Business Recorder Editorial February 28, 2020

Release of NAB detainees

An Islamabad High Court (IHC) division bench comprising Chief Justice (CJ) Athar Minallah and Justice Lubna Saleem has ordered on February 25, 2020 the release on bail of former prime minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi and former interior minister Ahsan Iqbal in the LNG Terminal and Narowal Sports City project cases, respectively. Their release comes after seven months behind bars for Shahid Khaqan Abbasi and two months for Ahsan Iqbal. The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) that had incarcerated both Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) leaders faced tough grilling by the bench regarding the grounds for their arrest. In the case of Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, it was revealed that the charge against him that as petroleum minister he manipulated the appointment of a UK-based firm, QED, as a consultant for the LNG Terminal project held no water as the entire project was funded by USAID, which also appointed QED. Similarly, NAB’s accusation that Shahid Khaqan Abbasi managed the appointment of a firm Maverick Legal for QED’s assistance was shot down during the proceedings when NAB’s investigating officer could not produce any documentary evidence for the same. Under questioning by the bench, he finally admitted that Maverick Legal too had been appointed by USAID. Trying to manufacture reliance on a Supreme Court directive to launch the probe, NAB’s prosecutor was embarrassed when told by the IHC bench that the apex court had referred the matter to NAB for further action and that is all. To top off this comedy of errors, the NAB investigating officer read out a statement of the ex-secretary for petroleum, Abid Saeed, who had turned approver in the case. But CJ Minallah wanted to know how the NAB chairman could pardon the then federal secretary who was the principal accounting officer of the ministry in charge of the whole project. The CJ made a rhetorical remark about the reference against Abbasi being prepared on the basis of a statement recorded after a lapse of five years. The investigating officer then tried to insinuate that a lower tariff was available from another company dealing in LNG, but soon confessed during questioning by the court that said company had not participated in the bidding process, which was in any case covered by a USAID grant for a specific purpose and therefore did not fall under the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority rules. In Ahsan Iqbal’s case, since NAB has yet to frame charges against him and could not satisfy the court that corruption rather than alleged procedural lapses were involved in the Narowal Sports City project, NAB could only watch sheepishly as Ahsan Iqbal too was granted bail.

Of late, the superior courts have taken NAB to task for arbitrarily, even without investigation, arresting people accused of some misdeameanour and keeping them incarcerated while so-called investigations proceed. But in a number of cases even before this one, judicial scrutiny has exposed NAB’s lack of capacity or expertise to conduct such investigations, which cause hardship to those languishing behind bars indefinitely. The courts are increasingly finding this unacceptable on the logic that investigations can surely proceed even without keeping the accused under lock and key, and if NAB has reservations about any of them attempting to flee the country to escape prosecution, surely remedy lies in asking for surrender of their passports and putting their names on the Exit Control List rather than keeping them behind bars. A vigorous debate is emerging on the NAB chairman’s powers of arrest under the NAB Ordinance. Parliament should take up this issue and modify these powers to conform to the normal law of the land rather than the present draconian setup that has already caused so much unnecessary hardship and in the process earned NAB a bad name for being partisan and pillorying only the opposition.

Business Recorder Column February 25, 2020

An ephemeral peace

Rashed Rahman

The partial truce/ceasefire in Afghanistan that kicked in on February 22, 2020, if it holds, is expected to lead to the signing of a deal between the US and the Taliban on February 29, 2020 to allow the withdrawal of US forces from their longest foreign war. So far into the truce, reports speak of some small clashes in the rural areas but no major attacks. That serves to demonstrate to Washington’s satisfaction that the Taliban high command is in charge of its fighters in the field and that the latter are bound by the organisation’s discipline. So if the trend continues and no major incidents occur, it would be reasonable to assume that the February 29, 2020 signing of a ‘peace’ deal would go ahead as planned.

The problem of course is that the terms of the withdrawal of US forces are not known. As often expressed by US officials from President Donald Trump downwards, Washington would like to leave its air power and special forces in place despite the withdrawal of most ground troops. This is considered necessary to prevent the Taliban rolling over the Afghan government immediately after the US military withdraws the bulk of its forces. The other desire expressed by unofficial sources in the media and elsewhere is for the US to retain the intelligence and listening capacity it has through its presence in Afghanistan. This capability allows intelligence monitoring of Central Asia, Russia, China and Iran. Understandably, the US intelligence establishment would not like to have to abandon this precious Afghan ‘listening post’.

There are many unanswered questions before a conclusive finding can be arrived at about whether the revived efforts after the September 2019 cancellation by Trump of a political settlement will succeed according to plan. One, and obviously, the ‘plan’ is tantalisingly obscured from view. Two, no one is in a position to gauge the intentions of the Taliban after the bulk of US forces depart. The planned intra-Afghan dialogue in Oslo after the peace deal signing is still bogged down in uncertainty, not the least of which is the composition of the Afghan government side. Although the Taliban want it and President Ashraf Ghani has rhetorically supported the idea of a broad-based delegation that represents all shades of anti-Taliban opinion, after the controversy once again over the Afghan presidential elections that Ghani is reported to have won but which result has once again been rejected by his main rival Abdullah Abdullah, Ghani would obviously prefer to have his own ilk of delegate in Oslo. That would leave Abdullah Abdullah’s Tajik constituency and its allies out of the loop and inevitably raise questions about the representative character of the delegation.

The signs that Washington has ostensibly accepted the Taliban as legitimate players on the Afghan chessboard include the op-ed written by Sirajuddin Haqqani of the notorious Haqqani Network in The New York Times in which he sought to allay fears that the Taliban may not honour the commitments they make as part of the peace deal once the US presence is reduced and emphasised that women’s rights secured during the years the Taliban were out of power will be preserved (i.e. no repeat of the Taliban’s harsh repressive policies during their first stint in power). He also held out the olive branch of forging ties with the US and other countries, which would stand in stark contrast to the isolation of the 1996-2001 hardline Taliban government recognized only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Pakistan, in the shape of Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi, has lately been crowing about Pakistan’s role in bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table and persuading Washington to restart the peace talks after their abrupt breakdown in September 2019. While Mr Qureshi wishes to paint this contribution in the rosy hues of a peacemaker, the facts don’t quite fit that picture. Pakistan is feeling quite quietly triumphant at achieving its plan since 9/11 and the US invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. Starting with Musharraf, this plan consisted of a duality of policy whereby the Taliban were provided safe havens on Pakistani soil while Islamabad was ostensibly helping Washington in its aims in Afghanistan. The clever camouflage thrown over this duality of policy was Pakistan’s ‘delivering’ al Qaeda to the US (with the notable exception of Osama bin Laden) while saving the Taliban for a rainy day. History indicated that that rainy day would arrive sooner or later because like all previous invaders and occupiers of Afghanistan, the US would eventually tire in the face of the unremitting resistance of the Taliban (bolstered by their bases on Pakistani soil). This eventuality is what has now come to pass.

Would the Taliban, having fought the US to a standstill, now accept less than complete power? Perhaps tactically they might, as appears to be the case in their soothing noises to lubricate the US withdrawal, after which the overthrow of the Afghan government, despite whatever power sharing arrangement emerges from the intra-Afghan dialogue, seems only a matter of time.

This denouement may not be what the US wants, but it has realistically calculated that this is the best path to cutting any further losses, ensuring in the process the hoped for re-election of President Donald Trump as the incumbent who delivered on his promise to end the US’s involvement in the war in Afghanistan. Whether, however, the ‘peace’ deal will hold after the bulk of US forces withdraw, and what will be the consequences of a possible Taliban bid at that point to capture total power are unknowns. If such a bid does transpire, it promises the beginnings of another phase of the civil war, certainly not peace.

Ephemeral and uncertain as the prospects of peace appear at this point, the ‘deal’ is a recognition of necessity by Washington and its best possible face-saving withdrawal from an unwinnable war. For the hundreds of thousands of Afghan victims of the wars that have raged in that unfortunate country for almost five decades and their families, this is obviously not heartening news. But to hide one’s head in the sand ostrich-like and pretend peace is about to break out could lead to even more bitter heartbreak if things do not work out as they are being touted.

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

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Business Recorder Editorial February 25, 2020

Attorney General’s resignation

The Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) government seems to have a penchant for shooting itself in the foot. This time it was the government’s top legal officer, Attorney General Anwar Mansoor Khan who brought blushes to the government’s face. Arguing the case regarding the reference against Justice Qazi Faez Isa before a Supreme Court 10-member bench, (now former) Attorney General Anwar Mansoor reportedly made remarks against the judges comprising the bench that could have attracted contempt of court. The bench responded with great restraint, asking the Attorney General to place on record any evidence to substantiate the remarks he delivered on February 18, 2020, while expunging the said remarks from the record. As a result, the public does not know what exactly Anwar Mansoor delivered himself of, except for some intriguing hints in the media. Before things could go any further, Anwar tendered his resignation and submitted an unqualified apology to the Supreme Court. While he said he had resigned after criticism by the Pakistan Bar Council, the government, through the Law Ministry, distanced itself from Anwar’s remarks in court and insisted he had been asked to step down. Anwar Mansoor also insisted to the last that what he had said during the hearing was discussed with the government (implying it carried the incumbents’ imprimatur), but this was categorically denied by Law Minister Farogh Naseem. The whole fiasco once again exposed the lack of cohesion and coherence and haphazard functioning of the federal PTI government. The government has appointed Khalid Jawed Khan as Attorney General, and a notification to this effect has been issued.

There remain some unanswered questions surrounding the affair. How could the top government lawyer go so far as to call into question the integrity, standing, respect and dignity of the Supreme Court judges hearing the case with or without the government being in the know? If they were not in the know, as the Law Minister has claimed, how did Anwar Mansoor take it upon himself to transgress the limits of appropriate behaviour before the apex court? And if the government was trying to be too clever by half by calling into question the Supreme Court bench per se, are they now, through their denials, attempting damage control? In either case, the government emerges in a poor light. Even without full knowledge of the offending remarks of Mansoor Ali Khan, Pakistan People’s Party chairman Bilawal Bhutto Zardari has ventured that if the reports of Anwar Mansoor Khan having relied on what he claimed were surveillance reports of the apex court judges to deliver his comments were true, the government should resign. The temptation would be to dismiss this as mere politicking on the foundations of the embarrassment the government has faced. One wonders if the interests of transparency, the right of the public to know, and indeed the respect and dignity of the Supreme Court judges would not have been better served by full disclosure. This argument rests on the long experience of lack of transparency fuelling the rumour mills and even wild conspiracy theories. Nevertheless, the government has now approached the Supreme Court bench seized of the case with a request for adjournment for three weeks from the next date of hearing, February 24, 2020, to allow the new Attorney General to have time to prepare the case afresh. How the apex court proceeds from here is neither known nor should be speculated about, but arguably Anwar Mansoor Khan’s antics have certainly not helped the government’s cause in this matter.

Business Recorder editorial February 23, 2020

Clueless still

Life in Pakistan is proving not just difficult but even cheap. What began on the evening of February 16, 2020, as reports of some noxious fumes or gas that produced breathing difficulties to residents in Keamari, Karachi, close to the port remains a mystery as to the origins of this gas or noxious substance. Contradictory reports and rumours still abound, with little or no authoritative account of what happened, why, and where responsibility for the tragedy should lie. The pattern of initial denials and later passing the buck from one institution to the other was on display once again in this tragic episode. First reports spoke of ‘soya bean dust’ being the culprit, a notion reinforced by some doctors treating the affected, but denied wholesale by the shippers body. So convinced were the authorities of this explanation that they ordered an alleged offending ship unloading soya bean at the port to be shifted away from the area. Subsequently, there have emerged a whole rash of speculative theories about the culprit substance, ranging from poisonous choking gas such as methyl bromide (used as a fumigant for food shipments) or even hydrogen sulphide and nitric oxide. Amidst this confusion authored by the lack of an expert and authoritative institution capable of sifting the facts and evidence scientifically and arriving at some definitive explanation, and while the autopsy reports on the dead victims are not yet available, the authorities failed to reach out to the residents of the stricken area, either to evacuate them, as the Sindh government ‘ordered’ without lifting a finger to implement it, or to mollify the panic and fear that gripped the area because of the toll of human life and health exacted by the still unknown substance. Naturally in the absence of an authoritative explanation from the authorities, the rumour mills worked overtime. The frustrated residents of the area finally came out in a protest in the streets, only to disperse after negotiations with and assurances from the government. First reports spoke of 14 deaths and 200-300 persons seriously affected. These figures have now been modified by the authorities to 10 dead and 400-500 affected, most of the latter still under treatment in the local hospitals.

Although reports speak of the situation on the ground getting better (meaning a significant drop in the number of new cases) and life in Keamari haltingly returning to normal, the tragedy serves to underline the risks citizens face from the lack of separation of commercial and industrial operations from residential areas, a closeness that risks further such ‘accidents’. Secondly, the woeful inadequacy of institutions capable of identifying and dealing with such an outbreak points to the possibility of more such tragedies if timely steps are not taken in this regard. And last but not least, once the culprit substance has at long last been identified and its source determined, the reasons why the substance leaked and spread in the area must be ascertained and if human negligence or error is behind the tragedy, those responsible must be brought to book. Finally, the Sindh government would serve the people of Karachi well if it set up a high-powered body to investigate, analyse and report as soon as possible on other similar risks that may attend commercial and industrial operations cheek by jowl with residential areas and pre-emptive remedies for the same.

News on Sunday Column February 23, 2020

State of democracy, the past and present

Rashed Rahman

As Pakistan continues to struggle on the path of attaining a genuine parliamentary democracy, all eyes are currently focused on Prime Minister Imran Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) government. Unfortunately, the high hopes his electorate – of which the rising urban middle class constitutes the core – invested in Imran Khan as the negation of the other two mainstream parties, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), have yet to yield fruit. On the touchstone of handling the economy and running a parliamentary democracy, the PTI government has disappointed so far. But perhaps the fault lies more in the high expectations of this government than its performance in office over the last year and a half. Those expectations of course are rooted in the convoluted and complex history of the country’s travails in its journey towards democracy since independence.

A fundamental structural impediment to ringing in a genuine democracy confronted Pakistan from the very beginning, given its peculiar territorial makeup. Two wings, separated by a thousand miles of hostile Indian territory, confronted the leadership of the new state with complexities. The fact that East Pakistan at independence in 1947 constituted a majority (54 percent) of the country’s population, meant that the time honoured democratic principle of one-man-one-vote may end up yielding a permanent majority for the overwhelmingly Bengali populace of East Pakistan. This and the vexed questions surrounding the federal structure and provincial autonomy could not be resolved through the framing and promulgation of a constitution for nine long years after independence.

When, in 1956, a constitution finally saw the light of day, it was a unique construct. The provinces constituting West Pakistan, i.e. Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then called NWFP) and Balochistan were merged into One Unit and accorded ‘parity’ with the majority-population East Pakistan. It was a construct that, while obliterating the existence of the ancient provinces of West Pakistan with their own historical and cultural legacy, violated the one-man-one-vote principle of universal franchise and depreciated the vote of the citizen from East Pakistan in comparison with his/her counterpart in the western wing. The thought behind this move was obviously to weaken the hold of the natural majority of voters in East Pakistan in a democratic system and ensure that power remained concentrated in the western wing, particularly the Punjab, from which the majority of the two most powerful institutions inherited by the post-colonial state of Pakistan from British colonialism, the army and senior bureaucracy, were drawn.

The army and bureaucracy emerged after independence as more powerful than the political class. Their manoeuvrings of the political setup, initially (1947-58) from behind the scenes, shed this artifice when, after 4 prime ministers had come and gone in the brief period 1956-58, the whole system was wrapped up by army commander General Ayub Khan’s military coup. His partisan basic democracies presidential system failed to outlive his removal by the military under General Yahya Khan, when a countrywide agitation against his decade-long rule tolled in 1968-69 the death knell for Pakistan’s first military government.

Yahya ostensibly started off well by accepting the long standing demand for the undoing of One Unit and fair and free elections for a parliamentary democratic system in 1970. But he authored the breakup of the country by not accepting the majority mandate of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s Awami League and launching a military crackdown in East Pakistan. This resulted in the 1971 breaking away (with Indian help) of East Pakistan to re-emerge as Bangladesh. The Two Nation theory that had underpinned the pre-independence movement for Pakistan came into question as a result of this development. Logically, this outcome suggested religion was not a sufficient glue to hold the state together and democratic rights were a sine qua nonfor this purpose.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his PPP were brought to power by the post-Yahya military after the 1971 debacle. Bhutto’s five years in power present the contradictory spectacle of steps towards a democratic dispensation (e.g. the 1973 Constitution) and widespread repression (e.g. the military crackdown in Balochistan and severe handling of the opposition) that resulted finally in his overthrow by the military under General Ziaul Haq in 1977.

Ziaul Haq’s long dark regressive night finally yielded to restoration of democracy in 1988. However, the democracy was shadowed by the draconian 8^thAmendment introduced into the Constitution by Ziaul Haq. Three elected governments were dismissed by incumbent presidents under this law until Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N’s two thirds majority in the 1997 elections allowed the repeal of the notorious amendment.

The removal of this undemocratic instrument did not prevent another military coup by General Pervez Musharraf in 1999. His military rule ended finally in 2008, after which the PPP’s elected government lost power through the ballot box to the PML-N in 2013 for the first time in the country’s history.

Imran Khan and his PTI challenged the Nawaz Sharif PML-N government through their dharna(sit-in) in Islamabad for months. Nawaz Sharif’s removal by the Supreme Court was followed in 2018 by the controversial elections that brought Imran Khan to power, and so far he is ensconced in the seat (with the help, critics argue, of the military).

This brief and wholly inadequate recounting of the tortured journey and struggle for democracy in Pakistan suggests some underlying features of our history. Constant attempts by the military-bureaucratic oligarchy that the country inherited from colonialism emerged as the single greatest obstacle to the development and consolidation of a genuine democracy. This eventually cost us half the country. The other half, West Pakistan (now the remaining Pakistan), too has had its fair share of conflict over provincial autonomy and a democratic federal structure (to date five nationalist insurgencies in Balochistan, nationalist and democratic ruction in Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). Imran Khan’s perceived or actual failings notwithstanding, unless the powerful institution of the military (the junior partner in the oligarchy, the bureaucracy no longer being as powerful) steps back from politics and allows the free play of democracy through fair and free elections, freedom of expression, the media and the citizen, the sorry history of democracy’s travails seems destined to repeat itself ad nauseam.

The writer is a veteran journalist who has held senior editorial positions in several newspapers

Business Recorder Editorial February 22, 2020

Afghan refugees’ continuing plight

UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres’ participation in the “International Conference on 40 Years of Hosting Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: A New Partnership for Solidarity” has hopefully helped refocus the world’s attention on this lengthy displacement of millions of people. The call from the Conference to the representatives of nearly 20 countries attending as well as the world at large to support efforts for ending the protracted Afghan conflict to facilitate the return of the refugees is both timely and apt. It is estimated that Pakistan provided refuge to around 4.5 million Afghans at the peak of the conflict. Although with time and the conflicting fortunes of the Afghan wars, many refugees returned to their homeland, nearly 2.7 million refugees still reside on Pakistan’s soil. During this long stay, at least two generations have been born and grown up in exile in Pakistan. It should be mentioned that although the US-led west contributed to the upkeep of this huge population during the period when they were invested in the Afghan conflict and particularly against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, after the Soviets withdrew and the Berlin Wall crumbled in 1989, the so-called international community incrementally turned its back on the interminable conflict, including its victims the refugees. The West began from then on to treat the Afghan conflict as a ‘sideshow’ compared to its triumph over Communism, the seal on which was administered by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. That meant Pakistan was left holding the baby of the continuing civil war in Afghanistan as well as the burden of the huge Afghan refugee population, virtually alone and single-handed. Although it could be argued in hindsight that the ‘solutions’ engineered by our strategic thinkers, such as the raising and supporting of a new force, the Taliban, which entered the fray in 1994 and by 1996 were in control of the country, did not yield either peace or the return of the refugees. The US’s invasion and occupation of Afghanistan after 9/11 when the Taliban government refused to cooperate in bringing Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda to justice for the 9/11 atrocity has gone the way of all previous such adventures in Afghanistan. Not for nothing has the country been dubbed ‘the graveyard of empires’.

Now, 40 years later and still counting, Pakistan is very much within its rights to demand that the world accept its responsibility for this huge displaced population. As UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres framed it during his address at the Conference, it is time for the international community to step up to the plate and contribute to creating the conditions for a return of the refugees. Islamabad has rightly linked the refugees’ return with the peace settlement under discussion between the US and the Taliban. Given that the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Filippo Grandi was also in attendance at the Conference, he should have lent an attentive ear to what Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi delineated in his proposed 7-point action plan on the refugee issue, which included a call for providing the host country with the necessary resources to bear this huge burden, particularly since the Pakistani economy is not in the pink of health itself. Despite the fact that the peace deal under discussion between Washington and the Taliban still appears some way from closure, it remains the critical factor in creating the conditions of an absence of conflict and rehabilitation programmes for returning refugees that would provide a dignified return to their homes after decades of eking out a miserable existence in the refugee camps in Pakistan.

Business Recorder Column February 18, 2020

Now censorship of social media

Rashed Rahman

The insecurity and paranoia of the establishment increasingly on display is about to ‘conquer’ new heights (or lows, if you prefer). Having muzzled and gagged the mainstream media through financial strangulation (reduction of government advertising) and ‘directives’ regarding what is acceptable or not (both of which have ‘persuaded’ the corporate media to lie subserviently low), the guardians of our ‘national security’ (undefined and therefore open to the widest, most convenient description) have turned their unwanted attention to social media. The government has issued SRO (1)2019 dated January 21, 2020 that has delineated Citizens Protection (Against Online Harm) Rules. These rules have sprung from the government’s head like Medusa’s snakes without any attempt at consultation with citizens, providers, or stakeholders in social media.

The rules enjoin international social media companies to establish an office in Islamabad, establish database servers here, and provide any data or information sought by the authorities. Ostensibly this is intended to provide citizen data privacy. However, the rules soon let the cat out of the bag by laying down that these social media companies shall remove, suspend or disable access to such accounts and online content of citizens of Pakistan residing abroad who spread fake or defamatory news or material that violates the religious, cultural, ethnic or national security ‘sensitivities’ of Pakistan.

The rules speak for themselves so let us let them rest without comment as to their wording or content. However, what may be of greater value is to plumb the intent behind such vague, broad restrictions on free expression. Online and social media critics and dissidents physically present in Pakistan who do not toe the establishment’s line can be dealt with through traditional methods.

Since the authorities are relatively restricted in their ability to ‘reach out’ to critical and dissident exiles, the government has delivered its highly intelligent rules for reining them in on social media. But there appears to be a fly in the ointment.

The Asia Internet Coalition (AIC), an industry association comprised of the leading internet and technology companies, i.e. Facebook, Twitter, Google, Amazon, AirBnb, Apple, Booking.com, Expedia Group, Grab, LinkedIn, LINE, Rakuten and Yahoo (Oath) have warned the government that its new rules on online regulation will make it extremely difficult for digital companies to make their services available to Pakistani users and businesses. In a letter addressed to Prime Minister Imran Khan (who should have known better, given that his rise to power was fuelled to a considerable extent by his army of PTI trollers), AIC Managing Director Jeff Paine has expressed concern that these rules would severely cripple the growth of Pakistan’s digital economy (one of the few promising fields in today’s discouraging economic meltdown). The letter points out that no other country has announced such a sweeping set of rules, which risk Pakistan becoming isolated as a global outlier. The letter goes on to underline the lack of consultation with or input from stakeholders outside the government. The rules, AIC argues, are vague, arbitrary, and demand the social media companies to violate their confidentiality architecture and deviate from established human rights practices concerning user privacy and freedom of expression.

The last phrase above says it all. In this age of unfettered freedom of expression through one means or another, the Pakistani deep state wishes to impose the silence of the graveyard on our people at home and abroad. This reflects their insecurity and paranoia. Instead of embracing, in all their diversity of views and opinions, the citizens of Pakistan, the deep state wishes only one voice to emerge from this thicket – its own. What it does not realise is that this is a futile endeavour, not just because the means of free expression are so diverse and some beyond the control of their ‘thinkers’, but also because our history is the clearest evidence of the spirit of resistance to tyranny of our people. Quelling their voices, our friends in the ‘control’ department should realise, is not only difficult, it will prove a stretch too far. Nor should they forget the lesson of history that when you stifle dissent, the door is opened to new forms of resistance, some of which will bring little comfort to our ‘handlers’ of the national narrative.

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com

Business Recorder Editorial February 15, 2020

EU’s concerns

The European Commission of the European Union (EU) has in its bi-annual report on its Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP+) vis-à-vis Pakistan delivered a mixed balance sheet of progress and failings regarding fulfilment of the country’s commitments to meeting the 27 UN conventions that are the trade-off for concessional access to the EU market. As positives the report cites the institutional and capacity development of the Ministry of Human Rights, Treaty Implementation Cells, provincial human rights departments and cooperation with stakeholders. It acknowledges the ministry’s efforts for awareness on women’s and children’s rights with EU help. The report takes into account Pakistan’s progress in the fight against drugs, with the country leading a UN initiative on education in this regard. On the negative side, more ominously, the report expresses concerns at the state of civil society, freedom of expression, the media, and impunity on enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. Serious concern is expressed on the broad, vague grounds for cancellation of the registration of international non-government organisations. It cites the delay in the appointment of a commissioner for the National Commission for Human Rights as hampering its operation. The report lists the challenges to implementation/enforcement of UN Treaty Body obligations as the gaps/failings in devolved provincial powers under the 18^thAmendment, limited institutional coordination and capacity, not to mention scarce human and financial resources, and the effects of the overriding army and security (counter-terrorism) concerns. It focuses attention on the delay in passing of the Anti-Torture Bill that is still stuck in some parliamentary labyrinth. It deplores the high level of impunity for perpetrators of crimes against journalists and human rights defenders. The report comments on the present government’s anti-corruption drive by noting the criticism levelled against the National Accountability Bureau for being partisan and one-sided in its campaign against the opposition while giving the government a ‘free ride’. The report worries about the calls getting louder in Pakistan to strengthen the death penalty (in contrast with the worldwide trend). It argues for the need to bring about a transparent institutional setup. It highlights concerns about rampant forced and bonded labour, protection for collective bargaining and measures against wage discrimination. And last but not least, it bemoans the weakening of the labour inspection system.

The stakes of retaining the advantages GSP+ confers could not be higher. The arrangement offers partial if not full removal of duties on two-thirds of the EU’s tariff lines, the only rub being compliance with the 27 conventions on labour and human rights. To illustrate the benefits of GSP+, it is sufficient to point out that Pakistan tops among the nine countries availing the facility, enjoying 62 percent of all GSP+ imports into the EU in 2019 (74 percent in 2018). In the period 2008-18, EU imports from Pakistan rose from Euros 3.6 billion to 6.8 billion. Since the January 2014 award of GSP+ to Pakistan, there was a 30 percent increase in exports to the EU during 2014-16. This trend has since slowed, but Pakistan still enjoyed a trade surplus of Euros 1.2 billion with the EU in 2018. The EU is now the first export destination for Pakistani goods (34 percent of total exports in 2018), followed by the US (16 percent), China (eight percent), and Afghanistan (five percent). The EU is the third largest source for Pakistan’s imports (nine percent in 2018) after China (23 percent) and the UAE (14 percent). These figures speak for themselves. But what the EU report speaks of is our seemingly inexhaustible penchant for being quick to sign international conventions with a progressive tilt (especially if there is the kind of benefit that GSP+ bestows) and equally laggardly about implementing the provisions we have signed on for. The present state of political, legal and human rights, including freedom of expression and freedom from the dread hand of the deep state, speaks to the risks attendant on thinking the benefits of GSP+ can continue to be available irrespective of our failures in this regard.

Business Recorder Editorial February 13, 2020

Ehsan’s ‘escape’

The issue of former Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP’s) spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan’s ‘escape’ from the custody of the security agencies resonated in both houses of parliament on February 10, 2020. In the National Assembly (NA), the issue was first raised by MNA Mohsin Dawar of the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) and then taken up by the Pakistan People’s Party’s (PPP’s) Naveed Qamar. Mohsin Dawar sought an explanation from the government over the mysterious alleged escape of Ehsanullah Ehsan from the country. He said such a big blunder could not be called incompetence and pointed out that no one was listening to PTM’s warnings about the regrouping of the Taliban. The issue came to light recently through a social media video in which Ehsanullah Ehsan claimed he was in Turkey with his family. The government and the security authorities have so far maintained a resounding silence on the issue, except for an ‘acknowledgement’ by a ‘senior security official’ the other day that Ehsan had indeed escaped from custody. Naveed Qamar too demanded to know if Ehsanullah Ehsan had indeed escaped or been the beneficiary of some ‘deal’, which should be explicated even if such ‘deal’ was with the US. Both MNAs demanded an investigation of the matter by a parliamentary committee. Two Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) ministers were present in the house but maintained a studied (but meaningful) silence. MNA Imran Khattak who was presiding over the session in the absence of both the Speaker and Deputy Speaker fobbed off the demand for a parliamentary committee by saying he would only take a decision on the matter after receiving a response from the government. Given the latter’s deafening silence thus far, that may prove a long wait. In the Senate too, the Standing Committee on Interior sought a detailed report on the ‘escape’ within three days from the Ministry of Interior. Senator Javed Abbasi did fine to raise the issue but then spoilt his contribution by suggesting that if Ehsanullah Ehsan ended up in enemy hands that would be bad for our security but if he was on a ‘mission’, they would not take up the matter! The honourable Senator should reflect on the implications of his suggestion. PPP Chairman Bilawal Bhutto Zardari too weighed into the controversy by citing Ehsanullah Ehsan’s ‘escape’ as proof of the government’s incompetence and failure. How, he asked, could a person charged with the attacks on the Army Public School (APS) Peshawar and Malala Yousafzai flee the country? Was the government complicit in the matter or incompetent? The consequences of either would be grave, he went on. Such a huge failure of the state would leave no room to face the victims of terrorism. He pointed out that no Joint Investigation Team (JIT) had been set up for the APS tragedy, whose affectees were still demanding a judicial commission on the massacre. Bilawal echoed Naveed Qamar’s words about how this debacle would go down with the FATF by asking how can we tell the international community we are combatting terrorism when the biggest terrorist has ‘fled’ the country from our custody?

Put on the mat in this matter, it is difficult not to feel some sympathy for the PTI government that is now called upon to answer for the failings of ‘others’. But those are the wages of the devil’s bargain whereby the PTI came to power in 2018. Ehsanullah Ehsan surrendered to the security authorities in 2017 and has been credited with providing much useful information that helped the struggle against the TTP. The problem is that the embarrassed and helpless silence of the government and it seems the deliberate silence of the security establishment is bringing rich grist to the rumour mills. Not only, as Naveed Qamar said in the NA, does parliament have a right to be informed on the issue, so does the public. Incompetence, laxity, or something more sinister, whatever the truth, it cannot just be wished away or brushed under the carpet.

Business Recorder Column February 11, 2020

Maulana’s ‘assurance’

Rashed Rahman

Maulana Fazlur Rehman, chief of the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F), is a frustrated man. Two rounds of a sit-in in Islamabad and highly ambitious attempted blockage of highways throughout the country last year failed to find traction and had to be abandoned. Now the Maulana has announced round three of his campaign to oust the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf government by once again taking to the streets in Karachi on February 23, 2020, followed by a national convention in Islamabad on March 1, 2020 and a public meeting in Lahore on March 19, 2020.

The Maulana was bitter about the ‘betrayal’ of his cause by the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) by not fully backing his drive against the government. The vote in favour of the bill to extend the COAS’ tenure proved, in the Maulana’s eyes, the icing on the cake of the ‘betrayal’ by the two largest mainstream parties. All this is by now well known as the Maulana has not been shy of criticising these parties on this account earlier too.

But what was intriguing about the Maulana’s latest avatar was the ‘revelation’ that he had called off the Islamabad sit-in on an ‘assurance’ that Prime Minister Imran Khan would immediately resign and fresh elections would be held three months after. No prizes for guessing who might have given such an assurance. Maulana referred to Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) leader Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi’s statement that he could not disclose the conditions that led to the end of the sit-in since those were a ‘sacred trust’ with him by asking Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi to divulge the details of the ‘understanding’ that led to the end of the sit-in. The Maulana went on to castigate the government for the price hike making the people’s lives miserable, claimed it was his 13-day sit-in in Islamabad that caused the fissures appearing in the ruling coalition’s ranks, and dismissed the sitting parliament as based on a bogus mandate that had resulted in a vacuum in the corridors of power.

Whatever the hidden truth, it appears unlikely that the powers-that-be so easily gave in to the Maulana’s demands. If Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi did play the role of mediator and carrier of messages, it may not be the messenger who is to blame. This is not the only conundrum to emerge in recent days. First, there was the startling revelation on social media that Ehsanullah Ehsan, the erstwhile spokesman of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) who surrendered to the authorities in 2007, had ‘escaped’ to Turkey. Although the report was belatedly confirmed by ‘a senior security official’, there is no clear or credible explanation of how such a prominent TTP figure who had been singing like a canary while ensconced in a safe house in Peshawar had managed to vanish from under the noses of those charged with his security. It is difficult to resist the suspicion that having been treated with kid gloves in exchange for information about the TTP that allowed the security forces to considerably root out its cells and organisation, he has been given a ‘free pass’ to freedom somewhere outside the country.

Or take the reappearance of the Lal Masjid cleric Maulana Abdul Aziz inside the infamous mosque two weeks ago, followed by hundreds of his militant female followers occupying Jamia Hafsa once again, to demand of the government that he be restored to his former position of the khateebof the mosque, be compensated for the cancellation of the plot in Islamabad’s H-11 sector meant for Jamia Hafsa, and paid between Rs 20 to 35 million claimed to have been spent by them on Jamia Hafsa. Do we need reminding of the bloody events of 2007 in and around Lal Masjid? How is it that Maulana Abdul Aziz gained entrance to Lal Masjid when the authorities had reportedly banned his entry? How were the Maulana’s female ninjas able to overcome the barriers to entry in Jamia Hafsa? Were the mosque and seminary left unguarded? Now reports speak of a ‘compromise’ hammered out with the Maulana by the Islamabad Capital Authority whereby he would be allowed to stay in the mosque but not deliver sermons, would be given a 20 kanal plot to build Jamia Hafsa and, according to Maulana Aziz, be paid Rs 35 million compensation for the ‘confiscated’ Jamia Hafsa in H-11.

The establishment seems to have latched on to the preferred tactic of making concessions to our religious parties and extremists in a bid to buy time, defuse the present standoff/crisis, and then deal with the recalcitrants in an ‘appropriate’ manner. First and foremost, we must remind ourselves that it is the establishment that, beginning with Ziaul Haq’s benighted rule, created, nurtured, and in various ways supported religious parties and fanatical extremist groups inside the country in pursuit of jihadi enterprises in Afghanistan and Indian Held Kashmir. Ignoring the warnings over the years of knowledgeable analysts that these proxy chickens would one day come home to roost, when some of these parties or groups no longer served the purposes of the establishment or actually took up arms against the state, they were unceremoniously dumped or worse.

Maulana Fazlur Rehman was winkled out of parliamentary politics through depriving him of his traditional seat in D I Khan in the 2018 general elections. Hence his newfound insight into rigged elections (of which he had been a beneficiary in the past, even forming the MMA government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa under Musharraf). The hints he is dropping after the failure of his sit-in vis-à-vis assurances of an entry back into the power corridors reflect the old game of pressurising through street power the powers-that-be and then negotiating an end in return for concessions.

Unfortunately for the Maulana, he has failed to read the tea leaves correctly. If only he had reflected on the manner in which the Tehreek-i-Labbaiq Pakistan’s sit-in in Islamabad was dealt with (cash bribery to bring it to an end, followed by a crackdown on the group) or Maulana Aziz is currently being ‘favoured’ (with perhaps a similar denouement when circumstances allow), he would have taken the ‘assurances’ he received with a huge pinch of salt.

Maulana’s third wave campaign is likely to go the way of the first two, with his reaching out to religious groups (excluding the Jamaat-i-Islami with which relations have cooled) likely to prove no substitute for the PPP and PML-N, who for all practical purposes have abandoned him.

Surveying the above examples, it should be amply evident that playing footsie with the establishment is a dead end as far as the people and their aspirations for justice and a better life are concerned. We should therefore leave the different varieties of Maulanas and their retinues to their own devices and concentrate instead on building a mass people’s movement for genuine democracy, a socially progressive system, and relief and a better life for the vast majority.

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Business Recorder Editorial February 11, 2020

Foreign policy controversy

An unseemly controversy has broken out regarding the country’s foreign policy. It all started when some cabinet ministers criticised the handling of foreign policy on Kashmir by the Foreign Office. Minister for Human Rights Shireen Mazari in particular had some trenchant things to say on the matter on the floor of the National Assembly last week. Asserting that she has followed the Kashmir issue for four decades, Shireen Mazari criticised the performance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Kashmir, saying it had failed to follow the forward looking vision of Prime Minister Imran Khan. She advocated sending parliamentary delegations abroad since the Foreign Office had missed several opportunities. During the weekly media briefing on February 6, 2020, the spokesperson of the Foreign Office defended the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by stressing that it has always taken the core issue of Kashmir very seriously and was considering a number of legal and political aspects, including taking the matter to the International Court of Justice. The spokesperson pointed out that the vision of Pakistan’s foreign policy is formulated at the leadership level by the government and is carried out under the direction of the foreign minister by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The spokesperson went on to point out that the observation that the Foreign Office is not taking the cause of Jammu and Kashmir seriously is not accurate. Pakistan and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the spokesperson added, have never been shy or negligent towards this core issue and were dedicated to taking it forward. As soon as India took the illegal and unilateral actions on August 5, 2019 (the abrogation of Kashmir’s special status), a Kashmir cell was established in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is a multi-agency unit dedicated to monitoring the evolving situation in Jammu and Kashmir and to take forward the strategy articulated by the government, steered by the foreign minister and executed by over 100 diplomatic missions of Pakistan all over the world. Taking forward the strategy on the Kashmir cause is not an event, it is a process. All aspects of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute are taken forward in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolutions. The spokesperson was asked what were the options available with the Foreign Office since so far it had failed to persuade Saudi Arabia to hold an emergency meeting on Kashmir. She was reminded of Prime Minister Imran Khan’s comments in Malaysia this week where he had complained about disunity in the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), which had failed to meet on Kashmir. In response the spokesperson defended the OIC’s role and recounted the process over the years whereby it had addressed the Kashmir issue.

The whole affair is surprising in some respects and raises some searching questions begging to be asked. Surprising because it is unprecedented that cabinet ministers should criticise their own government or its own foreign  ministry in parliament or even in the public space. Normally such discussions are held in cabinet and all decisions of the cabinet are considered binding on all cabinet members. But the really serious questions that beg for an answer include why Pakistan, its prime minister and foreign ministry’s efforts have failed to find resonance in the world at large, at the UN, in the west, and even in the Muslim world. Tentatively, it could be argued that Kashmir as one of the oldest extant disputes on the agenda of the UN is suffering from sympathy fatigue. Second, India has promoted itself in recent years as the next poster boy of development in the developing world. The opportunities this presents have persuaded a long line of countries, companies and entities to join the queue before India’s door. The west and important countries of the Muslim world are included in this company. Without doubting the government’s and the ministry of foreign affairs’ efforts in this regard, perhaps the focus should shift from within (implying fissures within the government) to without, meaning the world in the 21^stcentury and its geopolitical landscape.

Business Recorder Editorial February 7, 2020

Coalition blues

Having disbanded the committee charged with negotiating with its coalition allies over their grievances, Prime Minister (PM) Imran Khan reconstituted his negotiation team and dispatched Federal Minister for Education Shafqat Mahmood to Lahore on February 3, 2020 to talk to the estranged PML-Q leadership. However, the efforts of the honourable minister appear to have come to naught. Chaudhry Shujaat and Pervaiz Elahi cast the meeting as anything but a negotiation, insisting there would be no talks with the new committee, only the fulfillment of the agreement arrived at with the previous negotiating committee. The deadlock therefore persists despite Shafqat Mahmood’s revelation during a press conference after the meeting that he had assured the Chaudhries that the new committee would not open negotiations anew but proceed on the foundations of the agreement already reached. That however was not the most important part of the press conference but rather the notable absence of the Chaudhries from it. It may be recalled that the previous negotiating committee, comprising Jahangir Tareen, Pervez Khattak and Shahzad Arbab, was disbanded and replaced by the new committee in which, apart from Shafqat Mahmood, Governor Punjab Chaudhry Sarwar and Chief Minister Usman Buzdar were included. Media reports say some party insiders complained to PM Imran Khan that Jahangir Tareen had proved too ‘soft’ and conceded more to the PML-Q than was justified. The PM then withdrew Jahangir Tareen from the negotiations with the PML-Q as well as another disgruntled coalition partner, MQM. Although the PM is within his rights to appoint anyone to negotiate with estranged coalition partners, his choice of Governor Chaudhry Sarwar and Chief Minister Usman Buzdar may not have gone down well with the Chaudhries. Their reservations revolve around the manner in which Buzdar is handling the affairs of Punjab. They are also unhappy with the Punjab bureaucracy working under him since they complain that the civil servants still are tilted towards the PML-N. Speaker of the Punjab Assembly Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi said during the meeting with Shafqat Mahmood that he would like a meeting with PM Imran Khan on the matter, and added that the federal government should refrain from making changes (in the committee) that create distrust. Moonis Elahi last week had also asked on Twitter why the PTI government seemed bent on sabotaging itself. Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi and Chaudhry Shujaat expressed the view after the meeting with Shafqat Mahmood that some ministers were trying to create misunderstandings between the allies and that the PM faces a threat from people within his own party. Although disappointment was writ large over Shafqat Mahmood’s comment during his press conference that the PML-Q seemed not to believe in give and take, the fiasco appears to be a PTI own goal.

What the PTI has to learn is a very simple and basic truth. Coalitions cannot be held together without flexibility on the part of the bigger partner. Keeping coalition allies on board requires the understanding that politics in Pakistan has evolved over the years into patronage in the constituencies. If the PML-Q (and MQM) are ignored vis-à-vis their complaints that they are unable to keep their constituents satisfied because of a dearth of fulfillment of the promises made to them when they joined the coalition and an attitude on the part of the federal government that does not keep in view the exigencies of patronage politics in the constituencies, trouble is bound to follow. This is the ‘normal’ culture of coalitions in our country. It should not be taken for blackmail, since it appears to the disgruntled allies that there are promises the federal government must keep and maintain some sensitivity to their concerns. PM Imran Khan should not forget that the PTI has only a razor thin majority in the National Assembly. Unless his government smooths the ruffled feathers of its coalition partners, it may well find itself hoist on its own petard.

Business Recorder Column February 4, 2020

The price of defeat

Rashed Rahman

US Special Envoy for Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad is once more treading the well worn path of a political settlement of the Afghan war that would allow a defeated US a face-saving exit while saving as much of the Afghan government of Ashraf Ghani and the liberal-progressive reforms in Afghan society since 2001. This repeat journey has taken him once again to Doha, Qatar, where the Taliban office is located and talks have resumed without disclosing their content. Swinging by Islamabad to meet Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi and COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa, Khalilzad ended his regional tryst in Kabul to have talks with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani.

The communiqués from Islamabad and Kabul tell us little, and there is only silence from Doha. Media reports churn once again past rounds of talks and at best add updates regarding the battlefield. However, the shape and conjuncture of the talks are by now clear.

The US seemed to be on the verge of an undisclosed deal with the Taliban in September 2019 before US President Donald Trump abruptly called off the whole thing because of an attack on US forces in Kabul. The resurrected talks suffered another blow because of an attack on US forces in Bagram. It seemed the US was, by its off-again, on-again talks tactic, conveying the message that violence must decrease if a peace deal is to be signed. After the two talks setbacks mentioned above, the Taliban have ‘conceded’ only a reduction of attacks on US forces and the cities, while increasing their attacks in the rural areas. Clearly, this is a tactical shift on their part to open a window to secure a US withdrawal, while keeping up the pressure on US and Afghan forces in the countryside.

Meantime the intra-Afghan dialogue so dear to President Ghani’s so far ignored government in the minuet between the US and the Taliban, seems nowhere in sight. The Taliban want to postpone any decision on this front until after a peace deal with the US is signed. So far, Washington does not appear to have put much pressure behind according the Kabul government a ‘promotion’ from ‘US puppet’ (in the Taliban’s eyes) to indispensable peace partner.

In 2019, just to illustrate the point, the Taliban carried out over 8,000 attacks, up from over 6,000 in 2018. Retaliatory stepped up air attacks by the US and operations by the CIA-trained Afghan special forces led to over 8,000 civilian casualties in the blood-soaked country. The Taliban have made overtures from time to time offering brief ceasefires, which have of late not found favour in Washington that would like a permanent ceasefire to produce the conditions for an orderly withdrawal under satisfactory conditions. However, the prospects for this ‘happy’ ending do not seem bright.

The US reacted to 9/11 by invading and occupying Afghanistan, in the process overthrowing the Taliban government that had hosted Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. In the early years after the invasion and occupation, Washington mouthed ambitious plans for ‘nation-building’ in Afghanistan to turn it into a modern, liberal, democratic state. However, the escape of the Taliban to Pakistan (and, as was later revealed, Osama bin Laden) and their guerrilla resistance put paid not only to such fanciful schemes, but over time demonstrated the precariousness of the US’s hold on the country.

By now, the peace process initiated by Washington reflects, more than anything else, its defeat at the hands of the Taliban resistance. ‘Defeat’ in such conflicts is defined by the fact that the occupying power has been unable to achieve its goals, amongst which can be counted the military defeat of the Taliban and the construction of a credible post-Taliban order in Afghanistan capable of standing on its own feet even after the US departs. For the Taliban, ‘victory’ translates into foiling the US’s plans and staying the course despite tremendous odds. As things have played out and as they now stand, the US is desperately searching for a way out of the Afghan quagmire that does not dent its image of the world’s pre-eminent power, before whom all must kneel or perish.

The likely post-US withdrawal scenario, whenever and in whatever circumstances it takes place, portends another disaster in disaster-prone Afghanistan. Whether the Ashraf Ghani government survives or not, the expected Taliban push for power (even despite some sort of power-sharing agreement, unlikely as it looks for the moment) promises a renewed civil war, with the tenuous unity of the Ashraf Ghani-led anti-Taliban Pashtun forces with the Tajik Northern Alliance coming under immense strain. If this unity succumbs to the exigencies of the new civil war with the Taliban, it could mean Afghan society splintering once again along ethnic lines, with the majority Pashtuns split between the Taliban and their foes.

Though the Pakistani military establishment may feel a quiet triumphalism at having brought the mighty US to its knees through its duality of policy of running with the (Taliban) hare and hunting with the (US) hounds, the fallout of a renewed civil war in Afghanistan cannot but affect Pakistan, particularly its Pashtun belt. If the US is paying the price of its defeat in Afghanistan and attempting to minimise the damage to its repute and status, Pakistan cannot remain smug or complacent if the above post-US withdrawal scenario plays out. The intra-Afghan dialogue, if, when and in whatever shape or form it occurs, will not untie this Gordian knot. Nor will Pakistan’s successes against its own homegrown Taliban movement remain undisturbed. The fact that the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan is now largely based across the border on Afghan soil could mean a resurgent Afghan Taliban or their all-out victory could bring the Pakistani Taliban back into play, with its concomitant implications for our security.

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

Business Recorder Editorial February 4, 2020

Pressure for Afghan peace deal

The US Envoy for Afghan Peace and Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, has restarted his shuttle diplomacy to push the peace process forward. After renewed talks with the Afghan Taliban in Doha, Qatar, Zalmay Khalilzad arrived in Islamabad on January 31, 2020. Here he met Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi and COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa. Shah Mehmood Qureshi warned the US that the historic peace opportunity could be lost if the US did not act fast to clinch a deal. He argued that spoilers could exploit the fluid status quo. He emphasised that there was no military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan and if a political solution has to be achieved, the progress made so far towards a political settlement in the talks between the US and the Taliban over the past year needs to be consolidated and not frittered away. Zalmay Khalilzad, according to our Foreign Office, updated Shah Mehmood Qureshi on the developments in negotiations with the Taliban and other related issues. No further details have been made available. The US and the Taliban had restarted their talks about two weeks ago after the hiccups regarding attacks on the US forces in Kabul and Bagram provoked US President Donald Trump to slam the door shut. The renewed talks are described in media reports as ‘informal’, meaning thereby that nothing concrete is expected from them as an outcome for the moment, although both sides claim progress. However, the much touted and desired ‘deal’ remains elusive. The Taliban’s offer of reduced violence in response to US demands did not satisfy Washington as to its scope. Media reports describe the Taliban offer as being for a short ceasefire to allow the signing of the deal, which reflects their upper hand on the battlefield, whereas the US may be holding out for a longer if not permanent ceasefire to create the necessary conditions for an agreement on the pullout. The issue of an intra-Afghan dialogue is still hanging fire as the Taliban view the Ashraf Ghani government as a ‘US puppet’. After his talks in Islamabad, Zalmay Khalilzad flew to Kabul for discussions with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani.

Currently, the talks hinge centrally on conditions, particularly the question of a reduction in violence. Unfortunately, the facts on the ground appear to point in the opposite direction. Although attacks in Kabul and the major cities have abated of late, fighting in the rural areas has intensified. In 2019, the Taliban carried out 8,204 attacks, compared to 6,974 in 2018. The trajectory of the intensification or abatement of the attacks seems to follow the ups and downs in the talks process. Fighting while talking appears therefore to have been mastered as an effective tactic by the Taliban. As Shah Mehmood Qureshi too has said after his meeting with Zalmay Khalilzad, a lot depends on the reduction of the level of violence, which has by now acquired the status of the main challenge and prerequisite. The fear of course remains that the longer the negotiations are prolonged, the greater the risk of the talks’ derailment. A single major attack on US forces could bring the whole process to a grinding halt. The crash of a US military plane in Afghanistan in recent days, claimed by the Taliban as having been shot down by them, has heightened such concerns. Although Zalmay Khalilzad received assurances from both Shah Mehmood Qureshi and General Bajwa that Pakistan would continue to back the peace efforts, there still lies many a slip between the cup and the lip. And even if some agreement is hammered out between the US and the Taliban that leads to the withdrawal of US forces from Washington’s longest running war abroad, the post-withdrawal scenario is still clouded in uncertainty, not the least because the intra-Afghan dialogue has yet to get off the ground. Shah Mehmood Qureshi’s anxiety about striking a peace deal while the iron is hot and spoilers have not yet managed to play their part is matched by the pressure of the upcoming US presidential elections. Naturally President Donald Trump would like to enter the electoral fray having fulfilled his promise to end US entanglement in the Afghan quagmire, but whether fortune will smile on him in this regard still remains to be seen.

Business Recorder Editorial February 1, 2020

Clipping AGP’s wings

The Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) government seems embarked on a strange effort to clip the wings of the office of the Auditor General of Pakistan (AGP). This development has come to light through a media report that quotes the AGP office’s reaction to the attempt by the government to downgrade the AGP from a constitutional office to just a subservient body of the Ministry of Finance. On December 23, 2019, the Cabinet Division notified the office of the AGP as an autonomous body of the Finance Division. This was part of an exercise to restructure the federal government. Through the same notification, the Cabinet Division also intimated that a board of directors of the AGP will be created (presumably having members from all or most of the federal government’s branches) to oversee the functioning of the AGP. Apart from the constitutional and administrative issues any such redefinition of the status of the AGP raises, if the move is carried out, its immediate fallout will be on the officers of the Pakistan Audit and Accounts Service (PAAS), whom the Establishment Division initially refused to acknowledge as civil servants. The Central Selection Board is in the process of considering the cases of various civil service groups, including the PAAS officers, for promotion to grade 20 and 21. However, the Establishment Division is still seeking clarification from the AGP regarding the status of the PAAS officers. On January 3, 2020, the office of the AGP wrote to the Secretary Cabinet to point out that the scheme involving redefinition of the status of the AGP office should be based on the provisions of the Constitution, since the AGP is a constitutional body charged with the responsibility to audit the accounts of the federal and provincial governments and all other state institutions. The AGP letter also pointed out that making the office of the AGP subservient to the Finance Division is a glaring instance of conflict of interest since the Finance Division’s accounts too are audited by the AGP. The letter went on to argue that the independence and autonomy of a constitutional entity such as the AGP, with countrywide jurisdiction, must be upheld by treating it on a par with other constitutional offices. The AGP office terms the government’s decision as being in violation of the Constitution and the UN General Assembly’s resolution of March 2012 that guarantee the independence of the supreme audit institutions of all countries.

Another interesting aspect of the affair is the role of the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Institutional Reforms, Dr Ishrat Husain. The Cabinet Division’s notification was contrary to the promises and commitments Dr Husain had extended to the AGP office in May 2019 that its constitutional status will be protected. Now Dr Husain is saying the Cabinet Division’s notification was indeed an error that would be rectified. There seems to be a wide gulf between what Dr Husain has been saying and what the Cabinet Division is embarked upon. It is bizarre that the Advisor on Institutional Reforms seems to have been left whistling in the wind while the government of which he is an important part, and particularly the Cabinet Division, have chosen to ignore him. Another question that arises is about the functioning of this government. Surely they inherited a plethora of seasoned and experienced civil servants who would be in a position to point out the constitutional status of the AGP office and its role as the auditor and financial watchdog over all governments and state institutions. If such advice was available and indeed rendered, it too has been ignored a la Dr Husain. Where this confused blundering will lead is not clear, but it bodes ill for the audit of government and state institutions’ finances.