Pak-Afghan-US relations
Advice on relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan and
between Pakistan and the US has arrived from three different sources at the
same time, with remarkable convergence as to the conclusions. First, a
Pak-Afghan Track-II initiative called the Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Committee
(PAJC), Beyond Boundaries, met in Kabul on June 25, 2018, having previously had
two rounds, one in Kabul on December 15, 2017 and one in Islamabad on February
26, 2018. PAJC welcomed the commitment by Pakistan and Afghanistan to end their
mutual blame game and advised both sides to restrain their spokespersons from
knee-jerk reactions to events. PAJC found the recent Afghanistan-Pakistan
Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS) promising and capable of
providing the basis for a rapprochement between the two countries. PAJC asked
both governments to sign a bilateral consular agreement, work on a dignified,
reasonable plan for Afghan refugees’ repatriation, hold meetings to improve
trade, both transit and bilateral, address negative perceptions of the other,
hold media exchanges and highlight progress under APAPPS. On the other hand, a
Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) seminar in Islamabad on the
same day advised Pakistan, Afghanistan and the US to bridge their trust deficit
in order to bring peace to Afghanistan, a desirable goal no one country could
accomplish on its own. The seminar posited a region-led, region-owned peace
process, which appeared one step ahead of Pakistan’s formulation of an
Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace and reconciliation effort. The seminar, while
recognising Pakistan’s crucial role in this process, emphasized a sustained
western engagement in Afghanistan. Other participants argued Pakistan should be
engaged constructively while being treated as a sovereign state. Peace and
stability in Pakistan, it was pointed out, was dependent on peace and stability
in Afghanistan. The seminar concluded its deliberations by arguing for economic
interdependence between Pakistan and Afghanistan, in which mega projects like
the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline and the Central
Asia-South Asia electricity project were important. The SDPI seminar also
called for trade enhancement and facilitation between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The third contribution to the debate comes from an Institute for Policy Reforms
(IPR) report that argues that despite their differences and recent tensions
over Afghanistan, the Pak-US relationship cannot end. Both sides need to
understand each other’s perceptions and interests. The report says both
Pakistan and the US want peace in Afghanistan but differ on methods and goals. Concerned
about Indian influence, Pakistan wants a ‘friendly’ government in Kabul while
the US favoured a military solution over reconciliation (though the latter may
be changing now). IPR advises Pakistan to stay engaged with the US, regain
trust without necessarily yielding to all demands, state clearly what is
possible, what is not, without waiting for US pressure to respond. Pakistan
should offer sincere cooperation but make it equally contingent on US
accommodation of Pakistan’s security concerns. The US on the other hand must
help stop cross-border Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacks. While Pakistan
cannot control all Afghan Taliban acts, it should pledge to restrain them from
our borders while nudging them towards reconciliation. The report points out
that an Afghan Taliban government in Kabul is not acceptable to most Afghans,
the US, China and Russia. Pakistan must help negotiations with the Afghan
Taliban while extracting assurances from Kabul of effective border controls and
degrading the TTP. The report notes that the recent killing of Mullah
Fazlullah, the chief of the TTP, was viewed positively by Pakistan.
All three sources argue for cooperation based on trust
between the stakeholders in the Afghan conflict. While the logic of thus paving
the road to peace and reconciliation is unassailable, the fly in the ointment
remains the intransigence of the Afghan Taliban. On the same day as these
sources produced their remarkably congruent advice, the Afghan Taliban refused
to respond to Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s extension by another 10 days of
the (imperfect) ceasefire over Eid by extending their own ceasefire. On the
contrary they painted the ceasefire initiative as an attempt to persuade them
to lay down their arms and accept the regime in Kabul imposed by the US-led
west. This shows that however much the three sources speak eminent sense, the
road to peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan remains a long and bumpy one.