Business Recorder Column August 22, 2023

 Descent into madness, barbarism

 

Rashed Rahman

 

The events of August 16, 2023 in Jaranwala have evoked an unusual chorus in harmony of condemnation. And so they should. But let us attempt a balance sheet of the good and the bad during and after the mayhem visited upon the Christian community on yet another dark day in our history.

First and foremost, it is well to remind ourselves that the horror of August 16 came just two days after we celebrated, with the usual pomp and show, the 76^th independence anniversary of Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s Pakistan. And what was this Jinnah’s Pakistan? If his August 11, 1947 speech to the Constituent Assembly is anything to go by, he argued Pakistan would be a religiously tolerant state in which all would be free to go their places of worship and practice their faith without any discrimination by the state. However, with hindsight it can also be argued that the fate that met that speech (it was suppressed for years) and the events that transpired soon after the Quaid’s passing point to the different, if not opposite direction the state of Pakistan has traversed.

First, soon after the Quaid’s passing, came the Objectives Resolution, which, in placing religion at the heart of the state effectively negated Mr Jinnah’s stated objective of what the state of Pakistan would be like. That event opened the doors, incrementally, to steering the ship of state in the direction of a religious majoritarian polity, which effectively left the religious (and ethnic and other) minorities at its mercy. Whatever space for their rights and protections survived this trend was effectively wiped out by General Ziaul Haq’s fanning the flames of religious dogmatism and extremism, whose perhaps unintended effect enveloped not just the religious minorities, but minority Muslim sects such as the Shias in its malign embrace.

That distorted Pakistan sculpted by General Ziaul Haq is what we have inherited today, and whose negative fallouts we cannot prevent nor change course in the direction of the religiously tolerant society Mr Jinnah envisaged.

Jaranwala is neither the first such atrocity against religious minorities, particularly Christians, nor, given the state of things, likely to be the last. The evil forces of bigotry and other much more mundane worldly agendas such as revenge and seizing property illegally fan the flames of forces all too ready to take ‘advantage’ of our draconian blasphemy laws. If the long Afghan wars fanned the flames of religious extremism inside Pakistan, they relied overwhelmingly on the Deobandi (minority Muslim) sect in Pakistan. But towards the closing chapters of that monumental, long running war in our immediate neighbourhood, with its unintended radicalising fallouts in the shape of our own version of the Taliban (the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan or TTP), we experienced also the rise of the majority sect, the Barelvis, as a major player. It is this sect, or rather its extremist manifestation the Tehreek Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) that was responsible for the assassination of Punjab Governor Salmaan Taseer in 2011 for defending a poor Christian woman entrapped in prison on a patently false blasphemy charge. It is also the organisation whose name more frequently than not pops up whenever an alleged blasphemy issue arises. If a report from Lahore of August 21, 2023 is to be believed, they have now expanded the circle of their unwanted attentions to members of an already beleaguered non-Muslim sect.

If all the above seems too negative, let us also look on the bright side. Following the Jaranwala outrage, there has been more than the usual ritual condemnation from the highest to the lowest in the land. Protests against the burning of churches and Christian homes in the immediate aftermath of announcements from mosques to ‘take the blasphemers and their community to task’ have taken place all over the country, but sadly exhibit the character of scattered protests, the unity on display between Muslims and Christians notwithstanding. What, one wonders, is the attitude of the overwhelming majority of citizens who are silent? Do they feel the pain of the victims and the sensitive or are they beyond such empathy by now, having been subjected to the barbarism of extremist terrorist violence in its many forms for longer than one cares to remember? Have they resultantly suffered an exhaustion of sympathy, an emptying of spirit, or a self-preservatory retreat into confining oneself to things that affect one directly, not those that affect, even brutally, others?

There are no clear answers to these vexed questions about the state Pakistanis have been reduced to after all the traumas we have suffered for longer than one cares to recall. But wait, not all is black and worthy of mourning. Muslim neighbours of the Christian households under attack or fearing its impending arrival, sheltered their Christian friends and neighbours from the madness of the mob of fanatics that arrived to wreak vengeance for the alleged blasphemy, especially women and children. This suggests all is not lost as far as humanity, rationality and good sense are concerned. Even during the madness and barbarism on display during the communal riots and massacres attending Partition, there were many such stories of friends and neighbours sheltering their threatened ‘other’, even at risk to themselves.

On this bleak juncture in our lives, can such examples lift our spirits enough to confirm our resolve to overcome the malign inheritance of General Ziaul Haq and ensure our society and state are cleansed of such manifestations of madness and mob vigilantism, an inherently irrational phenomenon? Because if we do not, even at this late hour, purge our state and society of religious extremism, terrorism and all its other effects such as intolerance, no one will be able to stop our seemingly inexorable and steep descent into barbarism.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com

My discussion on Special TV

 Link to my discussion programme on Special TV: https://youtu.be/6RlyJQ3wleU

Rashed Rahman

Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)

Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) (on Facebook)

My interview with Arif Main on YouTube

 Link to my interview with Arif Main on YouTube: https://youtu.be/IEbTL6CK6HE

Rashed Rahman

Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)

Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) (on Facebook)

Business Recorder Column August 15, 2023

Legitimacy crisis

 

Rashed Rahman

 

On this 76^th independence anniversary of Pakistan, the heart is sorely charged, the spirit wilting and the mind under the overwhelming shadow of the uncertainty the future holds. Anwarul Haq Kakar, no doubt for his redoubtable services to the establishment in creating the Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) as the vehicle for a continuing undemocratic and repressive order in Balochistan, has been anointed caretaker Prime Minister (PM). Criticism of the appointment of a political figure to the role, envisaged as an impartial arbiter of the electoral exercise and day-to-day manager of the business of government, no doubt prompted Kakar to resign from his party and Senate seat. Whether this will be sufficient to remove the doubts about his impartiality remains to be seen.

Akhtar Mengal, chief of the Balochistan National Party-Mengal (BNP-M), has put to rest the argument about the appointment of a caretaker PM from a smaller (in population) province being aimed at placating the grievances of the people of Balochistan by stating in a message to the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) leader Nawaz Sharif (in self-imposed exile by now) that the appointment of Kakar without any consultation with allies has caused dismay and further widened the distance between the BNP-M and PML-N. He goes on to say that the appointment of a man from a rival party to the BNP-M as caretaker PM, which has closed the doors of politics for us, is cause for lamentation at the actions of politicians approaching the establishment for the solution of every problem instead of resolving issues politically. He then warns Nawaz Sharif that the Pakistan Democratic Movement’s (PDM’s) coalition government has once again weakened democratic institutions by legislating hurriedly in the dark without involving its allies. In a prophetic tone whose message is borne out by past experience, Mengal tells Nawaz Sharif that legislation contrary to human rights will probably be used against him in future. A flurry of Bills strengthening the arbitrary powers of security and law enforcement agencies was rammed through parliament in the dying days of former PM Shahbaz Sharif’s government. Last but not least, Mengal laments the fact that the Pak-China Gwadar University was being built in Lahore instead of Balochistan and Gwadar Airport was being named after former (late) PM Feroze Khan Noon whose name most people in Balochistan might not even be aware of. Another dissident voice regarding Kakar has been heard from the Awami National Party’s Aimal Wali Khan, who does not expect Kakar to be a fit candidate to conduct impartial, free and fair elections.

In the last days of his government, Shahbaz Sharif had taken to describing himself as the ‘blue-eyed boy’ of the establishment. At first one thought he was simply stating the obvious, despite his reminding us that he had been incarcerated by both Musharraf and Imran Khan, since it is no secret Shahbaz was always prone to compromise with the establishment, unlike his elder brother Nawaz, even at the worst of times. However, perhaps belatedly the idea sank in that this repeated statement was not only being taken literally, but may well be feeding into pre-existing public perception. Hence PML-N’s troubleshooter former Information Minister Maryam Aurangzeb was trotted out to put the spin on Shahbaz’s repeated statements that he had said it ‘satirically’. Perhaps, Ms Aurangzeb, but that is not how the public sees it, especially when Shahbaz advocates a ‘hybrid system’, which, stripped of its cover, simply means a military-dominated setup.

On Independence Day, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Asim Munir sought to rouse the people of Pakistan to their patriotic duty vis-à-vis the country and reject the doomsayers, all and sundry. As Independence Day speeches from army chiefs go, this was neither exceptional nor exceptionable. However, one was surprised to read the COAS quoting Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah to the effect: “There is no power on earth, which can undo Pakistan.” Perhaps this is a reflection of our collective amnesia regarding the events of 1971. Jinnah’s Pakistan was undone then by our own mistakes. The failure to remind ourselves of that painful fact means we have not, and are unlikely to, learn the appropriate lessons from that disaster.

Meanwhile the military’s economic role, already a considerable and growing phenomenon, has been further enhanced through its involvement in the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC) and corporate farming, without even, in the case of the latter, a glance at the needs of landless and smallholding farmers in our unequal society.

As though the uncertainties surrounding the date for the general elections, exacerbated by the last-minute decision of the Council of Common Interests that the next elections be held on the basis of the 2023 census, were not enough, the tussle between the judiciary and parliament continues, with the Supreme Court (SC) having ruled, only one day after the dissolution of the National Assembly, the SC (Review of Judgements and Orders) Act 2023 null and void and an interference in the constitutional jurisdiction and powers of the judiciary. Since the Act, some say, was intended, amongst other considerations such as the right of appeal, etc, to help Nawaz Sharif challenge his disqualification (since reduced to five years, which are up), the Senate’s eight parties have reacted by terming the SC ruling ‘unconstitutional’ and ‘interference in the ambit of parliament’. Thus the old conflict between these two pillars of the state seems bent to continue indefinitely. Naturally, this places a further cloud of uncertainty over future political stability, the minimum condition for Pakistan being able to wriggle out of its enormous economic problems, the resurrection of the IMF-Saudi Arabia-UAE-China begging bowl notwithstanding.

One cannot in all honesty offer any good news or optimism, even regarding the near future, since so many imponderables and unknowns are rendering the country’s horizons cloudy and obscure.

Happy Independence Day.

 

 

 

 

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com

The August 2023 issue of Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) is out

 The August 2023 issue of Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) is out. Link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com

Contents:

1. Ashraf Jehangir Qazi: An article with no takers.

2. Saulat Nagi: Without economic content, democracy becomes tool of ruling class.

3. Longway Foundation: Socialism 3.0: The Practice and Prospects of Socialism in China.

4. Ghazala Mufti: Women and Pakistan.

5. Fawzia Afzal-Khan: Pakistinian-Palestinian Border Crossings.

Rashed Rahman

Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)

Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) (on Facebook)

Business Recorder Column August 8, 2023

A tired merry-go-round

 

Rashed Rahman

 

Imran Khan’s conviction in the Toshakana case on August 5, 2023 and subsequent imprisonment in Attock Jail may only be the beginning of a new round of political contention, tension and instability. The former prime minister has been sentenced to three years imprisonment, a Rs 100,000 fine, failure to pay which would mean an additional imprisonment of six months, disqualification from holding public office for five years and, arguably, will soon find himself removed by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) from the position of chairman of his party, Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI). The manner in which the Additional District and Sessions Judge Humayun Dilawar applied closure to the case and announced the verdict may not entirely be due to impatience with the obvious delaying tactics Imran Khan and his legal team had been using in this and all the other cases against him in various courts all over the country. Although that impatience is understandable given that Imran Khan only attended, despite notices, three of the 40 hearings of the case and his lawyer failed to appear on the day despite repeated calls by the judge. Finally, at least on the surface, the judge decided enough is enough and went ahead with the sentencing. Legal eagles, not just those aligned with or sympathetic to the PTI and its leader, were quick to point out that the judge had not proceeded in the correct manner before the sentencing since the correct procedure would have been to call for the defendant’s attendance, failing which he could have been declared a proclaimed offender and then arrested. However, while the facts of the Toshakana case clearly go against Imran Khan, appeals to the superior courts may rely upon the procedural lacunae leading to the final verdict, with in some circles’ view, relief being available.

Interestingly, Imran Khan’s appeal to his followers to hold peaceful protests in case he is arrested seem to have fallen on stony, rendered infertile ground, given the extent and depth of the repression against the PTI since May 9, 2023, the subsequent flight of opportunists from the party’s leadership and ranks, and the reigning fear amongst the remaining workers in the light of the repression unleashed against them. As a result, scattered, small protests emerged here and there, but nothing like what happened earlier, particularly on May 9, 2023. This reflects the objective state of affairs of the PTI at the present conjuncture.

For those familiar with this country’s history and how political leaders fallen from grace are treated, the entire scenario resembles nothing but the same old tired, predictable script. One view is that the punishment in neither Nawaz Sharif’s (Iqama) nor Imran Khan’s (Toshakhana) case fits the crime. After all, the Supreme Court (SC) in its wisdom convicted the former on grounds that had nothing to do with the Panama Papers case. In the latter’s case, the fact that the judge imposed the maximum punishment suggests not just pique but some bigger plan. While Imran Khan cools his heels in Attock Jail, there may be further bad news in store for him. Judging by past experience and the plethora of cases against him, some of a far more serious nature than the Toshakhana one, there may be more misery in store for him. The ‘plan’ therefore reeks of a total ‘technical’ knockout of the contender. Will this be any different from the similar ‘technical knockouts’ delivered by the ubiquitous establishment against Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, to take only two examples from our relatively recent history? Only time will tell, but experience seems to indicate that political leaders and parties are seldom demolished by such judicial manoeuvrings.

More important, if Imran Khan is out of the running, and even if a depleted PTI is allowed to participate in the upcoming general elections, what will be the credibility of whatever government emerges from this familiar merry-go-round? The ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) has declared through Prime Minister (PM) Shahbaz Sharif that the next PM will be Nawaz Sharif. This is of course only possible when the path for Nawaz Sharif’s return to the country is cleared through judicial review of his conviction. The timeframe in the government’s mind may be after the retirement of incumbent Chief Justice of Pakistan Umar Ata Bandial. The government may be harbouring hopes the subsequent SC setup may look more kindly on Nawaz Sharif’s fate.

To get there however may require some time. Lo and behold, help and succour in this regard has been offered by the ‘unanimous’ decision of the Council of Common Interests endorsing the 2023 digital census, which by a remarkable coincidence, has arrived at the conclusion (after ‘corrections’ of the original population figures) that all the provinces of Pakistan have seen more or less equal growth in population since the 2017 census, obviating any need to change the number of National Assembly (NA) seats for any province, which would require a constitutional amendment, a venture made impossible by the fact that no party can at present muster a two-thirds majority in the present, incomplete (PTI absconding) NA. How fortuitous, how convenient! All that remains therefore is the few months the ECP needs to rejigger the NA constituencies within each province according to the 2023 census and the elections will ensue, possibly in spring 2024. By that time, whatever more is in store for Imran Khan and the PTI will probably have come to pass and there will be few if any obstacles for the ruling Pakistan Democratic Movement coalition parties to romp home in a one-sided election exercise.

Welcome to Pakistani democracy.

 

 

 

 

 

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com 

News on Sunday, Encore Section 5, Column on August 6, 2023

As written by me:

Caretaker governments: origins and issues

 

Rashed Rahman

 

Free and fair democratic elections remain a rarity in Pakistan. The country could not frame a Constitution for nine years after Independence in 1947. The 1956 Constitution introduced so-called parity of seats in the National Assembly (NA) for both wings of the country, West and East Pakistan, at the behest of the establishment for fear of East Pakistan’s majority population permanently being able to dominate the country’s politics on the basis of one man one vote. Naturally the effect of this legerdemain was to depreciate the weight of an East Pakistani citizen’s vote as compared to a West Pakistani’s. Within four years, this Constitution was overtaken, via the military coup of 1958, by Ayub Khan’s 1962 Constitution, which maintained this unjust parity clause.

It was not until a people’s movement broke out in both wings of the country in 1968 and after a prolonged agitation till April 1969 yielded the removal of Ayub Khan by the army’s commander-in-chief General Yahya Khan that the establishment realised it could not maintain this unjust electoral structure. The Yahya regime made political concessions to defuse the momentum of the widespread agitation by the people. It broke One Unit, thereby restoring the historical provinces of West Pakistan, i.e. Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then North West Frontier Province or NWFP) and Balochistan. It also undid parity as the basis for the proclaimed 1970 elections, which for the first time in the country’s history was held on the time honoured democratic principle of one man one vote.

The 1970 elections are still considered the freest and fairest elections in our history. This did not occur because the Yahya martial law regime had been persuaded in principle to adopt democratic practices in this regard. The calculation of the Yahya regime was that the elections were likely to produce a fractured mandate, which would provide room to the regime to manipulate the political outcome in the shape of the government to be formed. However, the Yahya regime’s best laid plans came a cropper since the momentum of the 1968-69 people’s movement produced (for the regime at least) unexpected results. In West Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) won the majority of the NA seats from West Pakistan, largely on the basis of its major victories in Punjab and Sindh. In East Pakistan, historical grievances were enhanced by the tardy response of the Yahya regime to a devastating cyclone that struck the eastern wing on the eve of the elections. The enhanced mountain of grievances gave Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s Awami League (AL) the overwhelming majority of all but two seats in East Pakistan, thereby giving it an overall majority in the NA and therefore the popular mandate to form the federal government. However, Yahya, in collaboration with and with the support of Bhutto, not only refused to honour the people’s mandate, he launched a genocidal military crackdown against the people of East Pakistan, which ended in December 1971 in the dismemberment of the country with India’s help.

The broken pieces of what remained of Jinnah’s Pakistan were pieced together by Bhutto, who was installed in power by a military junta that overthrew Yahya, on the basis of the (partial) results of the 1970 elections in a united Pakistan. Initially, the dire situation of a defeated country, the trauma of having lost the eastern wing and the majority of the populace and the fact of 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war in Indian hands persuaded Bhutto to act diplomatically without (the Simla Agreement) and, up to a point, democratically within (the 1972 Interim Constitution that conceded provincial governments in NWFP and Balochistan to the opposition coalition of the National Awami Party and Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Islam and the 1973 Constitution that rolled them back). From 1973 onwards, the Bhutto regime slid further and further into repressive mode, launching a military offensive in Balochistan, targeting the opposition in NWFP and the rest of the country. By 1977, the situation was politically fraught, the PPP arguably no longer enjoying the lustre of a populist left party, and the opposition entire united against the regime. The 1977 elections held by the Bhutto regime spawned widespread charges of rigging, the united opposition launched an agitation against the election results, and despite negotiations finally being held after months of agitation, resulted in the overthrow of Bhutto by the dark General Ziaul Haq martial law.

Although the country suffered partyless elections in 1985 after Zia’s martial law was finally lifted, voices began to emerge suggesting that given Pakistan’s fraught history as far as democracy and elections were concerned, the concept of neutral caretaker governments to conduct elections with a limited mandate of managing the country’s affairs on a day-to-day basis be considered. However, it still took till the 1990 elections for the idea to find traction and implementation. Since then, with the exception of the less than credible 2002 elections under Musharraf, all elections have been held under caretaker governments at the Centre and within the provinces. Although the idea seemed good given the country’s history and the track record of elections, the ‘neutrality’ of caretaker governments could not be sworn by in all cases. The argument in favour of non-political technocrats as caretakers found favour more and more as a result.

However, today’s trends appear to be veering in the opposite direction again. From sifting all the chatter going around, a tentative forecast may be that political figures for caretakers as opposed to technocrats seems to have found favour. Without naming names (with the exception of former Chief Justice of Pakistan Tassaduq Hussain Jillani), a list of five candidates appears to have surfaced. All that remains is for the allies of the ruling Pakistan Democratic Movement to forge a consensus, and voila!, we may have an agreed caretaker Prime Minister (PM) from amongst them. In passing, let it be clarified that Finance Minister Ishaq Dar’s floated balloon to occupy the position seems to have been roundly punctured by now. The formality of PM Shahbaz Sharif consulting the pliable Leader of the Opposition Raja Riaz remains a foregone conclusion. No surprises in store in that direction.

While the idea of neutral caretaker administrations conducting elections in Pakistan has a strong conceptual and empirical case for it, the objective situation still harbours a few niggling questions. If, as is being anticipated, the government dissolves the NA before its tenure expires, the elections are to be held within 90 days. However, there are still balloons being floated (recently by PM Shahbaz Sharif himself) that the elections should be held on the basis of the latest census exercise. This implies a delay in the constitutionally determined elections date, since that census is still being disputed (especially in Sindh) and even if it is accepted, the Election Commission of Pakistan will require months to delimit the constituencies afresh according to the census. This does not appeal to logic or the best interests of a beleaguered Pakistan on the security, political and economic fronts. Adherence to the constitutionally mandated timeframe for holding the elections on the existing delimitations seems the best course. And then of course there is still the vexed question of the fate of Imran Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI). Will he, and they, be around and allowed to participate in a hopefully free and fair election? The jury appears still to be out. 

As published by the paper:

Charting the origins

 

The idea of neutral caretaker administrations in Pakistan has a strong conceptual and empirical case but the objective situation harbours doubts

 

Rashed Rahman

 

Free and fair democratic elections remain a rarity in Pakistan. The legislators could not frame a constitution for nine years after independence in 1947. The 1956 Constitution introduced so-called parity of seats in the National Assembly (NA) for both wings of the country – West and East Pakistan – at the behest of the establishment for fear of East Pakistan’s majority population permanently being able to dominate the country’s politics on the basis of one man, one vote. Naturally, the effect of this legerdemain was to depreciate the weight of an East Pakistani citizen’s vote as compared to a West Pakistani’s. This Constitution was soon overtaken, via the military coup of 1958, by Ayub Khan’s 1962 constitution, which maintained the parity clause.

It was not until a people’s movement broke out in both wings of the country in 1968 and after a prolonged agitation till April 1969 yielded the removal of Ayub Khan by the army’s commander-in-chief Gen Yahya Khan that the establishment realised it could not maintain this unjust electoral structure. The Yahya regime made political concessions to defuse the momentum of the widespread agitation by the people. It broke One Unit, thereby restoring the historical provinces of West Pakistan, i.e. the Punjab,  Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then North West Frontier Province or the NWFP), Sindh and Balochistan. It also undid parity as the basis for the proclaimed 1970 elections, which for the first time in the country’s history were held on the democratic principle of one man, one vote.

The 1970 elections are still considered the freest and fairest in our history. This did not occur because the Yahya martial law regime had been persuaded to adopt democratic practices in this regard. The calculation of the Yahya regime was that the elections were likely to produce a fractured mandate, which would provide room to the regime to manipulate the political outcome in the shape of the government to be formed. However, the Yahya regime’s best laid plans came a cropper since the momentum of the 1968-69 people’s movement produced (for the regime at least) unexpected results. In West Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) won a majority of the NA seats, largely on the basis of its victories in the Punjab and Sindh. In East Pakistan, historical grievances were enhanced by the tardy response of the Yahya regime to a devastating cyclone that struck the eastern wing on the eve of the elections. The enhanced mountain of grievances gave Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s Awami League (AL) the overwhelming majority of all but two seats in East Pakistan, thereby giving it an overall majority in the NA and, therefore, the popular mandate to form the federal government. However, Yahya, in collaboration and with the support of Bhutto, not only refused to honour the people’s mandate, but also  launched a military crackdown, which in December 1971 resulted in the dismemberment of the country, with India’s help.

What remained of Jinnah’s Pakistan was pieced together by Bhutto, who was installed in power by a military junta that overthrew Yahya, on the basis of the (partial) results of the 1970 elections in a united Pakistan. Initially, the dire situation of a defeated country, the trauma of having lost the eastern wing and the majority of the populace, and the fact of thousands of Pakistani prisoners of war in Indian hands persuaded Bhutto to act diplomatically without (the Simla Agreement) and, up to a point, democratically within (the 1972 interim constitution conceded provincial governments in the NWFP and Balochistan to the opposition coalition of the National Awami Party and Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Islam and the 1973 constitution). From 1973 onwards, the Bhutto regime slid further and further into a repressive mode, launching a military offensive in Balochistan, targeting the opposition in the NWFP and the rest of the country. By 1977, the situation was politically fraught – the PPP arguably no longer enjoying the lustre of a populist Left party, and the opposition entire united against the regime. The 1977 elections held by the Bhutto regime spawned widespread charges of rigging. The united opposition launched an agitation against the election results, and despite negotiations being held after months of agitation, resulted in the overthrow of Bhutto by the Zia martial law.

Party-less elections were held in 1985 after the martial law was finally lifted. Some voices then began emerging to suggest that given Pakistan’s fraught history, as far as democracy and elections were concerned, the concept of neutral caretaker governments to conduct elections with a limited mandate of managing the country’s affairs on a day-to-day basis be considered. However, it took till the 1990 elections for the idea to find traction and implementation. Since then, with the exception of the less than credible 2002 elections under Musharraf, all elections have been held under caretaker governments at the Centre and in the provinces. Although the idea seemed good given the country’s history and the track record of elections, the neutrality of caretaker governments could not be sworn by in all cases. The argument in favour of non-political technocrats as caretakers found more and more traction as a result.

Today, trends appear to be veering in the opposite direction. From sifting all the chatter going around, a tentative forecast may be that political figures for caretakers as opposed to technocrats seems to have found favour. Without naming names (with the exception of former chief justice Tassaduq Hussain Jillani), a list of five candidates appears to have been drawn. All that remains is for the allies of the Pakistan Democratic Movement to forge a consensus, and voila! we may have an agreed caretaker prime minister from amongst them. The formality of PM Shahbaz Sharif consulting the pliable Leader of the Opposition Raja Riaz remains a foregone conclusion. No surprises in store in that direction.

While the idea of neutral caretaker administrations conducting elections in Pakistan has a strong conceptual and empirical case, the objective situation still harbours a few niggling questions. If, as is being anticipated, the government dissolves the National Assembly before its tenure expires, the elections are to be held within 90 days. However, trail balloons are still being floated. Recently, PM Shahbaz Sharif did one himself by suggesting that the elections should be held on the basis of the results of the latest census. This implies a delay, since the accuracy of the census is being disputed (especially, in Sindh). Even if the results are accepted, the Election Commission of Pakistan will require several weeks to delimit the constituencies afresh. This does not appeal to logic or the best interests of a beleaguered Pakistan on the security, political and economic fronts. Adherence to the constitutionally mandated timeframe for holding the elections on the existing delimitations seems the best course. And then, of course, there is still the vexed question of the fate of Imran Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI). Will he, and they, be around and allowed to participate in a hopefully free and fair election? The jury is out.

 

The writer, a veteran journalist, has held senior editorial positions in several newspapers

Business Recorder Column August 1, 2023

Bajaur atrocity

 

Rashed Rahman

 

Pakistan’s long standing affliction of religious extremist terrorism is far from over. In Khar, Bajaur, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) on July 30, 2023, a suicide bomber blew himself up in a Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) workers convention, killing more than 44 people and wounding over 150. The death toll, given the condition of the seriously wounded, some of whom have been transferred to Peshawar by helicopter, seems likely to rise. Though there has been no claim of responsibility so far, the finger of suspicion points towards Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), which in 2022 admitted being behind attacks on JUI-F religious scholars, having accused the party of Maulana Fazlur Rehman of hypocrisy for being an Islamic group but supporting successive hostile governments and the military.

Given that Pakistan is poised on the cusp of general elections, the Bajaur atrocity has naturally raised concerns about security during the election campaign. Reportedly the suicide bomber was seated in the front row of the meeting, which boggles the mind whether there was even a rudimentary level of security checking of the participants. Clearly, either it was conspicuously absent or had so many holes that the perpetrator could easily worm his way into the venue and take his strategic seat in the front row. This amounts to the state’s failure as well as the convention organisers, particularly since IS-K death threats were reportedly in the air in the area. In fact, in the light of such threats, and IS-K’s attacks in the recent past, the local administration initially refused permission for the meeting, but the JUI-F insisted. In the last few days alone, one attack took place in Hayatabad, two in Khyber, followed by this fourth suicide attack in KP. The first three of these attacks targeted security personnel, while the fourth targeted a political rally for the first time.

Lest we think the wave of attacks by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on the other hand have abated, one policeman was killed and another wounded while one terrorist was killed in an attack in Mardan on July 30, 2023. On the same day, a police post was assaulted in Khyber but the attack was repulsed without any casualties. These are part of the pattern of a number of terrorist attacks in KP’s various districts during the last few weeks. The Afghan Taliban government has seldom unequivocally condemned this wave of attacks, instead rubbing Pakistan’s nose in the dirt by suggesting talks with the TTP again. The Kabul government has this time condemned the Bajaur attack but the simple explanation for this deviation from the norm lies in the fact that the IS-K is a rival of the Afghan Taliban inside Afghanistan and in the region as a whole.

It needs to be recalled that the benighted Imran Khan government initiated negotiations with the TTP in 2021, soon after the Afghan Taliban took power in Kabul. A ceasefire followed, but could not be sustained since the state of Pakistan, quite rightly, refused to countenance the outlandish extreme demands of the TTP, instead insisting it must lay down its arms and adhere to the country’s Constitution. The breakdown soon led to renewed TTP attacks, facilitated enormously by the safe havens it enjoys on Afghan soil and the windfall of the latest US weapons left behind when Washington withdrew, which were captured by the Afghan Taliban and now are in the possession of the TTP.

A UN committee has reported to the Security Council that the TTP is indeed regrouping and seeking the umbrella of al Qaeda. Therefore, the committee’s report states, Pakistan’s fears are well-founded. TTP, the report goes on, represents a real threat not only to Pakistan but the region as a whole. It argues the Afghan Taliban government should be prevailed upon to flush out all such elements from Afghan soil, as it agreed to do in the Doha Agreement, not parrot the obviously failed talks effort with the TTP endlessly. This sounds more like a pious hope than a realistically achievable goal.

Plumbing the surface facts that are obvious, there are important lessons to be learnt from the birth and now resurgence of the TTP and other religious extremist terrorist groups besieging Pakistan. The whole responsibility lies on the muddled thinking over decades that creating and supporting such groups as the Afghan mujahideen and later the Taliban for strategic reasons to our west would not imply a serious fallout for us. Proxy wars can be dangerous things. Our protracted one in Afghanistan over the last 50 years has by now delivered the deadly crop of religiously motivated extremist terrorism with a vengeance. No right minded person familiar with how things work in our Pakistan would harbour any illusions about anyone or any state institution being held responsible for this blowback from our proxy war exertions. But at least now any lingering illusions about the Afghan Taliban being grateful to us for helping them defeat the US occupation and return to power should be shed. They are not, and are unlikely to be, our friends at the expense of their ideological brothers in the TTP. The major effort in lives and resources expended on the military operations against the TTP after 2014 seem in retrospect to have been wasted, since the TTP was not crushed but escaped across the border into Afghanistan, where it has been hosted since then by the Haqqani Group and the Afghan Taliban.

Given Pakistan’s current vulnerabilities on the political, economic and social front, the civilian and military authorities need to come together in a solemn compact not to rest until the threat from TTP and other similar groups is eliminated, once and for all. KP may only be the beginning, as Mohsin Dawar has warned an audience in the US. Given the track record of the TTP’s ability to bounce back from an apparent resounding military defeat, the path to spreading its malign presence and activities to the rest of Pakistan seems open and obvious. If we turn back to the National Action Plan formulated to deal with the terrorist threat after the Army Public School Peshawar massacre, it envisaged, at the very least, a coordinating centre for the complex task of rooting out the terrorist threat root and branch. Since much of such an effort rests on intelligence, the lack of coordination will continue perhaps to be manifested in tragedies such as Bajaur and indeed many others.

 

 

 

 

 

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