An ephemeral peace
Rashed Rahman
The partial truce/ceasefire in Afghanistan that kicked in on February 22, 2020, if it holds, is expected to lead to the signing of a deal between the US and the Taliban on February 29, 2020 to allow the withdrawal of US forces from their longest foreign war. So far into the truce, reports speak of some small clashes in the rural areas but no major attacks. That serves to demonstrate to Washington’s satisfaction that the Taliban high command is in charge of its fighters in the field and that the latter are bound by the organisation’s discipline. So if the trend continues and no major incidents occur, it would be reasonable to assume that the February 29, 2020 signing of a ‘peace’ deal would go ahead as planned.
The problem of course is that the terms of the withdrawal of US forces are not known. As often expressed by US officials from President Donald Trump downwards, Washington would like to leave its air power and special forces in place despite the withdrawal of most ground troops. This is considered necessary to prevent the Taliban rolling over the Afghan government immediately after the US military withdraws the bulk of its forces. The other desire expressed by unofficial sources in the media and elsewhere is for the US to retain the intelligence and listening capacity it has through its presence in Afghanistan. This capability allows intelligence monitoring of Central Asia, Russia, China and Iran. Understandably, the US intelligence establishment would not like to have to abandon this precious Afghan ‘listening post’.
There are many unanswered questions before a conclusive finding can be arrived at about whether the revived efforts after the September 2019 cancellation by Trump of a political settlement will succeed according to plan. One, and obviously, the ‘plan’ is tantalisingly obscured from view. Two, no one is in a position to gauge the intentions of the Taliban after the bulk of US forces depart. The planned intra-Afghan dialogue in Oslo after the peace deal signing is still bogged down in uncertainty, not the least of which is the composition of the Afghan government side. Although the Taliban want it and President Ashraf Ghani has rhetorically supported the idea of a broad-based delegation that represents all shades of anti-Taliban opinion, after the controversy once again over the Afghan presidential elections that Ghani is reported to have won but which result has once again been rejected by his main rival Abdullah Abdullah, Ghani would obviously prefer to have his own ilk of delegate in Oslo. That would leave Abdullah Abdullah’s Tajik constituency and its allies out of the loop and inevitably raise questions about the representative character of the delegation.
The signs that Washington has ostensibly accepted the Taliban as legitimate players on the Afghan chessboard include the op-ed written by Sirajuddin Haqqani of the notorious Haqqani Network in The New York Times in which he sought to allay fears that the Taliban may not honour the commitments they make as part of the peace deal once the US presence is reduced and emphasised that women’s rights secured during the years the Taliban were out of power will be preserved (i.e. no repeat of the Taliban’s harsh repressive policies during their first stint in power). He also held out the olive branch of forging ties with the US and other countries, which would stand in stark contrast to the isolation of the 1996-2001 hardline Taliban government recognized only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Pakistan, in the shape of Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi, has lately been crowing about Pakistan’s role in bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table and persuading Washington to restart the peace talks after their abrupt breakdown in September 2019. While Mr Qureshi wishes to paint this contribution in the rosy hues of a peacemaker, the facts don’t quite fit that picture. Pakistan is feeling quite quietly triumphant at achieving its plan since 9/11 and the US invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. Starting with Musharraf, this plan consisted of a duality of policy whereby the Taliban were provided safe havens on Pakistani soil while Islamabad was ostensibly helping Washington in its aims in Afghanistan. The clever camouflage thrown over this duality of policy was Pakistan’s ‘delivering’ al Qaeda to the US (with the notable exception of Osama bin Laden) while saving the Taliban for a rainy day. History indicated that that rainy day would arrive sooner or later because like all previous invaders and occupiers of Afghanistan, the US would eventually tire in the face of the unremitting resistance of the Taliban (bolstered by their bases on Pakistani soil). This eventuality is what has now come to pass.
Would the Taliban, having fought the US to a standstill, now accept less than complete power? Perhaps tactically they might, as appears to be the case in their soothing noises to lubricate the US withdrawal, after which the overthrow of the Afghan government, despite whatever power sharing arrangement emerges from the intra-Afghan dialogue, seems only a matter of time.
This denouement may not be what the US wants, but it has realistically calculated that this is the best path to cutting any further losses, ensuring in the process the hoped for re-election of President Donald Trump as the incumbent who delivered on his promise to end the US’s involvement in the war in Afghanistan. Whether, however, the ‘peace’ deal will hold after the bulk of US forces withdraw, and what will be the consequences of a possible Taliban bid at that point to capture total power are unknowns. If such a bid does transpire, it promises the beginnings of another phase of the civil war, certainly not peace.
Ephemeral and uncertain as the prospects of peace appear at this point, the ‘deal’ is a recognition of necessity by Washington and its best possible face-saving withdrawal from an unwinnable war. For the hundreds of thousands of Afghan victims of the wars that have raged in that unfortunate country for almost five decades and their families, this is obviously not heartening news. But to hide one’s head in the sand ostrich-like and pretend peace is about to break out could lead to even more bitter heartbreak if things do not work out as they are being touted.
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