the festering nationalist insurgency in that province. Summing up the terrorism and nationalist insurgency landscape is the Pakistan Security Report 2018 by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), an Islamabad-based think tank on security and conflict in Pakistan and the region.
First the recent incidents mentioned above. The car bomb in Peshawar on January 5 in a market area was set off by its driver, who alighted and disappeared from view on CCTV cameras just before an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) was detonated by remote control. Fortunately, the casualty toll was six people injured, including two women, but no deaths. Three stores were damaged by the 8-10 kilograms IED, in the first such incident of 2019.
On January 6, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar terrorists attacked a checkpoint of the security forces in the Loy Shalman area in Landikotal, Khyber tribal district. The attack was repulsed without any casualties. This incident may reflect the increased difficulties of the terrorists based on Afghan soil to infiltrate into Pakistani territory because of the fencing and beefed up security on the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa border, across which are grouped the terrorists driven out of the tribal areas by the military’s counterinsurgency campaigns.
The Pishin and Panjgur bomb blasts in Balochistan had striking similarities, both in modus operandi as well as targets. In both cases, IEDs were planted in motorcycles that were then parked either at the offices or routes of the security forces and detonated by remote control. The casualty toll was 12 persons wounded, including four security personnel. These blasts followed close on the heels of the attack on a Frontier Corps (FC) training facility in Loralai the other day in which all four attackers were killed and four each security forces personnel were killed and wounded.
Now for the PIPS report. Its analysis informs us that there was a decline of 29 percent in terrorist attacks in 2018. It nevertheless regards the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its allied groups, which now include the local chapter of Islamic State (IS), as the most potent threat, followed by nationalist insurgent groups, especially in Balochistan. Unlike the run of reporting and commentary on the issue of terrorist attacks, the PIPS report argues that a distinction needs to be made and maintained between the terrorists per se and the nationalist insurgency in Balochistan. It reminds us that the National Action Plan (NAP) calls for reconciliation efforts with the nationalist insurgents in Balochistan and argues against foregoing this aim or conflating nationalist attacks with terrorism despite the nationalist insurgents seemingly having taken a leaf out of the terrorists’ playbook in mounting suicide attacks. The argument has merit since, unlike the fanatical fundamentalist terrorists, the nationalist insurgency in Balochistan is essentially a political issue based on a sense of grievance by the Baloch on their treatment at the hands of the Pakistani state since Independence and deprivation of their legitimate share in the mineral and other natural resources of the province. The parameters of this issue offer scope for solutions within the four corners of the Constitution and law on the basis of provincial autonomy (largely conceded already under the 18th Amendment but awaiting proper implementation), unlike the track record of failed reconciliation attempts with the fundamentalist terrorist groups, who finally had to be driven out of their bases in the tribal areas and across the border into Afghanistan by means of the military’s counterinsurgency campaigns in erstwhile FATA.
Any attempt at mainstreaming terrorist outfits, the report continues, should be undertaken through a proper mechanism so as not to be seen as excluding those already mainstreamed. This recommendation is difficult to swallow since the so-called ‘mainstreaming’ project has simply translated in practice into banned terrorist outfits reinventing themselves with new names, being allowed thereby to function openly, and even participate in elections. The 2018 elections in particular showed the outcome of such efforts in proscribed extremist organisations under new banners running in and even winning some seats. What this does is confer an aura of legitimacy under the camouflage of changed names on banned terrorist outfits.
The good news the report delivers is that terrorist and nationalist groups carried out 262 attacks in 2018, including 19 suicide and gun-and-suicide coordinated attacks, killing 595 people and wounding 1,030. This represents a 29 percent decline in such attacks compared to 2017. Of these 262 attacks, 171 or over 65 percent were carried out by Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), its splinter groups (mainly Jamaatul Ahrar), Hizbul Ahrar and other groups with similar aims as TTP and Islamic State (IS), killing 449 people (over 75 percent of the total killed of 595). The other contributory factor was 11 sectarian attacks that killed 50 people and wounded 45. Nationalist insurgent groups, mostly in Balochistan followed by a few in Sindh, carried out 80 attacks with a death toll of 96 people.
More than half of all attacks, about 136, hit security and law enforcement agencies (LEAs). In turn the security forces and LEAs killed 120 militants in 2018 compared to 524 in 2017 in 31 military operations in addition to 22 armed clashes across the four provinces. Unfortunately we do not have a breakdown of these figures to distinguish between terrorists and nationalist insurgents.
Another factor of concern was 24 attacks on political leaders and workers in which 218 people were killed and 394 wounded. The deadliest of these targeted attacks occurred during the run-up to the 2018 elections.
The report also notes 131 cross-border attacks from Afghanistan, India and Iran, claiming 111 lives and wounding 290. The inclusion of India in this regard is puzzling, unless the report is lending credence to India’s claim of surgical strikes across the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir, although even that is untenable in the face of India so far only claiming one such strike in 2016, a claim refuted and disputed by Pakistan.
The report says Balochistan remains the centre of conflict. The province’s tally of deaths is 354, which represents 59 percent of the total countrywide toll. Two attacks by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) stand out for targeting Chinese workers and diplomats. However, the report cautions that while groups like TTP and IS carried out less attacks in Balochistan, the death toll was far higher. Not surprisingly, the report notes that Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), including the tribal areas, faced the highest number of terrorist attacks compared to all other regions of the country.
The report says Pakistan is struggling to convince the world of its bona fides in the anti-terrorism war. Pakistan’s allowing the banned terrorist outfits to resurrect themselves under different banners and enter the mainstream of national life and politics has much to do with that. The report recommends removing all ambiguity in this matter, making any process to this end inclusive, led by parliament, which should define the criteria for mainstreaming such groups. This exercise could also strengthen Pakistan’s efforts to meet the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF’s) demands regarding the status of banned terrorist outfits.
The real worry now is the fallout of US President Donald Trump’s declared intent to quit Afghanistan. With the negotiations between the US and the Afghan Taliban still a long way from resolution, including the latter’s acceptance of the Kabul government as a possible peace partner, the consequences of a US withdrawal could be severe. These could include an outright Taliban capture of power, setting off potentially a new civil war and a fresh wave of refugees into neighbouring countries like Pakistan and Iran.
Much food for thought.


rashed-rahman.blogspot.com

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