Pak-Saudi relationship
Pakistan-Saudi Arabian ties have been extremely close over many decades. In times of difficulty, both sides have come to the aid and succour of the other within their respective capacities. These ties extend across the gamut of religious, economic, financial and strategic convergence. After all, Saudi Arabia is home to the two holiest cities of Islam, Makkah and Madinah. Notable convergences in the history of the relationship include the Islamic summit in Lahore in 1974 (attended, among a host of Muslim luminaries, by the late King Faisal who hosted it with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto), Pak-Saudi collaboration in the Afghan resistance to the Soviet occupation, Saudi concessional oil supplies and monetary aid to Pakistan in dire financial crises, and Pakistan’s oft pronounced and demonstrated in practice, when necessary, commitment to the defence and security of the Kingdom, to name just a few. Nevertheless, despite such close ties stretching back over time, allies sometimes differ too. Speculation currently is whirling around the possibility that frictions have arisen of late in the model relationship. It is in this context that Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi's statement the other day that Pakistan would be compelled to raise the Kashmir issue outside the framework of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) if the latter failed to convene a foreign ministers conference on Kashmir should be seen. The opposition, not unexpectedly, has pounced on this pronouncement as ‘irresponsible’ and likely to disrupt the close ties with Saudi Arabia. Shah Mahmood Qureshi has since been treading desperately in the water to fend off such criticism by saying his statement has been taken out of context and used by the opposition for political point scoring. What has heightened anxiety around the issue is the recent news of the Saudis demanding repayment of $ one billion of the $ three billion they had ‘parked’ with Pakistan in 2018 soon after the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) government had come to power to help it tide over its financial troubles. Unconfirmed reports speak of the Saudis demanding an additional $ one billion back. Other reports speak of Pakistan having turned to China to help bridge any financing gap that may emerge as a result. To contextualise the sensitivities of the Saudis regarding their undoubted and unchallenged paramount position in the OIC, one only has to recall the Muslim summit in Malaysia in December 2019 that Prime Minister Imran Khan opted out of attending at the last minute because, it was argued at the time, of Saudi angst at what was perceived as a move to weaken or split OIC or create another parallel Muslim platform that would challenge OIC’s (and therefore the Saudis’) eminence in Muslim issues. Given that debacle, and notwithstanding some frustration and teeth gnashing in Islamabad over the world’s, and particularly the Muslim world’s seeming indifference to the suffering of the people of Kashmir, care must be exercised in venturing into what has emerged as a political minefield. It is not clear whether the Saudi demand for return of $ one billion had anything to do with its annoyance over Shah Mahmood’s statement regarding OIC. However, it should be noted that the concessional oil facility worth $ 3.2 billion by Saudi Arabia has expired and there is so far no word on whether it will be extended/renewed.
There is of course another issue on which the Pak-Saudi relationship has encountered turbulence. This is the Saudi-led Gulf States’ drive against Iran itself as well as the latter’s alleged interventions on the side of Shia causes in the region. This sectarian divide in the Muslim world has put Pakistan in a dilemma. On the one hand are its historical, religious, economic and strategic ties to Saudi Arabia, including the presence of Pakistani workers in that country who remit about $ four billion a year to Pakistan, and on the other the exigencies of Iran as a geographical neighbour with a deep commonality of culture, Pakistan’s not insignificant Shia population, and the imperative of cooperation on the Balochistan border against militants on either side. Overarching above all this, given the history of sectarian strife in Pakistan, the latter understandably seeks to balance its close ties with Saudi Arabia with friendly relations with Iran. It was the consensus in Pakistan’s parliament to turn down the Saudi request for Pakistani troops to fight in Yemen against the Iranian-backed Houthis that expressed this reluctance to enter a sectarian fray in the region that could have serious repercussions at home that so annoyed the Saudis and their Gulf allies. Pakistan’s balancing act must of course continue in its own national interest, but care must be exercised not to appear to be sprinkling salt on the perceived wounds inflicted on Saudi sensibilities by loose talk.
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