Talking to Baloch insurgents
Prime Minister (PM) Imran Khan’s visit to Gwadar on July 5, 2021 provided the opportunity to express his desire to hold talks with the Baloch nationalist insurgents. While dilating on the development of Gwadar specifically and Balochistan generally, Imran Khan conceded the Baloch people have not been treated fairly nor have their genuine grievances (accumulated over the decades since Independence) been addressed. This may have induced the angry Baloch to take up arms. In the context of the looming crisis in neighbouring Afghanistan that may trigger a fresh civil war in that country and a fresh influx of refugees into neighbouring countries such as Iran and Pakistan, Imran Khan underlined the importance of working for peace in Balochistan. While CPEC and Chinese investment in Gwadar and other areas of Balochistan can be expected to bring long overdue development to the most underdeveloped province of Pakistan, these benefits, if they are to change the lives of the Baloch people, can only deliver if development finds ownership by the local populace. One could argue, while looking back at the history of conflict in Balochistan, with the current fifth insurgency by Baloch nationalists in progress, that a fresh approach to this virtually perennial problem is required.
Balochistan has been on the receiving end of a heavy-handed, repressive approach, including, but not confined to, military operations since Pakistan came into being. Although it may seem that the original conflict over Balochistan’s desire to be treated as a state with treaty status with the British colonialist Crown and thus differently and allowed the right of deciding its own fate and future by now is irrelevant or out of date, the fact that that original conflict was followed by broken promises, exploitation of Balochistan’s Sui gas and minerals for the development of the rest of the country while depriving Balochistan of its share and even royalties, only served to add to the list of grievances of the people of Balochistan. Military might unleashed by the Ayub military dictatorship, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government and General (retd) Pervez Musharraf’s regime has only served to fuel the fire. From 1978, when the fourth nationalist insurgency of the 1970s abated, the political mood in Balochistan swung round to fighting for rights within the parliamentary system rather than through armed struggle. Unfortunately, that golden opportunity to find a permanent peaceful solution to Balochistan’s woes was wasted since the relatively sparsely populated province could not exercise the kind of heft and influence at the Centre that could have found peaceful, democratic solutions to the province’s troubles. Disappointment with that 25-year peaceful interregnum persuaded a new generation of alienated Baloch to once again take up arms in 2002. The reckless actions of Musharraf in killing Nawab Akbar Bugti produced rebellion by a section of his tribe that had earlier not been part of Balochistan’s insurgencies. Also, during this period (post-9/11), the worldwide tendency to lump all non-state actors and their movements in the ‘terrorist’ basket obliterated the fine but critical dividing line between religiously motivated terrorism per se and the nationalist insurgency in Balochistan. What followed as a result was a ‘one size fits all’ policy of using military might to quell, once again, what remains essentially a political problem. In recognition of this, the then Chief Minister Balochistan Dr Abdul Malik made efforts to negotiate with the insurgents, going so far as to meet their leaders in exile, but his well-intentioned gambit ran foul of the insurgents’ critical question whether he had the mandate to implement his proposals for a peaceful, political settlement. Since Dr Malik was unable to convince his Baloch insurgent interlocutors of his power to do so, the effort came to naught. A similar risk attends Imran Khan’s initiative to use political negotiations rather than military means to resolve Balochistan’s troubles. The question now can be rephrased to ask whether the security establishment backs the PM’s move and has been persuaded of the efficacy of switching from military means to political negotiations to bring peace to Balochistan. Needless to say, ending the conflict in Balochistan is not only in the interests of the state and the people of the province, the latter will only acquire a sense of ownership of the CPEC and other development efforts in the province if peace prevails and they are made beneficiaries of the development envisaged for Balochistan.
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