The silence of
the graveyard
Rashed Rahman
The silence of
the graveyard has descended over Indian-occupied Kashmir. Having illegally and
unconstitutionally robbed Kashmir of its special status under Article 370 of
the Indian Constitution and reversed the protections against outsider influx
into the state under Article 35A, Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
government has also bifurcated the state into Ladakh, to be ruled directly from
New Delhi without any representative Assembly, and Jammu and Kashmir, currently
under Governor’s rule since the state Assembly stands dissolved since former
chief minister Mehbooba Mufti’s government was dismissed. (Incidentally, the
Indian Constitution requires a resolution of the Kashmir Assembly before
Articles 370 and 35A can be revoked. This will form part of the basis of the legal
challenges to Modi’s ‘coup’ before the Indian Supreme Court). The Ladakh decision
has aroused the ire of China, which is in control of the Aksai Chin region of
the historical state of Jammu and Kashmir and has ongoing border disputes in
this and other areas along the border with India.
Meanwhile a
complete lockdown, curfew and communications embargo continues into its third
week in Kashmir, punctuated from time to time by mass protests. Since Friday
has traditionally served as a trigger for protests after Friday prayers, New
Delhi has banned these public prayers too. The Indian opposition leaders who
travelled to Srinagar to assess the situation and express solidarity with the
people of Kashmir were turned away from the airport. While the armed resistance
to India’s oppression sputters along, increased exchanges along the Line of
Control (LoC) point to the possibility of increased infiltration of Kashmiri
freedom fighters into the state.
Pakistan’s
political leadership, government and opposition, seemed to rally to the
Kashmiri cause after Modi’s ‘coup’, but this show of amity and national
solidarity did not last long, and the two sides were soon back at daggers
drawn. Pakistan’s diplomatic ‘offensive’ has yielded, to put it politely, mixed
results. With long time friend China’s help, Islamabad was able to have a
closed-door consultation of the UN Security Council on the Kashmir crisis after
half a century of neglect of the dispute. No communiqué followed the
discussion. The respective ambassadors of China, India and Pakistan interpreted
the outcome to the media along well known and oft trodden paths. China, in line
with three members of the UN Security Council – the US, UK and Russia –
repeated the desire of the big powers to decrease tensions between Pakistan and
India, without going beyond their desire that Islamabad and New Delhi settle
their differences through peaceful means (the threat of escalation to the
nuclear threshold being uppermost in most minds). France at first retained an
enigmatic silence and then ‘dismissed’ Pakistan’s case by declaring the crisis
India’s internal matter. As for the Muslim world, the Organisation of Islamic
Conference (OIC) came out with a ‘diplomatic’ statement. The UAE and Bahrain
followed up with the bestowing of their highest civilian awards to Modi, and
Saudi Arabia clinched lucrative investment deals with India. So much for
Islamic/Muslim unity/solidarity.
The facts and
ground realities can obviously not be ignored in summing up the results of
Pakistan’s diplomatic efforts so far nor in terms of the future. Pakistan
stands relatively isolated in the world, thanks to years of acrimony with the
US over Afghanistan. The latter has used its clout and influence worldwide, and
even amongst our Gulf Arab friends to deny Pakistan any leverage. The world
powers and the Gulf Arabs are licking their chops over India’s emergence as a world
power, with the economic and financial rewards expected now closer to low
hanging fruit.
The Kashmiri
armed resistance, reinforced by the unarmed intifada of citizens’ protest,
realistically remains the only hope for the oppressed people of Indian-occupied
Kashmir. To avoid complications that could entangle it in the rows to be
expected between Pakistan and India, the resistance may have to move towards a
more self-reliant strategy. It could also in principle seek ties and mutual
help from the other regional (e.g. the Nagas, Mizos) and revolutionary
movements (the Naxalite Maoist armed struggles) ongoing in India. With due
respect, and notwithstanding the pious wishes of the Pakistani establishment,
Pakistani support for the Kashmiri struggle has not always worked to the
latter’s advantage. The armed uprising that broke out in 1989 after the rigged
state elections of 1987 metamorphosed from a struggle for self-determination
into a jihad when the secular (and then pro-independence for Kashmir) Jammu and
Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), after bearing the brunt of Indian repression,
was sidelined and eventually broke up in favour of jihadi groups allegedly
supported by Pakistan. The JKLF subsequently abandoned the armed struggle in
favour of peaceful, open struggle. Its leader, Yasin Malik, is in and out of
jail on a regular basis. Needless to add, he is currently again under detention
along with almost the entire political leadership of the Hurriyet Conference
and even pro-India leaders like Mehbooba Mufti, Omar Abdullah, et al.
While the Kashmiris
face a long and arduous struggle for freedom, events back home in Pakistan seem
to be treading a familiar and well worn path. Prime Minister Imran Khan’s
decision to give COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa a three-year extension, no
matter how it is dressed up as a necessity given the national security
challenges, nevertheless is seen by most informed observers as an ‘insurance
policy’ for the incumbents. Since it is by now abundantly clear that Imran Khan’s
Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) enjoyed the establishment’s backing during the
elections and over the first year of the PTI government in office despite its
floundering, incompetence and blunders, the decision ensures the government has
the military’s backing until one year before its term expires. Since the last
year after that will likely be an election year (all other things being equal
in the meantime), Imran Khan and company appear to be home and dry for this
term at least. The only thing that could upset the apple cart and undo the best
laid plans of mice and men may be the government’s own inability (demonstrated
with a vengeance already) to govern.
On that happy
note, readers should wait and watch what promises to be a wild and unpredictable
ride.
rashed-rahman.blogspot.com
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