Daily Times editorial Oct 23, 2011

“Days and weeks”

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton arrived in Islamabad from her interaction with the Afghan leadership in Kabul and in the backdrop of the tensions between Pakistan and the US, stemming from a series of events beginning with the Abbottabad raid, Admiral Mullen’s castigation of the ISI’s links with the Haqqani network, and the Pakistani civilian-military response orchestrated through the All Parties Conference (APC). The expectation in some circles may have been that Ms Clinton came bearing gifts and palliative noises. To some extent they may have been satisfied. But the essential thrust of Ms Clinton’s message was clear and unequivocal. The US expects Pakistan to act against the terrorist safe havens on its soil within “days and weeks”, she said, while nudging, cajoling, persuading the Taliban to enter peace negotiations. If they do not cooperate, Ms Clinton asserted, stern action should be taken against them. The palliatives, largely overshadowed by the import of the ‘stern’ message, were that the Pakistan-US relationship is too critical for both sides and cannot be given up, and that the US would not carry out any (further) unilateral actions against Pakistan. She ended by emphasising Pakistan’s critical role in the Afghan endgame, and that the APC call to “give peace a chance” could only be achieved if both sides realise that “we have some work to do”.
Reports state that Clinton seemed to have extracted the recognition from Pakistan that it could do more against terrorist safe havens on its soil. This led some commentators, especially on television, to criticise foreign minister Hina Rabbani Khar for having seemingly conceded this point. However, a careful reading of Ms Khar’s statement may show that the American ‘joy’ at the seeming concession may have been overstated, and that the criticism had more to do with sensitivity amongst some of our commentators to the ‘do more’ mantra rather than what she actually said. Khar linked safe havens on this side with their counterparts across the border (a reference to the Pakistani Taliban having found sanctuary in eastern Afghanistan, reportedly with the Haqqani network’s help). Khar went on to say that better cooperation by the two sides could yield better results but categorically refuted ISI’s support to safe havens. So while the foreign minister stuck to her brief, the real question is the credibility of her defence of the Pakistani military and ISI’s role in supporting and providing sanctuaries to the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network on Pakistani soil, for which there is by now overwhelming evidence.
A parallel and important development is the concentration of US and Afghan forces in the eastern Afghan provinces considered the stronghold of the Haqqani network, presumably in preparation for military action against the group. Clinton would like Pakistan to put pressure on the group from the Pakistani side (the old hammer and anvil tactic). This would include not only military action on both sides of the border (Ms Clinton pointed out that action on only one side would not achieve the desired results) but that military operations offer limited gains (based on the experience of the military also intelligence cooperation. Pakistani policy makers are by now wedded to the view offensives in Swat and FATA), and it is time now for a comprehensive reconciliation ahead of the withdrawal of the foreign forces from Afghanistan. The question however remains, if the military is not prepared to reject its strategic depth obsession and continues to support the continued fight of the Afghan Taliban against the foreign and Afghan forces, what incentive is there for the Taliban to come to the negotiating table? From their perspective, it makes perfect sense to wait out the withdrawing foreign forces. What may follow causes greater concern. Unlike the relatively easy victory of the Taliban in 1994-96, this time they will face a broader and more determined anti-Taliban front, comprising not just the non-Pashtun ethnic groups, but also those Pashtuns who reject the medievalism of the Taliban. Therein lie the seeds of another civil war in Afghanistan, from whose effects Pakistan cannot isolate itself. Talking of a peaceful and stable Afghanistan while stoking the Taliban insurgency seems, to put it mildly, contradictory.