The murky interface between journalism and intelligence
Rashed Rahman
The sensational assassination of Syed Saleem Shahzad, web-based Asia Times Online’s reporter in Pakistan, in May this year sent shockwaves through the media community and public. The discovery of his body, fully clothed and with even his tie and shoes on, in the Upper Jehlum Canal on May 30, and the subsequent discovery of his car 20 miles upstream, indicated foul play. The autopsy revealed Shahzad had been brutally beaten and tortured, leading to his death. But what came out after these revelations was even more sensational and alarming.
Shahzad was ‘kidnapped’ on his way to a television interview in Islamabad on May 29. He never arrived. Daily Times broke the story of his disappearance. That scoop owed a great deal to its editor having been ‘leaned on’ by the ISI’s media cell just days before his disappearance to discontinue reproducing Shahzad’s stories. The request was not acceded to.
The gory end of Saleem Shahzad raised a storm in the media. Fingers of accusation were pointed at the ISI, which issued a denial for the first time in Pakistan’s history. The denial, far from assuaging the rage in the media and public, strengthened suspicions. The government was forced to respond by announcing an inquiry commission headed by Supreme Court Justice Mian Saqib Nisar. After an initial flurry of hearings with prominent media practitioners and others, the commission appears to have fallen into the limbo especially reserved for all such commissions.
The real story of Saleem Shahzad’s life, work and brutal death revolves around the perils of getting too close to the ISI, extremist militants, and foreign intelligence agencies in the cauldron that is Pakistan. Perfectly valid journalistic practices of cultivating contacts will all the players in and around a story do not, in Pakistan’s peculiar circumstances, guarantee the safety of journalists. Pakistan has become arguably the most dangerous country in the world to be a journalist in. Hundreds of journalists have been killed, particularly since the war on terror began ten years ago. Seldom has there been an adequate inquiry or investigation into these deaths on duty, let alone closure and justice served.
In Shahzad’s case too, his contacts with the militants, ISI, and approaches with offers from foreign intelligence agencies (which he is said to have declined) may have opened up his bold reporting on the links and relationship between Pakistan’s intelligence agencies and a wide array of jihadi extremists, from Osama bin Laden downwards, to the unwanted and brutal attentions of our ‘deep state’. His stories on bin Laden being on the move in Pakistan, meeting with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, expose of the first reported death (false) of Ilyas Kashmiri, and last but not least, links between and infiltration of the armed forces by terrorists probably sealed his fate. The context in which his status changed in the authorities’ eyes from ‘troublesome reporter’ to ‘enemy agent’ had a lot to do with the acute embarrassment faced by the Pakistani military, which has always portrayed itself as invincible, by the Abbottabad raid in which US Navy Seals killed Osama bin Laden, and the attack on the Mehran naval base in Karachi. Feeling cornered, the military intelligence agencies may have changed their view of Shahzad, leading to his abduction and murder.
Before his assassination, Saleem Shahzad had shared the details of the perceived threat to him in emails to Ali Dayan Hasan of Human Rights Watch and Hameed Haroon, executive head of Dawn. In these mails he documented his interface over a period of almost one year with the ISI’s media cell, including the pressure exerted on him to reveal sources, retract or rebut stories, etc, all of which he refused. There is also the documentation in these messages of the (not so) veiled threat to him by the ISI that he may well be on the hit list of a recently captured militant, and if that was so, the ISI would ‘duly’ inform him of the fact.
Unfortunately, despite the circumstantial evidence of murky doings by the intelligence agencies in this case, the commission is highly unlikely to uncover the truth and provide justice to Shahzad’s widow and family. To that extent, they seem fated to join the growing tribe of victims of the deep state’s excesses against journalists, political activists and even human rights defenders, all of whom have been targeted, ‘disappeared’ and, in the case of Balochistan at least, tortured brutally, killed, and their bodies dumped all over the province. Pakistan’s democracy, weak and flawed and lacking vision or leadership, has been unable to challenge, let alone redress, these long standing violations of the law, constitution and human and civil rights through the length and breadth of the country. Hopes for justice therefore struggle to keep their head above the dark waters rushing to sweep all that is decent and civilised about our society into oblivion.
The writer is Editor, Daily Times
Thursday, September 15, 2011
Tuesday, September 13, 2011
Editorial Daily Times Sept 14, 2011
Foreign policy paradigm shift
Prime Minister (PM) Yousaf Raza Gilani’s visit to Iran signals, as he himself put it in a meeting with Iranian President Mehmoud Ahmedinejad, a paradigm shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy. Pakistan, the PM added, wanted to maintain close relations with its neighbours and Iran was one of the countries with which it would like to have very close relations. The ‘shift’ referred to may be seen as disillusionment with excessive reliance on the US or the west, traditionally Islamabad’s preferred partners, and a ‘return’ to seeking regional cooperation, particularly in the emerging scenario post-withdrawal of the bulk of US and Nato forces from Afghanistan. One should also bear in mind the present atmosphere of mutual mistrust and suspicion between Islamabad and Washington.
The bilateral relationship between Pakistan and Iran is sought to be strengthened in the areas of trade, economic cooperation, security and intelligence sharing. For example, bilateral trade, currently at $ 1.2 billion, of which Pakistan’s exports to Iran are at a paltry $ 200 million, would be boosted to $ 10 billion. The controversial (in US eyes) gas pipeline and import of 1,000 MW electricity from Iran would be expedited. The gas pipeline in particular, which was originally intended to transit Pakistan to India but has been reduced to a bilateral project after New Delhi withdrew, some say on Washington’s urging, has been a thorn in the side of the US because of its open hostility to the regime in Tehran. If the two neighbouring countries go ahead with this project, as now seems increasingly likely, it will not only bolster Pakistan’s energy needs, it will also indicate that Ahmedinejad’s preference for rooting out foreign influence from the region has been taken on board by Pakistan. In the context of trade and economic cooperation, it stands to reason that the two sides will have to improve communication and transport links, in particular road, rail and air traffic. Two committees have been set up for the new enhanced cooperation, jointly chaired by the foreign ministers and interior ministers of the two countries. The latter committee has been charged with the task of satisfying Tehran vis-à-vis security on the Balochistan-Seistan border, implying a closer watch on the Baloch Jundullah group’s activities. This group has been attacking Iranian security forces inside Iranian Balochistan in the past, and is widely considered a shady and controversial element because of its alleged ties to (some say) both al Qaeda and US intelligence.
The PM appreciated Iran’s offer of $ 100 million for flood relief and reports say Iran has already dispatched two planeloads of relief goods. President Ahmedinejad in turn wished for greater people-to-people contacts, cultural cooperation, and promised sympathetic consideration of Pakistan’s request for opening a consulate in Bandar Abbas. Iran, he said, was interested in importing wheat, vegetables, fruit and other items from Pakistan. He argued the need for a new world order in which the historical underdevelopment of countries like Pakistan and Iran could be combated and the policies of the developed world that kept them in such straits resisted.
On arguably the most vexed foreign policy issue for the region, PM Gilani said Pakistan supported an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation and peace process. He asserted that Pakistan was part of the solution for Afghanistan’s woes, not part of the problem. It is good that the PM clarified his government’s position on this problematic issue, since it distances the civilian democratic government from the military’s hobbyhorse of ‘strategic depth’. On relations with the US, the PM reiterated Islamabad’s position that unilateral actions of the sort that killed Osama bin Laden on Pakistani soil were unacceptable. If Washington has intelligence, it must share it with the Pakistani authorities and leave it to them to act on it. He also repeated the stricture against drone attacks on Pakistani soil, arguing that they were counter-productive.
The new energy in Pakistan-Iran relations is of a piece with the tectonic power shifts taking place in the region as the Afghan endgame approaches. The countries of the region are waking up to the post-withdrawal scenario, in which they will have to manage the fallout of war-torn Afghanistan’s transition to hopefully peace and rehabilitation. As its two closest neighbours, with historic cultural, religious and other ties, Pakistan and Iran are uniquely placed to assist the transition looming, as well as ensure it takes a healthy and acceptable path for the Afghan people, as much as its neighbours.
Prime Minister (PM) Yousaf Raza Gilani’s visit to Iran signals, as he himself put it in a meeting with Iranian President Mehmoud Ahmedinejad, a paradigm shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy. Pakistan, the PM added, wanted to maintain close relations with its neighbours and Iran was one of the countries with which it would like to have very close relations. The ‘shift’ referred to may be seen as disillusionment with excessive reliance on the US or the west, traditionally Islamabad’s preferred partners, and a ‘return’ to seeking regional cooperation, particularly in the emerging scenario post-withdrawal of the bulk of US and Nato forces from Afghanistan. One should also bear in mind the present atmosphere of mutual mistrust and suspicion between Islamabad and Washington.
The bilateral relationship between Pakistan and Iran is sought to be strengthened in the areas of trade, economic cooperation, security and intelligence sharing. For example, bilateral trade, currently at $ 1.2 billion, of which Pakistan’s exports to Iran are at a paltry $ 200 million, would be boosted to $ 10 billion. The controversial (in US eyes) gas pipeline and import of 1,000 MW electricity from Iran would be expedited. The gas pipeline in particular, which was originally intended to transit Pakistan to India but has been reduced to a bilateral project after New Delhi withdrew, some say on Washington’s urging, has been a thorn in the side of the US because of its open hostility to the regime in Tehran. If the two neighbouring countries go ahead with this project, as now seems increasingly likely, it will not only bolster Pakistan’s energy needs, it will also indicate that Ahmedinejad’s preference for rooting out foreign influence from the region has been taken on board by Pakistan. In the context of trade and economic cooperation, it stands to reason that the two sides will have to improve communication and transport links, in particular road, rail and air traffic. Two committees have been set up for the new enhanced cooperation, jointly chaired by the foreign ministers and interior ministers of the two countries. The latter committee has been charged with the task of satisfying Tehran vis-à-vis security on the Balochistan-Seistan border, implying a closer watch on the Baloch Jundullah group’s activities. This group has been attacking Iranian security forces inside Iranian Balochistan in the past, and is widely considered a shady and controversial element because of its alleged ties to (some say) both al Qaeda and US intelligence.
The PM appreciated Iran’s offer of $ 100 million for flood relief and reports say Iran has already dispatched two planeloads of relief goods. President Ahmedinejad in turn wished for greater people-to-people contacts, cultural cooperation, and promised sympathetic consideration of Pakistan’s request for opening a consulate in Bandar Abbas. Iran, he said, was interested in importing wheat, vegetables, fruit and other items from Pakistan. He argued the need for a new world order in which the historical underdevelopment of countries like Pakistan and Iran could be combated and the policies of the developed world that kept them in such straits resisted.
On arguably the most vexed foreign policy issue for the region, PM Gilani said Pakistan supported an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation and peace process. He asserted that Pakistan was part of the solution for Afghanistan’s woes, not part of the problem. It is good that the PM clarified his government’s position on this problematic issue, since it distances the civilian democratic government from the military’s hobbyhorse of ‘strategic depth’. On relations with the US, the PM reiterated Islamabad’s position that unilateral actions of the sort that killed Osama bin Laden on Pakistani soil were unacceptable. If Washington has intelligence, it must share it with the Pakistani authorities and leave it to them to act on it. He also repeated the stricture against drone attacks on Pakistani soil, arguing that they were counter-productive.
The new energy in Pakistan-Iran relations is of a piece with the tectonic power shifts taking place in the region as the Afghan endgame approaches. The countries of the region are waking up to the post-withdrawal scenario, in which they will have to manage the fallout of war-torn Afghanistan’s transition to hopefully peace and rehabilitation. As its two closest neighbours, with historic cultural, religious and other ties, Pakistan and Iran are uniquely placed to assist the transition looming, as well as ensure it takes a healthy and acceptable path for the Afghan people, as much as its neighbours.
Saturday, September 10, 2011
Editorial Daily Times Sept 11, 2011
9/11 and all that
On the tenth anniversary of 9/11 today, much introspection is taking place on the meaning and impact of that seminal event. Despite successes against al Qaeda, in particular the degrading of its terrorist capabilities by taking out Osama bin Laden (OBL) and many of the top leaders of the organisation, cautionary voices can be heard arguing that the struggle against terrorism is far from over and there is little room for complacency. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pointed to a credible, new, but still unconfirmed threat to the US on the eve of the anniversary. Ex-British Prime Minister Tony Blair too chimed in with the statement that the post-9/11 battle was not over. Some context needs to be recalled.
The decade 1991-2011 could be looked back at with the benefit of hindsight as arguably providing the momentum that led to 9/11 in the midst of historic changes and developments. The first Iraq war of 1990-91 saw foreign, particularly US forces, deployed for the first time on Saudi soil. This event is widely believed to have alienated OBL from his home country and its monarchy, and impelled him to seek ways and means to combat American worldwide hegemony. This project led him from Sudan back to his original battlefield against the Soviets, i.e. Afghanistan, now ruled by the Taliban. From his base there, OBL stands accused of planning 9/11. The American response in the shape of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq crippled the neo-con American century project, in the process eroding due process and civil liberties at home and abroad, the latter witnessing the recourse to rendition and torture of suspects. However, whatever success or lack of it attended the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, they had the unintended consequence of spreading the al Qaeda franchise further abroad, increasing the threat of the terror network beyond its original support base. Western interventionism found a new lease of life (which continues), while the checks and balance provided in world affairs by the USSR-led communist camp during the cold war ended with a whimper when the Soviet Union imploded in 1991. The assassination of redoubtable Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud in Afghanistan just two days before 9/11 has been considered by many as the prelude to and preliminary strike by al Qaeda in preparation for the 9/11 attacks. The purpose perhaps was to ensure the strengthening of al Qaeda’s hosts, the Taliban’s grip on Afghanistan.
While there is little quarrel with the assertion that 9/11 changed the world almost beyond recognition, it is perhaps too early to grasp all the ramifications of that change. After all, if the cautionary voices mentioned above are correct, and there is weighty evidence that they are, the struggle against the ideology that al Qaeda represents is continuing, even while it spawns affiliates and draws to its banner a diverse array of religious extremists worldwide. Of all the countries most affected by 9/11 and its aftermath, in order of destruction, Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan probably enjoy pride of place. We in particular have been hoist by our own petard, our support to the export of jihadi extremism having returned to haunt us with a vengeance. While the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are seeing an incremental drawdown and withdrawal of foreign troops, the problems they leave behind will not so easily go away. In particular, Afghanistan’s endgame is poised delicately at the cusp of a possible return to the corridors of power, albeit partial, in Kabul of the Taliban. This spells risks not only for the Afghan people, but also for Pakistan’s security if the nexus of the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban strengthens the latter’s ability to operate from Afghan soil against Pakistan’s security. Ironically, our military establishment’s quest for that will-o-the-wisp, ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan, may end up in the strategic pit of increased threats to Pakistan’s own security.
On the tenth anniversary of 9/11 today, much introspection is taking place on the meaning and impact of that seminal event. Despite successes against al Qaeda, in particular the degrading of its terrorist capabilities by taking out Osama bin Laden (OBL) and many of the top leaders of the organisation, cautionary voices can be heard arguing that the struggle against terrorism is far from over and there is little room for complacency. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pointed to a credible, new, but still unconfirmed threat to the US on the eve of the anniversary. Ex-British Prime Minister Tony Blair too chimed in with the statement that the post-9/11 battle was not over. Some context needs to be recalled.
The decade 1991-2011 could be looked back at with the benefit of hindsight as arguably providing the momentum that led to 9/11 in the midst of historic changes and developments. The first Iraq war of 1990-91 saw foreign, particularly US forces, deployed for the first time on Saudi soil. This event is widely believed to have alienated OBL from his home country and its monarchy, and impelled him to seek ways and means to combat American worldwide hegemony. This project led him from Sudan back to his original battlefield against the Soviets, i.e. Afghanistan, now ruled by the Taliban. From his base there, OBL stands accused of planning 9/11. The American response in the shape of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq crippled the neo-con American century project, in the process eroding due process and civil liberties at home and abroad, the latter witnessing the recourse to rendition and torture of suspects. However, whatever success or lack of it attended the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, they had the unintended consequence of spreading the al Qaeda franchise further abroad, increasing the threat of the terror network beyond its original support base. Western interventionism found a new lease of life (which continues), while the checks and balance provided in world affairs by the USSR-led communist camp during the cold war ended with a whimper when the Soviet Union imploded in 1991. The assassination of redoubtable Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud in Afghanistan just two days before 9/11 has been considered by many as the prelude to and preliminary strike by al Qaeda in preparation for the 9/11 attacks. The purpose perhaps was to ensure the strengthening of al Qaeda’s hosts, the Taliban’s grip on Afghanistan.
While there is little quarrel with the assertion that 9/11 changed the world almost beyond recognition, it is perhaps too early to grasp all the ramifications of that change. After all, if the cautionary voices mentioned above are correct, and there is weighty evidence that they are, the struggle against the ideology that al Qaeda represents is continuing, even while it spawns affiliates and draws to its banner a diverse array of religious extremists worldwide. Of all the countries most affected by 9/11 and its aftermath, in order of destruction, Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan probably enjoy pride of place. We in particular have been hoist by our own petard, our support to the export of jihadi extremism having returned to haunt us with a vengeance. While the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are seeing an incremental drawdown and withdrawal of foreign troops, the problems they leave behind will not so easily go away. In particular, Afghanistan’s endgame is poised delicately at the cusp of a possible return to the corridors of power, albeit partial, in Kabul of the Taliban. This spells risks not only for the Afghan people, but also for Pakistan’s security if the nexus of the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban strengthens the latter’s ability to operate from Afghan soil against Pakistan’s security. Ironically, our military establishment’s quest for that will-o-the-wisp, ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan, may end up in the strategic pit of increased threats to Pakistan’s own security.
Thursday, September 8, 2011
Editorial Daily Times Sept 9, 2011
Intensifying atrocities and threats
Three developments on Wednesday point to the intensifying atrocities and threats from the terrorist network in Pakistan. First was the devastating and horrifying twin suicide attack targeting the DIG FC’s residence in Quetta. At least 26 people were killed, including the wife of the DIG FC and three children, and over 60 injured, some of whom are described as critical. It is a sign of the cowardly nature of the terrorists’ campaign in Pakistan that they do not shrink from making war on women and children. And this barbarism is sought to be justified in the name of Islam! The targeted residence lay in a busy and high security area of the city. That raises the question of how the terrorists’ vehicle, laden with 100 kg of explosives, managed to sneak into the area without being checked. Equally, how did the second suicide bomber on foot manage to evade security and reach inside the house, the chaos and confusion of the first blast notwithstanding, within minutes of the vehicle’s exploding? These questions point to security gaps and lapses even for such a high profile area.
The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) of Hakeemullah Mehsud was quick to claim responsibility, asserting it was in retaliation for the arrest of three al Qaeda top leaders from Quetta the other day. Further, the TTP spokesman, Ehsanullah Ehsan threatened to launch even bigger attacks in future. If there was any lingering doubt on the issue, this attack and the claim of responsibility clearly establishes the nexus between the TTP and al Qaeda. Since the TTP is currently enjoying the hospitality of the Afghan Taliban across the border, that just about squares the circle. The terrorist network now encompasses al Qaeda, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. What does this say about our military establishment’s clinging to the out of date notion that the Afghan Taliban are our ‘strategic assets’ as the Afghan endgame approaches? Arguably, the military establishment may be painting itself into a corner in future that may hold some unpleasant surprises. It must by now be understood by our military high command that the shelf life of the idea of relying on jihadi proxies for foreign policy or even domestic political goals has long ago passed its sell-by date. The military, as one of the most powerful organs of the state, responsible for defence and security, must revisit the situation inside Pakistan and on its periphery as it has panned out and understand that the only solution for both our country and the region is a return to the moderate vision of Islam that defined us before the extremists hijacked it in the present sinister, destructive direction.
If the Quetta incident were not sufficient to underline the real security threat Pakistan faces from the extremist terrorist network, two other developments appear to clinch the argument. There is a report of a very real security threat in Peshawar, already the victim of some of the worst terrorist attacks the country has seen, along the lines of what happened in Quetta. Two bomb hoaxes on PIA flights panicked passengers and officials and resulted in diversions towards the closest airports en route, before checks revealed no bombs on board. Disruptive activities such as these can be equally damaging to struggling PIA and the country as a whole in terms of its international image and credibility.
The military first and foremost, and the political and social forces of the country must now pull together against the extremist threat that appears to be intensifying in response to actions within Pakistan against the terrorists, such as the Quetta al Qaeda arrests, and the approaching endgame in Afghanistan. A return to the moderate, tolerant, civilised Pakistan of not so distant memory would have a salutary effect within, as well as outside the country, to its obvious advantage. Accompanying this turn of the page, the terrorists must be fought to the bitter end, not given leeway to exploit the ‘good Taliban, bad Taliban’ illusion to their advantage.
Three developments on Wednesday point to the intensifying atrocities and threats from the terrorist network in Pakistan. First was the devastating and horrifying twin suicide attack targeting the DIG FC’s residence in Quetta. At least 26 people were killed, including the wife of the DIG FC and three children, and over 60 injured, some of whom are described as critical. It is a sign of the cowardly nature of the terrorists’ campaign in Pakistan that they do not shrink from making war on women and children. And this barbarism is sought to be justified in the name of Islam! The targeted residence lay in a busy and high security area of the city. That raises the question of how the terrorists’ vehicle, laden with 100 kg of explosives, managed to sneak into the area without being checked. Equally, how did the second suicide bomber on foot manage to evade security and reach inside the house, the chaos and confusion of the first blast notwithstanding, within minutes of the vehicle’s exploding? These questions point to security gaps and lapses even for such a high profile area.
The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) of Hakeemullah Mehsud was quick to claim responsibility, asserting it was in retaliation for the arrest of three al Qaeda top leaders from Quetta the other day. Further, the TTP spokesman, Ehsanullah Ehsan threatened to launch even bigger attacks in future. If there was any lingering doubt on the issue, this attack and the claim of responsibility clearly establishes the nexus between the TTP and al Qaeda. Since the TTP is currently enjoying the hospitality of the Afghan Taliban across the border, that just about squares the circle. The terrorist network now encompasses al Qaeda, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. What does this say about our military establishment’s clinging to the out of date notion that the Afghan Taliban are our ‘strategic assets’ as the Afghan endgame approaches? Arguably, the military establishment may be painting itself into a corner in future that may hold some unpleasant surprises. It must by now be understood by our military high command that the shelf life of the idea of relying on jihadi proxies for foreign policy or even domestic political goals has long ago passed its sell-by date. The military, as one of the most powerful organs of the state, responsible for defence and security, must revisit the situation inside Pakistan and on its periphery as it has panned out and understand that the only solution for both our country and the region is a return to the moderate vision of Islam that defined us before the extremists hijacked it in the present sinister, destructive direction.
If the Quetta incident were not sufficient to underline the real security threat Pakistan faces from the extremist terrorist network, two other developments appear to clinch the argument. There is a report of a very real security threat in Peshawar, already the victim of some of the worst terrorist attacks the country has seen, along the lines of what happened in Quetta. Two bomb hoaxes on PIA flights panicked passengers and officials and resulted in diversions towards the closest airports en route, before checks revealed no bombs on board. Disruptive activities such as these can be equally damaging to struggling PIA and the country as a whole in terms of its international image and credibility.
The military first and foremost, and the political and social forces of the country must now pull together against the extremist threat that appears to be intensifying in response to actions within Pakistan against the terrorists, such as the Quetta al Qaeda arrests, and the approaching endgame in Afghanistan. A return to the moderate, tolerant, civilised Pakistan of not so distant memory would have a salutary effect within, as well as outside the country, to its obvious advantage. Accompanying this turn of the page, the terrorists must be fought to the bitter end, not given leeway to exploit the ‘good Taliban, bad Taliban’ illusion to their advantage.
Tuesday, September 6, 2011
Editorial Daily Times Sept 7, 2011
Al Qaeda arrests
The Pakistan military announced on Monday the arrest of senior al Qaeda leader Younis al-Mauritani along with two other top operatives, Abdul Ghaffar al-Shami and Messara al-Shami, from Quetta. The arrests were the result of an intelligence-led operation that included elements of the FC. Younis al-Mauritani is said to be head of al Qaeda’s international operations, charged with planning and preparing attacks on the US, Europe and Australia. Such attacks would have included US economic interests such as gas/oil pipelines, power generating dams, and strikes against ships/oil tankers using explosive-laden speedboats in international waters.
Interestingly, the arrests have not only been lauded by the White House as a shining example of the common anti-terrorist goals and cooperation between Pakistan and the US, they have also been held up by Pakistan’s ISPR as resulting from the close cooperation between the intelligence services of the two countries, particularly the ISI and CIA. Now public memory is notoriously short, but not so short as to have forgotten how since 2011 dawned, the two countries, and in particular the ISI and CIA have been at loggerheads, first manifested in the Raymond Davis affair, later peaking after the Abbottabad raid that killed Osama bin Laden. In this space, we had argued consistently for both sides to draw back from the brink of a seemingly hopeless incremental breakdown in relations amidst mutual mistrust, suspicions and accusations. This position was not motivated by any illusions about the two countries’ interests or their convergence/divergence. Instead it was based on the bigger picture in the struggle against terrorism, in which the stakes for both sides were so huge as to require statesmanship and restraint if the terrorists were not to have the last laugh. It is therefore gratifying to see that the logic of the situation appears finally to be reasserting itself and both sides have not only generously lauded each other’s contribution, but also the cooperation that made this breakthrough possible. The terrorists of all hues and persuasions would love nothing more than if the US and Pakistan alliance against them breaks down, naturally to their benefit. The hope is that both sides have drawn the appropriate lessons from the near debacle in their relations provoked by the adverse developments earlier this year and will use that wisdom to further the common goals of defeating the terrorist menace.
Of course there is no room to be lulled into complacency at this positive turn. The reason is the convergence (since 9/11) of interest and policy between Washington and Islamabad regarding al Qaeda and the divergence regarding the Afghan Taliban. Even under General Musharraf, Pakistan led the way in cracking down on al Qaeda and was central to the arrest of many of those who masterminded the 9/11 attacks. However, it must also be said that there has been an inherent divergence in the approach to and policy towards the Afghan Taliban. Whereas Washington has tended to see the Afghan Taliban as merely an extension of their main target – al Qaeda – Islamabad, and particularly Rawalpindi has had a different take. While our military establishment was rooting out al Qaeda from Pakistani soil and transferring all operatives captured to the custody of the US over the last 10 years, it was at the same time providing safe havens and operating bases to the Afghan Taliban to fight the US and Nato forces operating in Afghanistan. And all this while acting as the main logistical conduit for the western forces in Afghanistan and also paying lip service to common goals and strategy! The duality of approach of the Pakistani military establishment, which continues to date, is at the heart of the friction in the relationship between the two allies.
A return of Taliban rule in Afghanistan would be a disaster not only for the suffering people of that country, it would arguably be a disaster for the region and the world. One, our homegrown Taliban movement would be free to operate from Afghan soil against the Pakistani state (something they have already begun through cross-border attacks from bases in Afghanistan). Two, who will guarantee that the Afghan Taliban will not allow their old ally al Qaeda to once again find a foothold on Afghan soil? And who will rescue the Afghan people from the medieval rule and practices of the Taliban again, given war weariness in the west?
The Pakistan military announced on Monday the arrest of senior al Qaeda leader Younis al-Mauritani along with two other top operatives, Abdul Ghaffar al-Shami and Messara al-Shami, from Quetta. The arrests were the result of an intelligence-led operation that included elements of the FC. Younis al-Mauritani is said to be head of al Qaeda’s international operations, charged with planning and preparing attacks on the US, Europe and Australia. Such attacks would have included US economic interests such as gas/oil pipelines, power generating dams, and strikes against ships/oil tankers using explosive-laden speedboats in international waters.
Interestingly, the arrests have not only been lauded by the White House as a shining example of the common anti-terrorist goals and cooperation between Pakistan and the US, they have also been held up by Pakistan’s ISPR as resulting from the close cooperation between the intelligence services of the two countries, particularly the ISI and CIA. Now public memory is notoriously short, but not so short as to have forgotten how since 2011 dawned, the two countries, and in particular the ISI and CIA have been at loggerheads, first manifested in the Raymond Davis affair, later peaking after the Abbottabad raid that killed Osama bin Laden. In this space, we had argued consistently for both sides to draw back from the brink of a seemingly hopeless incremental breakdown in relations amidst mutual mistrust, suspicions and accusations. This position was not motivated by any illusions about the two countries’ interests or their convergence/divergence. Instead it was based on the bigger picture in the struggle against terrorism, in which the stakes for both sides were so huge as to require statesmanship and restraint if the terrorists were not to have the last laugh. It is therefore gratifying to see that the logic of the situation appears finally to be reasserting itself and both sides have not only generously lauded each other’s contribution, but also the cooperation that made this breakthrough possible. The terrorists of all hues and persuasions would love nothing more than if the US and Pakistan alliance against them breaks down, naturally to their benefit. The hope is that both sides have drawn the appropriate lessons from the near debacle in their relations provoked by the adverse developments earlier this year and will use that wisdom to further the common goals of defeating the terrorist menace.
Of course there is no room to be lulled into complacency at this positive turn. The reason is the convergence (since 9/11) of interest and policy between Washington and Islamabad regarding al Qaeda and the divergence regarding the Afghan Taliban. Even under General Musharraf, Pakistan led the way in cracking down on al Qaeda and was central to the arrest of many of those who masterminded the 9/11 attacks. However, it must also be said that there has been an inherent divergence in the approach to and policy towards the Afghan Taliban. Whereas Washington has tended to see the Afghan Taliban as merely an extension of their main target – al Qaeda – Islamabad, and particularly Rawalpindi has had a different take. While our military establishment was rooting out al Qaeda from Pakistani soil and transferring all operatives captured to the custody of the US over the last 10 years, it was at the same time providing safe havens and operating bases to the Afghan Taliban to fight the US and Nato forces operating in Afghanistan. And all this while acting as the main logistical conduit for the western forces in Afghanistan and also paying lip service to common goals and strategy! The duality of approach of the Pakistani military establishment, which continues to date, is at the heart of the friction in the relationship between the two allies.
A return of Taliban rule in Afghanistan would be a disaster not only for the suffering people of that country, it would arguably be a disaster for the region and the world. One, our homegrown Taliban movement would be free to operate from Afghan soil against the Pakistani state (something they have already begun through cross-border attacks from bases in Afghanistan). Two, who will guarantee that the Afghan Taliban will not allow their old ally al Qaeda to once again find a foothold on Afghan soil? And who will rescue the Afghan people from the medieval rule and practices of the Taliban again, given war weariness in the west?
Monday, September 5, 2011
Editorial Daily Times Sept 6, 2011
Rehman Malik’s request
Federal Interior Minister Rehman Malik has studiously refused to be drawn into a response to ex-Home Minister Sindh Zulfikar Mirza’s diatribe against him. Instead, it now transpires that he has written to the prime minister with a request to constitute a judicial commission to probe Mirza’s allegations. In the process, Malik hopes to have an opportunity to clear his name regarding the two arguably most damaging allegations against him: 1) so-called connections with target killers; 2) the alleged release of target killers under Malik’s instructions. When asked about this during an interaction in Lahore with newsmen, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani said he was considering the request. At the same time, the PM was careful and diplomatic when answering prickly questions about his two party colleagues. While he did not condemn, in fact was ‘soft’ on Mirza by appreciating his resignation from all offices before he launched his criticism, the PM was also at pains to defend his interior minister against Mirza. Interestingly, in answer to another question, Gilani hoped that the local bodies elections would be held before the next general elections. Ordinarily, this would have been an unremarkable statement, but given the context of the troubles in Karachi and the recent flip-flop over the local bodies system, it could be read by some as one more sop towards the MQM, which the PPP is trying once again to persuade back into the fold of the coalition. In the given situation, when Karachi and Hyderabad have been allowed the restoration of the Musharraf-era local bodies system, which advantages the MQM, the rest of Sindh is now under the restored commissionerate system! Wonders will never cease in this Land of the Pure.
The slaughter continues in the streets of Karachi, even as the beginnings of the fruits of the operation are becoming visible in the arrests of a handful of target killers. Meantime, despite the furore aroused by the Mirza attack on MQM, the overtures from the PPP to Altaf Hussain and his followers continue. Both the PM and Rehman Malik, the latter virtually the permanent bridge between the two sides, spoke to Altaf to inquire after his health upon his return home from hospital. Platitudes about upholding democracy and cooperating with each other were exchanged as usual. But that should not be taken to mean that all is well on this front. Reports of a meeting between the PPP emissaries former federal law minister Babar Awan and Sindh Local Government Minister Agha Siraj Durrani with Sindh Governor Ishratul Ebad point to continuing wooing efforts even though the wake of Hurricane Mirza has yet to subside.
What is not clear so far, and has led to much speculation in the media, is whether Mirza has acted entirely off his own bat or served some Machiavellian purpose of President Asif Ali Zardari in the troubled relationship with the MQM. One view is that Zardari and Mirza are practicing a ‘good cop, bad cop’ routine intended to pressurise the MQM into making concessions on the terms of engagement between the two sides. That only time will prove or otherwise. But there is no mistaking the enthusiastic response of the PPP’s Sindhi constituency and the Sindhi nationalists to Mirza’s outbursts against the MQM. Whether this will be sufficient to win back this alienated constituency, irritated over the perceived molly-coddling of the MQM in the name of ‘reconciliation’, too will only become clear over time. Meanwhile the latest Wikileaks revelations have laid bare the troubles between the PPP and the MQM over the last two years. The PPP’s complaint can be boiled down to MQM’s tactics of ‘escalating demands’ every time an agreement had been reached. Perhaps the new ‘line’ (if it is that) of the PPP is to pay its negotiating partner back in its own coin.
Federal Interior Minister Rehman Malik has studiously refused to be drawn into a response to ex-Home Minister Sindh Zulfikar Mirza’s diatribe against him. Instead, it now transpires that he has written to the prime minister with a request to constitute a judicial commission to probe Mirza’s allegations. In the process, Malik hopes to have an opportunity to clear his name regarding the two arguably most damaging allegations against him: 1) so-called connections with target killers; 2) the alleged release of target killers under Malik’s instructions. When asked about this during an interaction in Lahore with newsmen, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani said he was considering the request. At the same time, the PM was careful and diplomatic when answering prickly questions about his two party colleagues. While he did not condemn, in fact was ‘soft’ on Mirza by appreciating his resignation from all offices before he launched his criticism, the PM was also at pains to defend his interior minister against Mirza. Interestingly, in answer to another question, Gilani hoped that the local bodies elections would be held before the next general elections. Ordinarily, this would have been an unremarkable statement, but given the context of the troubles in Karachi and the recent flip-flop over the local bodies system, it could be read by some as one more sop towards the MQM, which the PPP is trying once again to persuade back into the fold of the coalition. In the given situation, when Karachi and Hyderabad have been allowed the restoration of the Musharraf-era local bodies system, which advantages the MQM, the rest of Sindh is now under the restored commissionerate system! Wonders will never cease in this Land of the Pure.
The slaughter continues in the streets of Karachi, even as the beginnings of the fruits of the operation are becoming visible in the arrests of a handful of target killers. Meantime, despite the furore aroused by the Mirza attack on MQM, the overtures from the PPP to Altaf Hussain and his followers continue. Both the PM and Rehman Malik, the latter virtually the permanent bridge between the two sides, spoke to Altaf to inquire after his health upon his return home from hospital. Platitudes about upholding democracy and cooperating with each other were exchanged as usual. But that should not be taken to mean that all is well on this front. Reports of a meeting between the PPP emissaries former federal law minister Babar Awan and Sindh Local Government Minister Agha Siraj Durrani with Sindh Governor Ishratul Ebad point to continuing wooing efforts even though the wake of Hurricane Mirza has yet to subside.
What is not clear so far, and has led to much speculation in the media, is whether Mirza has acted entirely off his own bat or served some Machiavellian purpose of President Asif Ali Zardari in the troubled relationship with the MQM. One view is that Zardari and Mirza are practicing a ‘good cop, bad cop’ routine intended to pressurise the MQM into making concessions on the terms of engagement between the two sides. That only time will prove or otherwise. But there is no mistaking the enthusiastic response of the PPP’s Sindhi constituency and the Sindhi nationalists to Mirza’s outbursts against the MQM. Whether this will be sufficient to win back this alienated constituency, irritated over the perceived molly-coddling of the MQM in the name of ‘reconciliation’, too will only become clear over time. Meanwhile the latest Wikileaks revelations have laid bare the troubles between the PPP and the MQM over the last two years. The PPP’s complaint can be boiled down to MQM’s tactics of ‘escalating demands’ every time an agreement had been reached. Perhaps the new ‘line’ (if it is that) of the PPP is to pay its negotiating partner back in its own coin.
Editorial Daily Times Sept 4, 2011
Dushanbe summit
The quadrilateral summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, brought the presidents of four major regional powers to discuss increased cooperation in regional trade, fighting terrorism and drug trafficking, and making joint efforts for regional peace and security. Earlier in Kashgar, Xinjiang, China, President Asif Ali Zardari had mooted the idea of a revival of the historic Silk Route and the Eurasian Corridor. In its modern avatar, this would take the form of increased connectivity through modern highways, railroads and air services. Increased trade and investment would follow the development of these modern means of communication, bolstered by banking and other mutually beneficial services. The potential for good of these ideas is further underlined by the possibility of Pakistan acting as the southern leg of a trade and energy corridor, linking Gwadar Port with China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe. The dream is ambitious but doable, as underlined by Russian President Dimitry Medvedev’s remarks on regional issues, particularly Afghanistan, and the role Russia was desirous of playing in implementing the dream.
The summit communiqué emphasised the importance of accelerated training and arming of the Afghan security services in the light of the planned withdrawal of 10,000 US troops this year, another 23,000 by the end of next summer, leaving behind a 65,000-strong force, to be gradually whittled down to perhaps a residual 25,000 by 2014. Medvedev expressed the sense of the meeting when he argued for a regional solution to Afghanistan. Naturally, Afghanistan and all its neighbours are seized of the fact that with the withdrawal of the US-led coalition, the region would have to fill its shoes if Afghanistan was to be stabilised as the first step in the stabilisation of the region as a whole. This would allow the Russian interest in CASA 1000, the project to supply 1,000 MW electricity from Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan, to be implemented, along with the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline. Russia is attempting to recover its influence in a region it has historically had an important role in, especially in the light of the recently emerged tensions in the US-Afghan and US-Pakistan relationships, but without any direct involvement in Afghanistan, from which the Soviet Union retreated with a bloody nose in 1989. Medvedev lamented the lack of progress in these joint energy projects and committed his country to investing millions of dollars to ensure they see the light of day. As part of Russia’s policy of recovering influence in its ‘near abroad’, it has managed an extension in the agreement with Tajikistan for its military base by another 49 years.
This quadrilateral summit of Pakistan, Russia, Afghanistan and Tajikistan seems to be acquiring a regular character. Last August, President Medvedev had hosted it in Sochi. Next year it is Pakistan’s turn in Islamabad. As is usual at such international moots, they provide opportunities for the participants to have bilateral discussions on the sidelines of the main action, which often are productive. For example, Presidents Zardari and Karzai took the opportunity to discuss Pak-Afghan relations, the transit trade agreement between the two countries, security and mutual cooperation. The atmospherics, body language of all the leaders and the obvious friendliness and bonhomie point to the quadrilateral process acquiring a dynamic that is the obvious need of the countries concerned, as well as the region as a whole. There is a visible tectonic shift away from the western ‘interlopers’ to regional arrangements for mutually beneficial security and economic cooperation. More power to their Excellencies’ elbows.
The quadrilateral summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, brought the presidents of four major regional powers to discuss increased cooperation in regional trade, fighting terrorism and drug trafficking, and making joint efforts for regional peace and security. Earlier in Kashgar, Xinjiang, China, President Asif Ali Zardari had mooted the idea of a revival of the historic Silk Route and the Eurasian Corridor. In its modern avatar, this would take the form of increased connectivity through modern highways, railroads and air services. Increased trade and investment would follow the development of these modern means of communication, bolstered by banking and other mutually beneficial services. The potential for good of these ideas is further underlined by the possibility of Pakistan acting as the southern leg of a trade and energy corridor, linking Gwadar Port with China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe. The dream is ambitious but doable, as underlined by Russian President Dimitry Medvedev’s remarks on regional issues, particularly Afghanistan, and the role Russia was desirous of playing in implementing the dream.
The summit communiqué emphasised the importance of accelerated training and arming of the Afghan security services in the light of the planned withdrawal of 10,000 US troops this year, another 23,000 by the end of next summer, leaving behind a 65,000-strong force, to be gradually whittled down to perhaps a residual 25,000 by 2014. Medvedev expressed the sense of the meeting when he argued for a regional solution to Afghanistan. Naturally, Afghanistan and all its neighbours are seized of the fact that with the withdrawal of the US-led coalition, the region would have to fill its shoes if Afghanistan was to be stabilised as the first step in the stabilisation of the region as a whole. This would allow the Russian interest in CASA 1000, the project to supply 1,000 MW electricity from Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan, to be implemented, along with the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline. Russia is attempting to recover its influence in a region it has historically had an important role in, especially in the light of the recently emerged tensions in the US-Afghan and US-Pakistan relationships, but without any direct involvement in Afghanistan, from which the Soviet Union retreated with a bloody nose in 1989. Medvedev lamented the lack of progress in these joint energy projects and committed his country to investing millions of dollars to ensure they see the light of day. As part of Russia’s policy of recovering influence in its ‘near abroad’, it has managed an extension in the agreement with Tajikistan for its military base by another 49 years.
This quadrilateral summit of Pakistan, Russia, Afghanistan and Tajikistan seems to be acquiring a regular character. Last August, President Medvedev had hosted it in Sochi. Next year it is Pakistan’s turn in Islamabad. As is usual at such international moots, they provide opportunities for the participants to have bilateral discussions on the sidelines of the main action, which often are productive. For example, Presidents Zardari and Karzai took the opportunity to discuss Pak-Afghan relations, the transit trade agreement between the two countries, security and mutual cooperation. The atmospherics, body language of all the leaders and the obvious friendliness and bonhomie point to the quadrilateral process acquiring a dynamic that is the obvious need of the countries concerned, as well as the region as a whole. There is a visible tectonic shift away from the western ‘interlopers’ to regional arrangements for mutually beneficial security and economic cooperation. More power to their Excellencies’ elbows.
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