The price of defeat
Rashed Rahman
US Special Envoy for Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad is once more treading the well worn path of a political settlement of the Afghan war that would allow a defeated US a face-saving exit while saving as much of the Afghan government of Ashraf Ghani and the liberal-progressive reforms in Afghan society since 2001. This repeat journey has taken him once again to Doha, Qatar, where the Taliban office is located and talks have resumed without disclosing their content. Swinging by Islamabad to meet Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi and COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa, Khalilzad ended his regional tryst in Kabul to have talks with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani.
The communiqués from Islamabad and Kabul tell us little, and there is only silence from Doha. Media reports churn once again past rounds of talks and at best add updates regarding the battlefield. However, the shape and conjuncture of the talks are by now clear.
The US seemed to be on the verge of an undisclosed deal with the Taliban in September 2019 before US President Donald Trump abruptly called off the whole thing because of an attack on US forces in Kabul. The resurrected talks suffered another blow because of an attack on US forces in Bagram. It seemed the US was, by its off-again, on-again talks tactic, conveying the message that violence must decrease if a peace deal is to be signed. After the two talks setbacks mentioned above, the Taliban have ‘conceded’ only a reduction of attacks on US forces and the cities, while increasing their attacks in the rural areas. Clearly, this is a tactical shift on their part to open a window to secure a US withdrawal, while keeping up the pressure on US and Afghan forces in the countryside.
Meantime the intra-Afghan dialogue so dear to President Ghani’s so far ignored government in the minuet between the US and the Taliban, seems nowhere in sight. The Taliban want to postpone any decision on this front until after a peace deal with the US is signed. So far, Washington does not appear to have put much pressure behind according the Kabul government a ‘promotion’ from ‘US puppet’ (in the Taliban’s eyes) to indispensable peace partner.
In 2019, just to illustrate the point, the Taliban carried out over 8,000 attacks, up from over 6,000 in 2018. Retaliatory stepped up air attacks by the US and operations by the CIA-trained Afghan special forces led to over 8,000 civilian casualties in the blood-soaked country. The Taliban have made overtures from time to time offering brief ceasefires, which have of late not found favour in Washington that would like a permanent ceasefire to produce the conditions for an orderly withdrawal under satisfactory conditions. However, the prospects for this ‘happy’ ending do not seem bright.
The US reacted to 9/11 by invading and occupying Afghanistan, in the process overthrowing the Taliban government that had hosted Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. In the early years after the invasion and occupation, Washington mouthed ambitious plans for ‘nation-building’ in Afghanistan to turn it into a modern, liberal, democratic state. However, the escape of the Taliban to Pakistan (and, as was later revealed, Osama bin Laden) and their guerrilla resistance put paid not only to such fanciful schemes, but over time demonstrated the precariousness of the US’s hold on the country.
By now, the peace process initiated by Washington reflects, more than anything else, its defeat at the hands of the Taliban resistance. ‘Defeat’ in such conflicts is defined by the fact that the occupying power has been unable to achieve its goals, amongst which can be counted the military defeat of the Taliban and the construction of a credible post-Taliban order in Afghanistan capable of standing on its own feet even after the US departs. For the Taliban, ‘victory’ translates into foiling the US’s plans and staying the course despite tremendous odds. As things have played out and as they now stand, the US is desperately searching for a way out of the Afghan quagmire that does not dent its image of the world’s pre-eminent power, before whom all must kneel or perish.
The likely post-US withdrawal scenario, whenever and in whatever circumstances it takes place, portends another disaster in disaster-prone Afghanistan. Whether the Ashraf Ghani government survives or not, the expected Taliban push for power (even despite some sort of power-sharing agreement, unlikely as it looks for the moment) promises a renewed civil war, with the tenuous unity of the Ashraf Ghani-led anti-Taliban Pashtun forces with the Tajik Northern Alliance coming under immense strain. If this unity succumbs to the exigencies of the new civil war with the Taliban, it could mean Afghan society splintering once again along ethnic lines, with the majority Pashtuns split between the Taliban and their foes.
Though the Pakistani military establishment may feel a quiet triumphalism at having brought the mighty US to its knees through its duality of policy of running with the (Taliban) hare and hunting with the (US) hounds, the fallout of a renewed civil war in Afghanistan cannot but affect Pakistan, particularly its Pashtun belt. If the US is paying the price of its defeat in Afghanistan and attempting to minimise the damage to its repute and status, Pakistan cannot remain smug or complacent if the above post-US withdrawal scenario plays out. The intra-Afghan dialogue, if, when and in whatever shape or form it occurs, will not untie this Gordian knot. Nor will Pakistan’s successes against its own homegrown Taliban movement remain undisturbed. The fact that the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan is now largely based across the border on Afghan soil could mean a resurgent Afghan Taliban or their all-out victory could bring the Pakistani Taliban back into play, with its concomitant implications for our security.
rashed-rahman.blogspot.com
rashed.rahman1@gmail.com
No comments:
Post a Comment