Peace or surrender?
Rashed Rahman
After innumerable delays and amidst uncertainty, the intra-Afghan talks process was kicked off in Doha on September 12, 2020. However, the difficulties surrounding the process have been highlighted by the persistence of fighting on the ground in Afghanistan. While the agenda for the talks has still to be hammered out in Doha, six policemen were killed in a Taliban attack in Kunduz on September 13, 2020, while five officers were slain in Kapisa province. A roadside mine blast in Kabul wounded two civilians, while another explosion did not result in any casualties. Fawad Aman, a spokesman for the Afghan defence ministry said in Kabul that on September 11, 2020, on the eve of the inaugural ceremony in Doha, the Taliban carried out 18 attacks against the government forces and installations across the country, causing heavy casualties. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid countered by stressing that the Taliban had attacked a convoy of government forces that arrived to launch an operation along a key highway in Kunduz, while security forces carried out air and artillery strikes on September 12, 2020 in Baghlan and Jowzjan provinces. In other words, shifting the blame to government attacks and trying to present the Taliban actions as ‘defensive’.
However, the ‘defensive’ argument of Mujahid failed to explain the bomb attack on Afghan Vice President Amrullah Saleh in Kabul on September 9, 2020, in which he fortunately escaped unharmed but the 10 people killed were not so lucky. Saleh is a staunch opponent of the Taliban. One could argue endlessly whether this posture of continuing attacks is Taliban leadership-led, reflects their relative lack of control over their local commanders, or can be attributed to the Islamic State (IS) factor in the brew.
After the September 12, 2020 inaugural ceremony in Doha, Afghan government negotiators appeared cautiously optimistic, which to sceptics seemed merely hoping against hope. At the opening ceremony, ceasefire calls dominated the speeches of the Afghan government, the US, and allies of both, but the Taliban simply ignored the demand. The Taliban therefore seem to be adhering to a classic ‘talking while fighting’ strategy, not the least because of concern that tapering off the fighting would lessen their leverage against their enemies and weaken the resolve and unity of their own ranks.
Latest reports say the ‘talks about talks’ in Doha have already hit deadlock over the insistence by the Taliban of a restoration of their draconian version of Islamic law, including harsh punishments, while the Afghan government is not prepared to budge on its stand that the gains since 2001 in democracy, rights (including women) and the rule of modern, civilised law cannot be reversed. The deadlock has persuaded US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad to travel to Pakistan to get help from their ‘daddy’ in persuading the Taliban to show flexibility. Let us see how that plays out.
Pakistan’s leaders continue to pat themselves on the back for playing a role in fostering the February 2020 agreement between the US and the Taliban and facilitating the current attempts at an intra-Afghan dialogue. The mantra beloved of our leaders of supporting an “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned” peace process translates in critics’ mind as a ‘Taliban-led, Afghan government-owned (under duress, mind)’ one.
If we blow away the chaff surrounding the issue, it seems clear that the Taliban are clearly dictating terms relentlessly, relying on their control of a claimed 50 percent of the countryside. They are faithfully following Mao Tse Tung’s dictum “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” The rest is political-diplomatic camouflage. The US has been defeated in Afghanistan after incurring heavy losses of life, money, and credibility. They have turned to negotiations in the hope of a face-saving extrication from the longest war the US has ever fought, with the Trump administration hoping for a breakthrough that will impact the presidential election in November 2020. In the process, their spokesmen, such as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, have admitted failure in their ‘nation-building’ ambition. It was never more than imperial hubris that persuaded Washington that it could invade and occupy developing countries and mould them in its own image. This imposed, inorganic effort did not succeed in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Libya. No wonder US President Donald Trump has resurrected the critique of the military-industrial complex that is the stoker of foreign wars, as former US President Eisenhower had warned long ago.
To allay fears regarding what will follow after a complete US withdrawal, the Americans revert every now and again to the ‘conditions’ they have laid down. One such important one from the US’s point of view, was the commitment by the Taliban that they would severe ties with al Qaeda to prevent a repeat of Afghan soil being used for attacks against the US or its allies, a la 9/11. But a recent report by the UN reveals that these ties have not been broken and al Qaeda continues to operate in a number of Afghan provinces.
With the best goodwill and intentions in the world, no flight of imagination can convince one that the Taliban, holding all the cards as they do, are negotiating anything other than a US withdrawal, after which the Afghan government may prove a sitting duck. Its ability to resist and survive the likely offensive by the Taliban once the foreign forces are out of the way is already questionable. Given the US defeat, it is difficult to envisage any country being in a position to bolster the Afghan government. Another abandonment of Afghanistan, a la post-Soviet withdrawal in 1989, seems likely.
If Islamabad is having difficulty hiding its crowing at the victory of its creation the Taliban, it should pause and reflect. A Taliban victory in Afghanistan refreshes concerns regarding the Pakistani Taliban sheltering on Afghan soil along the poorly policed border with Pakistan. It should not be forgotten that the folly of fostering local Taliban during the Afghan wars eventually forced their erstwhile patrons to conduct massive military operations against them, which seriously wounded the snake and forced it to retreat across the border, without having scotched it. Such unthinking follies have been the hallmark of our Afghan policy for decades. One fears fresh problems of security along the border and the postponement of any return of the remaining Afghan refugees if and when a fundamentalist Taliban regime is once again in control of Afghanistan.
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