Business Recorder Editorial August 30, 2019

Afghanistan needs genuine, not illusory, peace

As the US and the Taliban appear to inch closer to a negotiated settlement of the war in Afghanistan through the talks in Doha, unsettling issues nevertheless dog the process. Whereas the Taliban confidently see an agreement being reached in the next few days in Doha, whether peace will return to war-torn Afghanistan remains a troubling question. What has emerged over the rounds of talks is that the US and Taliban seem to be agreed on the former’s troop withdrawal, with a tentative timeline of a year to year-and-a-half in the air (the Taliban seemingly not having insisted on their initial desire for a six month deadline). The withdrawal too may be staggered, with the 14,000 US troops in the country initially perhaps being reduced to around 9,000. Even more significantly, US air support, which has so far been critical for the Afghan government forces, will no longer be available against the Taliban. However, US chief negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad has rejected the Taliban’s assertion that the remaining US forces will not defend or support the Afghan government forces in any shape or form. In return, the Taliban pledge not to attack US forces, particularly through ‘insider’ attacks, but insist Afghan government forces remain fair game. Also of course, the Taliban have pledged to break with groups such as al Qaeda as a guarantee that neither they nor any of their allies will be involved in any terrorist attacks a la 9/11 against the US or its allies and interests. So far so good, one might be tempted to think. However, the fly in the ointment even now is the stubborn rejection by the Taliban to hold talks with the Afghan government, which they dismiss as a puppet. President Ashraf Ghani’s government can be forgiven for feeling ‘left out’ of the talks process. Although the Doha talks have not so far dented the Taliban’s stubbornness in this regard, efforts are afoot to hold intra-Afghan talks in Norway. However, as has happened at such meetings in recent days in disparate venues, the Afghan side will not have an official Afghan government component. The Taliban instead will face a conglomerate of civil society groups that seek assurances the Taliban will not try to reverse the gains in political, human and women’s rights since they were ousted and attempt to reimpose the dark days of their rule. Any assurances in this regard ring hollow when the statement of a Taliban commander is paid heed to. The gentleman insists a deal with the US will not stop attacks on the Afghan government forces and that “We will continue our fight against the Afghan government and seize power by force.”

Whether deliberately or inadvertently, the commander quoted above has let the cat out of the bag as far as the Taliban’s post-US withdrawal game plan is concerned. So the way the deal seems to be shaping up in the Taliban’s mind is a two-party deal that effectively ends the US-Taliban war, but not the threatened fresh civil war between them and the Afghan government. The Americans keep saying that talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban are critical for a peace agreement but that they have not started as yet. True, but if the commander speaks for the Taliban mind, the prospects of these starting, let alone producing a peace agreement, seem remote. Washington may be satisfied with the door opening to its withdrawal and guarantees of no more 9/11 type attacks, but the Afghan government and people face the unsavoury prospect of being led like lambs to the slaughter. Of course they will defend themselves against a fresh onslaught by the Taliban, but the prospects of that succeeding are dim. A fresh civil war after a US withdrawal will also have implications for the region, not to mention Pakistan, in the shape of the spillover effects of such a new civil war. Washington must ensure that genuine, not illusory, peace is attained before it leaves. Otherwise the Afghan people will again suffer the light being extinguished by the benighted views of the Taliban. And that could produce another wave of refugees fleeing the fighting or the Taliban threatened takeover.

Business Recorder Editorial August 29, 2019

US-Iran opening

Whatever else the G-7 summit in Biarritz, France, may or may not have achieved, it witnessed a development pointing to a possible opening between the US and Iran to settle their differences through a meeting of the top leaders of both countries. The credit for this ‘breakthrough’ must go to French President Emmanuel Macron. Apparently after intense diplomacy and consultations before the summit, Macron took the unprecedented step of inviting Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif to the summit. His appearance on the sidelines of the summit came as a surprise, but Zarif and US President Donald Trump did not meet (Zarif is currently under travel restrictions by the US). However, Macron’s alacrity seemed to have produced a softening of the positions of both the US President as well as Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. In a joint press conference with Macron after the summit, President Trump indicated his willingness to meet his Iranian counterpart within weeks after the Iranian nuclear programme was discussed at the summit. Contrary to his policy of maximum pressure on Iran over its nuclear programme, including crippling sanctions imposed after the US withdrew in 2015 from the deal restricting Iran’s nuclear programme development and which led to tensions culminating in recent days in an Iranian tanker being detained in Gibraltar (since released) and a retaliatory action against a British tanker by Iran, Trump thought Rouhani would like to meet him to find a solution to the situation. Rouhani in Tehran defended Zarif’s trip to France and Iran’s willingness to negotiate with the US against criticism by Iranian hardline press that saw the initiative as betraying signs of weakness. Zarif has since embarked on a trip to Asia, starting with China, one of the two countries, including India, that are big markets for Iranian oil that has been affected by the US worldwide sanctions against Iran. Macron’s deft diplomacy needs to be seen in the context of the EU’s concern regarding Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal, the US-imposed sanctions that followed, and the tense close shaves in the Gulf in recent days. The possibility of a turn towards talks between the US and Iran was therefore welcomed by Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel, who called it “a big step forward”.

Trump’s mercurial and unpredictable style of conducting diplomacy has often troubled both his allies and ‘enemies’. Amongst the former, only recently Macron had landed in Trump’s bad books for sending what Trump called “mixed signals” on Iran. But it seemed a soberer Trump who did not react negatively in Biarritz to Macron’s proposal of offering some relief to Iran such as lifting sanctions on oil sales to China and India and the possibility of a new credit line to enable exports, with Iran in turn returning to compliance with the 2015 nuclear deal. Trump’s remarks at the summit that he did not want regime change in Iran, instead desired a “good, really strong Iran” but had concerns about the nuclear deal timescale, contrasted radically with some of his past (and current) pronouncements on the Islamic Republic. An opportunity for Presidents Trump and Rouhani to meet may present itself on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in late September in New York. Given the current atmosphere as reflected in the developments in Biarritz, it can only be hoped that the good words on either side can be translated into diplomatic engagement and a possible solution to the nuclear and ballistic missiles programmes conundrums and help defuse the tensions over Iran’s alleged regional ‘activities’. On the last issue, if things improve between Washington and Tehran, Trump could conceivably act as a bridge between the Gulf Arab states and Iran to resolve their differences over regional conflicts in Yemen and Syria.

Business Recorder Column August 27, 2019

The silence of the graveyard

Rashed Rahman

The silence of the graveyard has descended over Indian-occupied Kashmir. Having illegally and unconstitutionally robbed Kashmir of its special status under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution and reversed the protections against outsider influx into the state under Article 35A, Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government has also bifurcated the state into Ladakh, to be ruled directly from New Delhi without any representative Assembly, and Jammu and Kashmir, currently under Governor’s rule since the state Assembly stands dissolved since former chief minister Mehbooba Mufti’s government was dismissed. (Incidentally, the Indian Constitution requires a resolution of the Kashmir Assembly before Articles 370 and 35A can be revoked. This will form part of the basis of the legal challenges to Modi’s ‘coup’ before the Indian Supreme Court). The Ladakh decision has aroused the ire of China, which is in control of the Aksai Chin region of the historical state of Jammu and Kashmir and has ongoing border disputes in this and other areas along the border with India.

Meanwhile a complete lockdown, curfew and communications embargo continues into its third week in Kashmir, punctuated from time to time by mass protests. Since Friday has traditionally served as a trigger for protests after Friday prayers, New Delhi has banned these public prayers too. The Indian opposition leaders who travelled to Srinagar to assess the situation and express solidarity with the people of Kashmir were turned away from the airport. While the armed resistance to India’s oppression sputters along, increased exchanges along the Line of Control (LoC) point to the possibility of increased infiltration of Kashmiri freedom fighters into the state.

Pakistan’s political leadership, government and opposition, seemed to rally to the Kashmiri cause after Modi’s ‘coup’, but this show of amity and national solidarity did not last long, and the two sides were soon back at daggers drawn. Pakistan’s diplomatic ‘offensive’ has yielded, to put it politely, mixed results. With long time friend China’s help, Islamabad was able to have a closed-door consultation of the UN Security Council on the Kashmir crisis after half a century of neglect of the dispute. No communiqué followed the discussion. The respective ambassadors of China, India and Pakistan interpreted the outcome to the media along well known and oft trodden paths. China, in line with three members of the UN Security Council – the US, UK and Russia – repeated the desire of the big powers to decrease tensions between Pakistan and India, without going beyond their desire that Islamabad and New Delhi settle their differences through peaceful means (the threat of escalation to the nuclear threshold being uppermost in most minds). France at first retained an enigmatic silence and then ‘dismissed’ Pakistan’s case by declaring the crisis India’s internal matter. As for the Muslim world, the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) came out with a ‘diplomatic’ statement. The UAE and Bahrain followed up with the bestowing of their highest civilian awards to Modi, and Saudi Arabia clinched lucrative investment deals with India. So much for Islamic/Muslim unity/solidarity.

The facts and ground realities can obviously not be ignored in summing up the results of Pakistan’s diplomatic efforts so far nor in terms of the future. Pakistan stands relatively isolated in the world, thanks to years of acrimony with the US over Afghanistan. The latter has used its clout and influence worldwide, and even amongst our Gulf Arab friends to deny Pakistan any leverage. The world powers and the Gulf Arabs are licking their chops over India’s emergence as a world power, with the economic and financial rewards expected now closer to low hanging fruit.

The Kashmiri armed resistance, reinforced by the unarmed intifada of citizens’ protest, realistically remains the only hope for the oppressed people of Indian-occupied Kashmir. To avoid complications that could entangle it in the rows to be expected between Pakistan and India, the resistance may have to move towards a more self-reliant strategy. It could also in principle seek ties and mutual help from the other regional (e.g. the Nagas, Mizos) and revolutionary movements (the Naxalite Maoist armed struggles) ongoing in India. With due respect, and notwithstanding the pious wishes of the Pakistani establishment, Pakistani support for the Kashmiri struggle has not always worked to the latter’s advantage. The armed uprising that broke out in 1989 after the rigged state elections of 1987 metamorphosed from a struggle for self-determination into a jihad when the secular (and then pro-independence for Kashmir) Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), after bearing the brunt of Indian repression, was sidelined and eventually broke up in favour of jihadi groups allegedly supported by Pakistan. The JKLF subsequently abandoned the armed struggle in favour of peaceful, open struggle. Its leader, Yasin Malik, is in and out of jail on a regular basis. Needless to add, he is currently again under detention along with almost the entire political leadership of the Hurriyet Conference and even pro-India leaders like Mehbooba Mufti, Omar Abdullah, et al.

While the Kashmiris face a long and arduous struggle for freedom, events back home in Pakistan seem to be treading a familiar and well worn path. Prime Minister Imran Khan’s decision to give COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa a three-year extension, no matter how it is dressed up as a necessity given the national security challenges, nevertheless is seen by most informed observers as an ‘insurance policy’ for the incumbents. Since it is by now abundantly clear that Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) enjoyed the establishment’s backing during the elections and over the first year of the PTI government in office despite its floundering, incompetence and blunders, the decision ensures the government has the military’s backing until one year before its term expires. Since the last year after that will likely be an election year (all other things being equal in the meantime), Imran Khan and company appear to be home and dry for this term at least. The only thing that could upset the apple cart and undo the best laid plans of mice and men may be the government’s own inability (demonstrated with a vengeance already) to govern.

On that happy note, readers should wait and watch what promises to be a wild and unpredictable ride.

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com

Business Recorder Editorial August 27, 2019

Grim ECP impasse

The issue of the reconstitution of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) has hit an impasse. Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) former Justice Sardar Mohammad Raza on August 23, 2019 refused to administer the oath of office to the two newly appointed members of the ECP, arguing that their appointment was not according to the Constitution. Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui and Munir Ahmad Kakar had been appointed by President Dr Arif Alvi as members ECP from Sindh and Balochistan, respectively, a day earlier, but when they arrived at the ECP headquarters to assume charge, the secretary conveyed to them the CEC’s view, much to the two aspirants’ dismay. The secretary also informed them that a communication on the issue had been sent to the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs. In his letter to the ministry, the CEC observed that the appointment of the two ECP members was not in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Constitution. He also cited a judgement of the Supreme Court from 2013 that held the President does not enjoy any discretionary power in appointment of the CEC or members of the ECP. The development sparked off a round of government and opposition responses along expected lines. Law Minister Farogh Naseem argued the CEC’s refusal to administer the oath was itself unconstitutional since the CEC had no authority to examine the validity of government notifications. On the other hand, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) welcomed the CEC’s decision, saying the ECP had set an example by rejecting the ‘unconstitutional’ move of the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) government. The PPP’s parliamentary leader in the Senate Sherry Rehman said the procedure for appointment of ECP members had been clearly defined in the Constitution and the government had violated these provisions. To prove the point, she pointed out that the government had bypassed the leader of the opposition and the parliamentary committee on such appointments. She advised the government to respect the Constitution, not try to run the government through presidential ordinances and notifications, and review its dictatorial approach. Former chairman Senate Raza Rabbani said the manner in which the two members were appointed was a clear violation of Articles 213 and 218 of the Constitution, an attack on parliament from within (since under Article 50, the President is part of parliament), and a mala fide violation of the 18^th Amendment. He went on to point out that the constitutional requirement of filling such vacancies within 45 days had also been violated.

The background to this latest conundrum is that when the two members Abdul Ghaffar Soomro and former Justice Shakeel Baloch from Sindh and Balochistan respectively retired in January 2019, the path dictated by the Constitution that these vacancies be filled within 45 days through a process of consultation between the prime minister and the leader of the opposition was not followed. Prime Minister Imran Khan held no face-to-face meetings with leader of the opposition Shahbaz Sharif to attempt to reconcile the suggested names put forward by the treasury and opposition. Instead, he opted for, and was replied in the same measure, of putting forward names through written communications (including a later infructuous ‘notification’ by a spokesperson of the Foreign Office!). Failing to meet or reconcile their different lists of names, the two sides sent their respective suggestions to the parliamentary committee as enjoined in the Constitution in the event of an impasse. The committee has an equal number of treasury and opposition members but it too failed to effect any outcome. Now the government has unilaterally ‘appointed’ the two members, achieving only embarrassment for them and itself. The underlying problem is the general state of hostility the government betrays every day towards the opposition. At a time when the Kashmir crisis brought rare unity between both sides for a national cause, the government has again failed to understand, let alone pursue, the proper constitutional path, parliamentary conventions, or the political culture underlying a parliamentary democracy. At the time of writing these lines, a petition challenging the President’s appointments to the ECP has been moved in the Lahore High Court. The country must brace itself therefore for a fresh round of acrimonious exchanges, court battles, and a continuation of the sour atmosphere between the two sides of the political divide. Last but not least, without a consensus set of members of a complete ECP, there can be no question of general elections next time round. The government should, in its own as much as the country’s and democracy’s interest, review its hardline attitude towards the parliamentary opposition and reach out to it where the Constitution and parliamentary convention enjoin it to.

Business Recorder Editorial August 7, 2019

INF demise

The US and Russia have announced their withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty that placed limitations on the use of medium range conventional and nuclear missiles. Signed in 1987 between then US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the INF treaty was considered a cornerstone of the global arms control regime. Both sides had been signalling their intent to pull out of the treaty for months, all the while trading charges of violating the treaty’s terms. The central bone of contention was a new missile that Russia had developed, which the US and NATO claimed violated the treaty. While the US and NATO placed the range of the 9M729 missile at 1,500 kilometres, Russia parried this by saying it could only travel 480 kilometres. Since the INF treaty limited the use of missiles with ranges of 500-5,000 kilometres, this disparity was about whether the 9M729 fell within the purview of the treaty. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivered the coup de grace to the INF treaty at an ASEAN conference in Bangkok on August 2, 2019, minutes after Russia pronounced the treaty was dead. Pompeo and the Russian Foreign Ministry traded charges of the other side being responsible for the development, with the latter saying the US had made a serious mistake by ditching the treaty more for its own gain than alleged Russian violations. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov urged the US to implement a moratorium on deploying intermediate-range nuclear missiles after the demise of the INF. But NATO responded by promising a ‘measured and responsible’ riposte to the alleged significant risks posed by the 9M729. The US had launched a six-month withdrawal from the INF treaty procedure in February 2019. Moscow responded by beginning its own move to pull out. Last month, Russian President Vladimir Putin formally suspended its participation. It appears that it was Washington that initiated the move, with Russia virtually being forced to follow. What is puzzling is why the US did not invoke the verification clauses of the INF treaty to settle once and for all the controversy over the range of the 9M729.

The mystery is resolved if the post-withdrawal statements of the US are perused. The US has spilt the beans by admitting its concern that the bilateral INF treaty gave rising power China free rein to develop its own long-range missiles. Recent US-China tensions, centred on trade and maritime disputes, are indicative of what lies behind the US’s hurry to leave the treaty. While Pompeo called on Russia and China to join discussions for a multilateral arms control treaty to replace the INF, observers thought the other key arms treaty, New START, which expires in 2021, may well be the next victim of Washington’s lack of will to maintain the global arms restraint architecture and its anxiety about China’s growing military strength. In the present atmosphere after the tearing up of the INF treaty by the US, it seems like asking for the moon for it to expect Russia or China to enter into another solemn agreement that Washington may tear up again later. The demise of the INF treaty and the manner in which it was killed has badly damaged trust and confidence between the US and Russia, and China will have taken note of the development. Pompeo’s ‘invitation’ for talks on a new multilateral treaty comes as the US Defence Secretary Mark Esper says he wants to quickly deploy new intermediate-range missiles in Asia to counter China. This hardly sounds like arms restraint. NATO too is making similar noises. While the US and Russia between them own 90 percent of global nuclear stockpiles, a new arms race, with China the third player, is feared by knowledgeable observers. Hardly a prospect the world needs amidst all its other troubles.