Civil service reform
The task force headed by Dr Ishrat Husain on civil service
reform has come out with the first item in its daunting task. This first item pertains
to the procedure for federal secretaries’ appointment and tenure. The task
force recommends that a committee comprising the cabinet secretary, establishment
secretary and the principal secretary to the prime minister forward a panel of
three suitable officers for appointment as federal secretaries. It would be up
to the prime minister to choose one of the suggested panel. In case the prime
minister does not consider any of the panel members fit for the post, the
committee will be asked to recommend a new panel. Effectively, this reform does
not leave any room or authority with the prime minister to appoint any officer
as the secretary of any ministry or division on his own, i.e. it institutionalises
the process and is intended to avoid or eliminate arbitrariness and bias. Once
the prime minister chooses an officer from amongst those recommended by the
committee for appointment as the secretary of a ministry or division, the
officer will be on probation for six months, during which he/she could be
removed or changed if his/her performance is unsatisfactory or on disciplinary
grounds. After the completion of this six month probation period, and if the
officer’s performance is found satisfactory, he/she will be confirmed for a protected
three-year tenure. During his/her tenure, the incumbent cannot be transferred
except if disciplinary action is initiated against the officer for corruption,
negligence of duties, insubordination, misconduct or failure to meet the
performance targets set for him/her. If evidence establishes the officer is at
fault on any of the above counts, the prime minister can decide that the
officer should be transferred during his tenure, provided the reasons for the
shifting are recorded in writing. Dr Ishrat Husain has long argued that one of
the most important problems facing the bureaucracy is the frequent transfer of
civil servants (read insecurity of tenure). The importance therefore of
security of tenure is underlined in this first reform. This security can help
re-establish the objectivity and integrity of civil servants’ advice and
functioning rather than the present affliction of serving their political
bosses’ whims and will. This was the case with the civil service in the 1950s
and 1960s, until Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s ill thought through changes to the
security of tenure and other civil service reforms arguably led to the present
disorder and malfunctioning of the bureaucracy. Besides, security of tenure
promises the training and experience of the officer in question will benefit
the ministry or division he heads, thereby contributing to the efficacious
functioning of the state. Also, empirical evidence shows lack of continuity of
the person in charge impacts negatively on government’s policies, programmes
and projects, which cannot be completed on time or within the projected cost.
Reform must always be thoroughly thought through as to its
implications and impact on existing state structures, especially the civil
service. Like it or not, we inherited the ‘steel frame’ of the British Empire
in the shape of the bureaucracy. The in-service training, further education and
hands-on experience of the job is what gave top bureaucrats their once
formidable standing and reputation. For narrow expedient political reasons, the
populist government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto decided the powerful bureaucracy
needed to be cut down to size. Inadvertently, and without being conscious of
this implication, the move resulted in throwing the baby of civil service
integrity and efficiency out with the bath water of the intent to weaken the
all-powerful civil service. The results since then have been a merry-go-round
or revolving door of appointments and transfers of civil servants by successive
governments, civil and military, leading to an erosion of the once sterling
qualities of these servants of the state. Time therefore to roll back the
manipulable arbitrary regime of civil servants’ appointment and transfers in
favour of an institutionalised, multi-centred procedure whose transparency and integrity
must be demonstrated in practice to overcome the present parlous state of the
bureaucracy.
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