Pakistan’s
increasing isolation
Rashed Rahman
Chief of Army
Staff (COAS) General Qamar Javed Bajwa is bending his back these days to
convince a sceptical world that Pakistan does not harbour the Afghan Taliban or
Haqqani Network in safe havens on Pakistani soil. That was again the gist of
his message on February 17, 2018 at the Munich Security Conference. He said
Pakistan had defeated al Qaeda, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other
militant groups, and therefore no organised military camps exist on Pakistani
soil today. General Bajwa also claimed that Pakistan has denied Islamic State
(IS) any foothold in the country.
Now while the
claims about ‘defeating’ al Qaeda and the TTP have considerable weight,
realistically speaking, claiming ‘victory’ against shadowy terrorist groups is
always fraught with risk. In the nature of things, insurgents faced with
overwhelming military odds normally choose to move away to avoid a frontal collision
that is likely to go badly for them. This is the inherent nature of guerrilla
warfare, where the overwhelming superiority of the enemy is blunted by trading
space for time, living to fight on another day. It is not certain how much of
the post-bin Laden al Qaeda still survives in the badlands on Pakistan’s border
with Afghanistan. We do know for sure that the al Qaeda ideological franchise
has spread to many parts of the world. Ayman al-Zawahari, the successor of
Osama bin Laden as leader of al Qaeda, was believed until some time ago to be
still holed up in the border lands. But since he has not issued any of his
ritual video messages since September 2017, it is not known how he is and where
located, speculation notwithstanding.
As far as TTP is
concerned, there is no denying that the Pakistan army has by and large driven
them from their bases in FATA through Operation Zarb-e-Azb. However, their
‘defeat’ consists so far only in losing their base areas. They have relocated
to Afghanistan just across the border and, taking advantage of the poorly
policed area, are utilising Afghan soil to mount terrorist attacks inside
Pakistan. Such attacks would be difficult to mount though without secret
sleeper cells inside Pakistan to fulfil the functions of logistics, safe
houses, etc, for such forays. On the evidence therefore, it would be more accurate
to describe the present state of the TTP as severely wounded, but not dead.
What is
intriguing about General Bajwa’s formulation is not so much what he mentions,
but what he leaves out. There is no mention of the Afghan Taliban or the
Haqqani Network, the bone of contention with Washington and Kabul. A bit of
historical context may not be out of place here.
After 9/11, the
Taliban proved uncooperative in delivering Osama bin Laden to justice. They
then suffered the ‘shock and awe’ invasion and occupation of their country by
the US led at the time by George Bush. The Taliban at that juncture made the
mistake of trying positional warfare against the invaders, whose advance
phalanx struck with the awesome weight of modern air power. The rain of bombs
forced the Afghan Taliban to break ranks and run to preserve whatever they
could of their forces, albeit not without losing a great many fighters in the
process. Their government in Kabul fell, and those that survived the US air
onslaught sought refuge in Pakistan in FATA and the border areas of Balochistan.
There they have remained to this day. General Bajwa may be right when he
disclaims any ‘safe havens’, but perceptive observers have long argued that the
US pressure on this issue would probably be met by converting the Afghan
Taliban’s ‘safe havens’ (i.e. organised military camps) into ‘safe houses’
(i.e. locations not visible to any ‘eye in the sky’). If that is indeed what
has transpired, General Bajwa has his work cut out for him in trying to persuade
the world of Pakistan’s stance.
That stance
includes new, incremental elements of late. One, Pakistan is a victim of
terrorism (true) and has made enormous sacrifices in the struggle against
terrorism (also true when measured in human lives, disruption, economic losses,
etc). Two, the terrorists operating inside Afghanistan do not need Pakistani
soil to operate from since they control at least 40 percent of Afghan
territory. Three, the terrorists carrying out attacks in Kabul and other cities
probably meld into the residual 2.7 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan (this
argument’s logic contradicts the second argument above).
Are these
arguments winning the day for Pakistan internationally, let alone with
sceptical Washington and Kabul? The weight of evidence is to the contrary. The
US, Afghanistan, the west and large parts of the rest of the world regard the
discriminatory actions of the Pakistan military as the latest manifestation of
the ‘good Taliban, bad Taliban’ binary. In other words, Pakistan picks and
chooses to attack Taliban who challenge the Pakistan state, while turning a
blind eye to, if not collaborating with, Taliban who attack neighbouring
Afghanistan.
And lest we be
misled into thinking that we only have problems with the US over Afghanistan,
the recent flurry of actions against Jamaat ud Dawa on the eve of the review of
Pakistan’s anti-terrorism financing regime by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
is an indicator that the Pakistani authorities are aware of the severe
financial and economic consequences of that review going against them. Whether
the takeover of Jamaat ud Dawa’s assets, including its Muridke complex, will
prove sufficient in the absence of similar actions against other UN-proscribed
(and banned by Pakistan) terrorist groups operating from and within Pakistan
remains to be seen.
Despite US
President Donald Trump’s by now well known belligerent demeanour, the US
administration appears constrained by the Pentagon’s advice. This US
institution remains the best friend the Pakistan army has in Washington. There
are a number of reasons for this. One, frictions over Afghanistan
notwithstanding, the Pentagon sees Pakistan’s battle hardened army as its best
ally in the region and beyond. Two, the logistical considerations of the
ongoing Afghan war restrict Washington’s room for manoeuvre against Pakistan.
That is what explains the ‘good cop, bad cop’ routine being practiced by
Washington vis-à-vis Pakistan.
These
considerations do not apply in the realm of bilateral aid (cut off recently) or
turning the financial and economic screws on Islamabad. The FATF gambit may
well be followed to deny or make prohibitively expensive multilateral lending
to a foreign exchange-strapped Pakistan. Neither China, despite its heavy
investments in Pakistan under CPEC, nor any other country can or will step in
to plug this impending hole in our finances. This turning of the financial
screws on Pakistan is likely to remain the preferred option for Washington,
since it can ostensibly be presented as unrelated to the latter’s concerns vis-à-vis
Afghanistan or even, arguably, groups in Pakistan targeting Indian Held
Kashmir. Watch this space.
rashed-rahman.blogspot.com
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