Tuesday, January 30, 2024

Business Recorder Column January 30, 2024

Elections and prospects

 

Rashed Rahman

 

As the date for general elections, February 8, 2024, looms, the election campaign scene exhibits some troubling tendencies. First and foremost, the lack of the traditional excitement and activity by the contending political parties is conspicuous by its absence. This malaise appears to have affected not only those vying for electoral success, but even those expected to elect them by casting their vote on the day. This apathy could be ascribed to a number of causes, but two or three appear to stand out. The political parties in the field can be neatly divided between those ‘acceptable’ to the present power structure, and one party in particular that is not. The ‘acceptable’ parties are all those that were part of the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) coalition government constituted after the ouster of Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) government through a no-confidence motion in 2022. To these could be added parties such as the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan, and a few minor contenders on the margins. The ‘pariah’ party in this polarised political environment is only the PTI. If it can be assumed then that the result of the election is a foregone conclusion, what does this say about the legitimacy of the regime to follow, and what effect will it have on its ability to tackle the imposing mountain of troubles the country faces, first and foremost the economic meltdown?

As described by one analyst, the journey of the PTI since its formation in 1996 may be described as one “from partner to pariah”. This is a fairly accurate description of the process whereby the PTI was belatedly ‘picked up’ by the establishment despite it being ignored by General Pervez Musharraf after the 2002 elections held by him, which have joined the growing list of elections in our history either answering to the description ‘manipulated’ (most of them) or whose results were ignored (1970, perhaps the fairest and freest of them all, the brushing aside of whose results by Yahya Khan’s military regime led to the loss of half the country, East Pakistan). Imran Khan expected to be made prime minister (PM) by Musharraf despite winning a sole seat. Musharraf’s refusal to contemplate the same in favour instead of adorning his new King’s Party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) of the Gujrat Chaudries with the crown, proved too bitter a pill for Imran Khan to swallow and at the same time betrayed his egotistical belief that he deserved the coveted prize irrespective of the rules governing the formation of governments that enjoy a parliamentary majority (whether genuine or not). That changed after the establishment (post-Musharraf) decided the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) government led by Asif Zardari after Benazir Bhutto’s assassination in 2007 and the returned-from-exile Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) were too ‘chummy’ despite their early falling out and PML-N going into opposition because in the background lurked the Charter of Democracy signed by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in exile in London in 2006, in which they committed to forego playing the role of the establishment’s plaything against each other, which had been characteristic of the 1990s. A government and government-in-waiting (the opposition) united in resisting manipulation against each other was too much for the establishment to stomach. Hence came the change of heart and preferred satrap in 2011 when the PTI burst upon the scene through its rally at Minar-i-Pakistan, Lahore, aided, abetted, mentored and allegedly secured by then ISI chief General Pasha.

This change in the PTI’s fortunes fed into the disqualification of incumbent PM Nawaz Sharif in 2017 and the allegedly manipulated result in favour of the PTI in the 2018 general elections that followed. Much to the horror and disappointment of his mentors and supporters in the military establishment, Imran Khan proved hopeless as a PM, failing to produce a single success in the exaggerated programme of development he had announced, and only keeping his government afloat (at the cost of the country) by borrowing in his four and a quarter years’ incumbency 71 percent of all the loans Pakistan had incurred from 1947 to 2018. It is no accident then that the PDM government that followed his ouster was hamstrung by the threat of the country defaulting on its ballooning debt burden.

Having lost the confidence and support of the military establishment that had brought him to power, Imran Khan foolishly believed that he had such overwhelming support within the military that a confident ‘strike’ would produce a mutiny against the successors of COAS Genera Bajwa (his main supporter), i.e. the top command under General Asim Munir. Nothing else explains the adventure of May 9 when military installations and monuments were attacked and mutilated by the PTI’s leaders and workers. What Imran Khan failed to appreciate was the discipline and unity of command of the military, which was intact. In the aftermath of the May 9 chaos, those in the upper echelons of the military suspected of sympathy for the PTI were summarily purged, a stampede of PTI leaders of all shapes, sizes and hues were seen recanting on television, and those who refused are to this day being given the run around of cases after cases at which our establishment has proved throughout our history to be extraordinarily adept.

Now, when Imran Khan is in jail and until recently was unable to communicate with his party people, we hear of ‘election’ rallies all over the country by the PTI workers, ostensibly on the call of Imran Khan. If true, this suggests Imran and the PTI have found a way around the wall of silence erected around him since his arrest. Be that as it may, the attempt was met with the usual tender ministrations of the police, resulting in injuries, arrests and justificatory statements of all kinds from the police and authorities why the baton, water cannon, arrests, etc, were unleashed against the PTI. Unfortunately, our establishment has proved incapable of learning anything from the past. It is arguable that such repressive tactics merely increase sympathy and support for the perceived underdog, and in our political culture, where the people are still searching for a way out of the quagmire of inflation and unemployment in which they have been trapped for decades and into which they slip further and further day by day, sentiment veers towards support for the victim/s of the establishment, whether deserved or not.

If further proof of this argument is needed, we may glance at the reception Dr Mahrang Baloch and her Baloch Yakjehti Committee have garnered in a massive rally in Quetta after their return from the long march from Turbat to Islamabad in support of their missing persons. One look at the proceedings of that rally and the speech by Dr Mahrang Baloch should clinch the argument that repression beyond reason begets the opposite effect of what was intended.

 

 

 

 

 

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com

Tuesday, January 23, 2024

Business Recorder Column January 23, 2024

Back from the brink

 

Rashed Rahman

 

After an exchange of missile attacks on alleged Baloch subversive elements in each other’s territory, Pakistan and Iran have been quietly rowing back from the brink of a breakdown in the longstanding friendly relations between the two neighbouring countries. Although both Islamabad and Tehran have longstanding complaints against each other about Baloch militants fighting their respective governments in both countries enjoying safe havens across their mutual border, Iran’s decision to strike an alleged Jaish al-Adl presence in Panjgur district in Pakistani Balochistan bordering Iran’s Seistan Baluchistan province took most observers by surprise. Not the least amongst these was Pakistan’s military and security establishment. Although few have raised the issue in Pakistan, questions do arise about a possible vulnerability to surprise aerial attacks on Pakistan. An accompanying worry must be possible holes in the country’s air defence system. Pakistan’s military felt compelled to retaliate for the unprovoked attack so as to send a message not only to Iran, but to all its neighbours with whom it has problems that any infringement of Pakistan’s aerial or territorial integrity would be responded to in equal measure. Although Pakistan has a troubled relationship with Afghanistan over the presence of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) elements carrying out terrorist attacks in Pakistan from Afghan soil, the real message was intended for India that any notion of such adventurism should not even be considered. It goes without saying that Pakistan-India confrontations are highly dangerous because of the nuclear weapons factor.

Given the longstanding good relations between Pakistan and Iran despite the latter being on the US-led west’s hostile radar since the 1979 revolution, why Tehran chose to include Pakistan in its list of targets (the other two, just before, being Syria and Iraq) for such attacks begs an explanation. Jaish al-Adl is a Sunni Islamist Baloch militant group seeking greater rights for Seistan Baluchistan if not separation. It has been carrying out attacks against Iranian military and security forces targets in that province for over a decade, allegedly from bases in Pakistani Balochistan. On December 15, 2023, it conducted an attack on a police station in Rask killing 11 police officers. On January 17, 2024, just a day after Iran’s missile attack on Pakistan, Jaish al-Adl claimed it had assassinated three Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials.

Although Iran claimed it had struck a Jaish al-Adl ‘base’ in Pakistan, Pakistan’s foreign ministry said the dead included two children, while wounding three girls. As a comparison, Pakistan’s retaliatory strike on alleged Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) ‘bases’ in Iran yielded amongst the dead three women, four children and two men. The casualty list suggests the targets were families on either side. It could of course be assumed that the Baloch militants in both cases had their families living with them, but it does undercut Pakistan’s claim that it struck these targets because it had information of an impending ‘big terrorist’ action by the BLA and BLF. In passing, it is not irrelevant to mention that although (since 9/11) all armed groups challenging state authority in any part of the world have been dumped in the basket of ‘terrorism’, this catch-all usage obliterates the distinction between terrorism and nationalist (and revolutionary) insurgencies.

The fact of the matter is that Iran struck out at a claimed Islamic State (IS) target in Syria and an Israeli secret service Mossad centre in Iraq in retaliation for the assassinations of its top IRGC commanders and the horrendous bomb attack in Kerman, Iran, at the commemoration of General Suleimani’s assassination. To that extent Tehran’s actions betray some logic, since the exchanges of assassinations and missile attacks are part of the spreading regional conflict sparked by the Gaza war. But bracketing the attack on Pakistan with these retaliatory actions defies logic. Particularly since after Pakistan’s measured response, both sides decided to come together to diplomatically defuse the crisis. Iran, besieged by the US-led west and Israel’s hostility, needs all the friends it can get in the region and beyond. It makes little sense therefore to attack Pakistan in the same breath as Syria and Iraq, neither of which are capable at present of retaliating. But to launch against friendly, nuclear-armed Pakistan defies sense, unless it can be put down to a rush of blood by the IRGC. Be that as it may, it seems irrefutable that Tehran’s concerns about Jaish al-Adl would have been (as they now, post facto, are) better addressed through diplomacy than missile fire.

While one welcomes the turn from potential hostility to the traditional friendly ties between Pakistan and Iran after the kerfuffle of missile exchanges, one cannot but be both bewildered and amused in equal measure at the extremes of bending over backwards to justify his deserved elevation of our Balochistan’s caretaker Information Minister Jan Achakzai, which is leading one to fear for the health of his spine. Achakzai has earlier been railing against the families of missing persons, led by women, holding a sit-in before the National Press Club, Islamabad after marching all the way from Balochistan. Now he has enlightened us (further) regarding the ‘nexus’ between the missing persons protestors and those killed by Pakistani missiles in Iran. The thrust of his new truth is that those killed are claimed by the protestors as ‘missing’, thereby demonstrating that the whole myth of missing persons is nothing but a conspiracy to malign Pakistan, blah, blah, blah…

Sometimes, in our benighted land, it is moments like this that one is left wondering whether to laugh or to cry.

 

 

 

 

 

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com

Tuesday, January 9, 2024

Business Recorder Column January 9, 2024

Balochistan: engagement or suppression?

 

Rashed Rahman

 

The rough treatment meted out to peaceful families of Baloch missing persons by the Islamabad police has placed this and all the related issues regarding Balochistan centre-stage (once again), not the least because Pakistanis have woken up and responded to the role of women in these protests. By and large, Balochistan has been viewed as a backward tribal society. But this ‘frozen’ perception is clearly out of date. Education has spread throughout Balochistan in recent decades, contributing to the emergence of a significant middle class. The women, young and old, who have led the march from Turbat to Islamabad against the custodial killing of a young man, on the one hand would be considered the natural takers up of the issue of their missing loved ones (men only), but on the other may come as a surprise to those in Pakistan still mired in the traditional view of Balochistan as a backward, undeveloped part of the country.

It is doubly unfortunate that first the caretaker government’s committee set up to deal with the arrests and rough treatment of the peaceful protestors obfuscated the whole issue to let the Islamabad administration and police off the hook. Then caretaker Prime Minister (PM) Anwaarul Haq Kakar whaled in with his two cents worth, part of which he repeated in a TV interview on January 7, 2024. If the Islamabad police inflicted wounds on the bodies of the peaceful protestors, not sparing even women or the elderly, the committee sprinkled the first batch of salt on those wounds, and whatever was left was delivered by the caretaker PM’s broadside. While arguing that the state could not tolerate armed rebellion, he failed to put the issue in any kind of context or perspective. The fact is that Balochistan has been restive ever since Pakistan came into being, first over the issue of accession to the new state versus the possibility of independence, later over the deprivation of the rights of the people of Balochistan, whether on the touchstone of control over and benefit from their natural resources or other democratic rights that have been conspicuous by their absence from day one. No people takes to armed struggle lightly or without reason. Kakar is either ignorant of the fact or has deliberately omitted any mention of the 25 years that separate the end of the fourth nationalist insurgency in Balochistan (1977) and the beginning of the fifth (2002). When he speaks fondly of Mir Ghaus Buksh Bizenjo as a close family friend, perhaps he should also have reflected on and voiced the fact that the Baloch people, when their armed struggle against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1973-77) imploded in the aftermath of his overthrow by General Ziaul Haq, bought into Bizenjo’s line of adhering to peaceful parliamentary politics in the struggle for their long denied rights. It is only when 25 years of this political path failed to move things even an inch that a new generation of Baloch youth took to the mountains once again to seek justice through the barrel of a gun when it was not available through any other means. The state during these 25 years continued playing its traditional games in denying the Baloch democratic representation, and through it, at least theoretically, their denied rights and redressal of their mounting grievances. I am not listing these in detail since they are well known, starting from the accession issue in 1947-48 to Sui gas being plundered to fuel the rest of the country’s development since 1952 without any meaningful share or compensation to the Baloch to the copper-gold treasure flowing to foreign companies without changing the lives of the locals where these mines are located or, indeed, Balochistan as a whole.

This history, when appended to the practice of enforced disappearances and extra-judicial killings of young Baloch men suspected of being sympathetic to the fifth nationalist insurgency, has added more fuel to the fire of indignation burning brighter and fiercer than ever against the state’s blatant, long standing practices of brutal suppression. This indignation is now spreading beyond the expected protest in Quetta to other parts of Pakistan and even abroad. A missing person’s case attracted such a protest rally in London on January 7, 2024. When Kakar or any other representative of the state argues in favour of adherence to the law by even aggrieved people, why does he fail to extend that same principle even more forcefully to the approach and practices of the state’s institutions themselves? Are they above the law? A law unto themselves? Not answerable to anyone or any forum for their blatant breach of what our laws and Constitution lay down? If anything, in the case of Balochistan, all the state has ever done is failed to engage the alienated Baloch in a dialogue about their grievances, failed to redress these grievances, and relied wholly on force to suppress even their genuine, acceptable demands within the parameters of our Constitution and laws. Why then should we be surprised that each succeeding generation of the Baloch since 1947 has seen no way forward except to pick up the gun to fight for their rights?

Mr Kakar claims 90,000 innocent people have been killed in Balochistan. But he fails to indicate over what period, who these 90,000 victims are, who killed them and why. In the absence of any factual basis to the claim, Mr Kakar may forgive us our scepticism. Quoting this figure smacks more of a propaganda gambit than a verifiable fact. He also makes the incredible claim that there is no law to punish terrorists in Pakistan, citing the ‘fact’ that despite the loss of 90,000 lives, not even nine people have been convicted for such crimes. Perhaps he should have added that they might have been had they been presented in a court of law, not forcibly disappeared or extra-judicially killed. Are they too part of this 90,000 figure?

Caretaker PM Kakar owes his rise to services rendered to our establishment, first by creating the Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) and then having the satisfaction of seeing it crowned (by hook or by crook) as the Balochistan provincial government. But perhaps his elevation as caretaker PM promises to be his last hurrah. Unless Mr Kakar can pull one more rabbit out of his overflowing hat full of tricks.

 

 

 

 

 

 

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com

Saturday, January 6, 2024

The January 2024 issue of Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) is out

The January 2024 issue of Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) is out. Link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com

Contents:

1. Chris Hedges: The Death of Israel.

2. Saeed A Malik: The Genesis of Gaza Genocide.

3. Akbar Notezai: The curious case of the Sanjranis: How they benefited from the massive copper-gold Saindak mine project.

4. Charles Amjad-Ali: Anti-semitism: A hypocritical epithet to cover Israel's Apartheid – V.

5. Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur: The Rise of Baloch Nationalism and Resistance – V.

Rashed Rahman

Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)

Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) (on Facebook) 

Tuesday, January 2, 2024

Business Recorder Column January 2, 2024

As written by me:

Crises old and new

 

Rashed Rahman

 

It is hardly breaking news on the first day of the new (not so happy) year that Pakistan faces a slate of challenges if not crises that seem destined to test the sinews of even the strongest Hercules. Of these challenges and possible crises, some are old, some recently inherited, others wholly new and hitherto unknown. Of the old crises, and at the risk of annoying our learned economists, it’s the economy (stupid!). If its travails can be summed up briefly, one may point to the process of deindustrialisation (contributed to majorly by the new shibboleth of privatisation as the solution to all our woes) underway for some 50 years now. Remaining industry is unable to export enough to sustain our critical import dependence stemming from the model of economic development we have been blindly trumpeting and following for decades. Hence the inevitable resort to dusting off our permanent begging bowl. However, since our ‘strategic’ importance to the US-led west has declined considerably (communism now being seen as all but routed worldwide), we can no longer expect, let alone rely on, our habitual ‘free lunch’. Our Gulf patrons are by now weary of our perpetual begging for handouts and bailouts. China has put economics in command (a profound reversal of Mao’s ‘politics in command’) and weighs support even to its most precious ally in the scales of capitalist profit and loss. We are therefore confronted with the uncomfortable necessity of getting off our knees (old habits die hard) and learning to stand upright on our own feet in a radically transformed and rapidly further transforming world.

In the absence of industrial development, the military-led SIFC is hoping to spark a new ‘green revolution’ in agriculture as the (continuing) base of our food security, raw material for industry, and perhaps export potential. All this is hoped for under the corporate umbrella of the military. It remains to be seen, however, whether the changed conditions if not crisis in agriculture is amenable to the attempt to reproduce a green revolution that was relevant and useful in the 1960s, but may or may not be the answer to the farming landscape today. Without being able in the present space to develop this argument fully, suffice it to say that without land reform and redistribution from the lax, inefficient large landholders to the poor and landless peasants who can then be expected to fulfil the need for intensive cultivation and contribute substantially to the rescue of the country’s economy, the hopes from military-led corporate farming may or may not yield the expected fruit.

Terrorism once again assails our lives as another of the old (at least 50 years again) crises engendered by our romance and flirtation with religious extremist proxies, first in the context of Afghanistan, later in the context of Kashmir, who, as proxies are wont to do, eventually freed themselves of the leash and turned on their former mentors and supporters (Israel’s similar experience with Hamas in an attempt to weaken the PLO is a striking contemporary clincher for this argument). Two analytical reports (those of the CRSS and PICSS) inform us that terrorist attacks are at a six-year high, with violence up 56 percent and attacks up 69 percent in 2023 alone. In 789 attacks and counter-terrorism operations last year, 1,542 people were killed, 1,463 wounded. The distribution of such attacks is also interesting, though not entirely unexpected. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan suffered 90 percent of the deaths and 84 percent of the terrorist attacks and counter-terrorism operations. Punjab and Sindh together suffered only eight percent of the deaths. In addition, sectarian violence killed 203 people, including 88 security personnel. These are the fruits of our unthinking creation and bolstering of fanatical religious forces and groups under the delusion that they would always remain faithful to their benefactors. It is the nature of jihadist thought that has cancelled all such hopes and produced another round of terrorism since the 2021 takeover in Afghanistan by the Taliban and their seeming free hand to groups such as the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to operate freely and at will from Afghan soil to attack Pakistan and its people. One of the major strategic blunders of the military operations against these terrorists in the tribal areas was the illusion that simply driving them out of Pakistan (into Afghanistan) would be the end of the matter. The crushing of these forces and ensuring no chance of their resurrection depended heavily on a pincer movement to cut off their escape routes across the border into Afghanistan. Instead, the military operations only succeeded in ‘exporting’ the problem, leaving open thereby the possibility that, helped by what appeared to be the inevitability of the Taliban coming to power in Afghanistan, and with help from the sleeper cells the TTP left behind in Pakistan, the hydra of terrorism would once again raise its head/s.

The juncture Pakistan is at is not very hopeful. If some naïve people believed that elections would somehow provide the wherewithal to lift us out of the morass the country and our people are trapped in, by now even the most generous amongst them must be having second thoughts. There has emerged a pandemic of rejection of the nomination papers of aspirants to run in the general elections scheduled for February 8, 2024. Out of 25,951 applicants, the Returning Officers (ROs) recruited from the bureaucracy have accepted 22,711 (6,449 for the National Assembly, 16,262 for the provincial Assemblies). The aspiring candidates rejected number 3,240 (1,024 National Assembly, 2,216 provincial Assemblies). Lest you are comforted by the thought that the overwhelming majority of aspirants have been accepted, we need to delve a little deeper into these numbers. The overwhelming majority of the rejected belong to the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) and include not only Imran Khan, but almost all the remaining leading figures left in the party after the tsunami of desertions following May 9, 2023. PTI’s favourite ally Shaikh Rashid is amongst the rejected. But the rejection pandemic does not stop there. Included are worthies such as Akhtar Mengal of the Balochistan National Party-Mengal (BNP-M). No doubt such shenanigans will serve as salve for the festering wounds of the Baloch, whose women and youth have recently tasted the wrath of our wonderful police in Islamabad, a force unable to distinguish between peaceful protestors and the other type. The rejected applicants have till January 3, 2024 to challenge their rejection, which must be decided by January 10, 2024. Given the large number of such cases, time is tight and the outcome uncertain.

If the general elections are perceived to have been held, as the PTI is alleging, on the basis of ‘pre-poll rigging’ (as opposed to our time tested post-poll rigging), it will lead to an absence of stability and quite possibly a major crisis of legitimacy down the road. If the present trend of reducing the elections to a farce continues, the state will then in its aftermath once again confront the lesson of our and the world’s history that state excesses are unable to dent the popularity of political parties and may even end up inadvertently enhancing it. If the current funereal mood in the country (reflecting a lack of hope of better things) continues in the presence of doubts about the legitimacy of the polls, turnout may well be low. And when the new dispensation, besmirched by the taint of being helped into power by the powers-that-be, takes office, its other problems of management of the country’s problems may well pale in comparison with the possible political fallout of what appears increasingly like gerrymandering. Ah, the wisdom of our real rulers!

  

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com


As published by the paper:


Crises old and new

 

Rashed Rahman

 

It is hardly breaking news on the first day of the new (not so happy) year that Pakistan faces a slate of challenges if not crises that seem destined to test the sinews of even the strongest Hercules. Of these challenges and possible crises, some are old, some recently inherited, others wholly new and hitherto unknown. Of the old crises, and at the risk of annoying our learned economists, it’s the economy (stupid!). If its travails can be summed up briefly, one may point to the process of deindustrialisation (contributed to majorly by the new shibboleth of privatisation as the solution to all our woes) underway for some 50 years now. Remaining industry is unable to export enough to sustain our critical import dependence stemming from the model of economic development we have been blindly trumpeting and following for decades. Hence the inevitable resort to dusting off our permanent begging bowl. However, since our ‘strategic’ importance to the US-led west has declined considerably (communism now being seen as all but routed worldwide), we can no longer expect, let alone rely on, our habitual ‘free lunch’. Our Gulf patrons are by now weary of our perpetual begging for handouts and bailouts. China has put economics in command (a profound reversal of Mao’s ‘politics in command’) and weighs support even to its most precious ally in the scales of capitalist profit and loss. We are therefore confronted with the uncomfortable necessity of getting off our knees (old habits die hard) and learning to stand upright on our own feet in a radically transformed and rapidly further-transforming world.

In the absence of industrial development, the military-led SIFC (special investment facilitation council) is hoping to spark a new ‘green revolution’ in agriculture as the (continuing) base of our food security, raw material for industry, and perhaps export potential. All this is hoped for under the corporate umbrella of the military. It remains to be seen, however, whether the changed conditions if not crisis in agriculture is amenable to the attempt to reproduce a green revolution that was relevant and useful in the 1960s, but may or may not be the answer to the farming landscape today. Without being able in the present space to develop this argument fully, suffice it to say that without land reform and redistribution from the lax, inefficient large landholders to the poor and landless peasants who can then be expected to fulfil the need for intensive cultivation and contribute substantially to the rescue of the country’s economy, the hopes from military-led corporate farming may or may not yield the expected fruit.

Terrorism once again assails our lives as another of the old (at least 50 years again) crises engendered by our romance and flirtation with religious extremist proxies, first in the context of Afghanistan, later in the context of Kashmir, who, as proxies are wont to do, eventually freed themselves of the leash and turned on their former mentors and supporters (Israel’s similar experience with Hamas in an attempt to weaken the PLO is a striking contemporary clincher for this argument). Two analytical reports (those of the CRSS and PICSS) inform us that terrorist attacks are at a six-year high, with violence up 56 percent and attacks up 69 percent in 2023 alone. In 789 attacks and counter-terrorism operations last year, 1,542 people were killed, 1,463 wounded. The distribution of such attacks is also interesting, though not entirely unexpected. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan suffered 90 percent of the deaths and 84 percent of the terrorist attacks and counter-terrorism operations. Punjab and Sindh together suffered only eight percent of the deaths. In addition, sectarian violence killed 203 people, including 88 security personnel. These are the fruits of our unthinking creation and bolstering of fanatical religious forces and groups under the delusion that they would always remain faithful to their benefactors. It is the nature of jihadist thought that has cancelled all such hopes and produced another round of terrorism since the 2021 takeover in Afghanistan by the Taliban and their seeming free hand to groups such as the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to operate freely and at will from Afghan soil to attack Pakistan and its people. One of the major strategic blunders of the military operations against these terrorists in the tribal areas was the illusion that simply driving them out of Pakistan (into Afghanistan) would be the end of the matter. The crushing of these forces and ensuring no chance of their resurrection depended heavily on a pincer movement to cut off their escape routes across the border into Afghanistan. Instead, the military operations only succeeded in ‘exporting’ the problem, leaving open thereby the possibility that, helped by what appeared to be the inevitability of the Taliban coming to power in Afghanistan, and with help from the sleeper cells the TTP left behind in Pakistan, the hydra of terrorism would once again raise its head/s.

The juncture Pakistan is at is not very hopeful. If some naïve people believed that elections would somehow provide the wherewithal to lift us out of the morass the country and our people are trapped in, by now even the most generous amongst them must be having second thoughts. There has emerged a pandemic of rejection of the nomination papers of aspirants to run in the general elections scheduled for February 8, 2024. Out of 25,951 applicants, the Returning Officers (ROs) recruited from the bureaucracy have accepted 22,711 (6,449 for the National Assembly, 16,262 for the provincial Assemblies). The aspiring candidates rejected number 3,240 (1,024 National Assembly, 2,216 provincial Assemblies). Lest you are comforted by the thought that the overwhelming majority of aspirants have been accepted, we need to delve a little deeper into these numbers. The overwhelming majority of the rejected belong to the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) and include not only Imran Khan, but almost all the remaining leading figures left in the party after the tsunami of desertions following May 9, 2023. PTI’s favourite ally Shaikh Rashid is amongst the rejected. But the rejection pandemic does not stop there. Included are worthies such as Akhtar Mengal of the Balochistan National Party-Mengal (BNP-M). No doubt such shenanigans will serve as salve for the festering wounds of the Baloch, whose women and youth have recently tasted the wrath of our wonderful police in Islamabad, a force unable to distinguish between peaceful protestors and the other type. The rejected applicants have till January 3, 2024 to challenge their rejection, which must be decided by January 10, 2024. Given the large number of such cases, time is tight and the outcome uncertain.

If the general elections are perceived to have been held, as the PTI is alleging, on the basis of ‘pre-poll rigging’ (as opposed to our time tested post-poll rigging), it will lead to an absence of stability and quite possibly a major crisis of legitimacy down the road. If the present trend of reducing the elections to a farce continues, the state will then in its aftermath once again confront the lesson of our and the world’s history that state excesses are unable to dent the popularity of political parties and may even end up inadvertently enhancing it. If the current funereal mood in the country (reflecting a lack of hope of better things) continues in the presence of doubts about the legitimacy of the polls, turnout may well be low. And when the new dispensation, besmirched by the taint of being helped into power by the powers-that-be, takes office, its other problems of management of the country’s problems may well pale in comparison with the possible political fallout of what appears increasingly like gerrymandering. Ah, the wisdom of our real rulers!

 

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com