The January 2023 issue of Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) is out. Link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com
Contents:
1. Vijay Prashad: Socialism is not a utopian ideal, but an achievable necessity.
2. Hamza Alavi: Peasants and Revolution.
Rashed Rahman
Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)
Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) (on Facebook)
Palestinians abandoned
Rashed Rahman
The new year has dawned in the midst of increased repression by Israel of Palestinians under its occupation. In the occupied West Bank alone, 30 Palestinians have reportedly been killed even before the month of January has ended. This statistic is the tip of the fitful spirals of violence instigated by Israeli military and security forces’ deadly actions against Palestinians accused of, or actually engaged in, resistance to the Zionist state’s killing spree. Since the advent of the most right wing government ever in power in Israel, tougher Israeli measures against the hapless Palestinians loom.
When the Israeli military are unable to reach underground Palestinian fighters, they increasingly resort to targeting their families. Apart from arrests of family members or even neighbours of resistance fighters, their homes are demolished without exception. A perusal of the news emanating from occupied Palestine in recent days illustrates the Israeli policy of targeting innocent families and friends of resistance fighters in an abhorrent attempt to lower the morale of the fighters and persuade them to give up the struggle. On the evidence so far however, this draconian repression has failed in this objective. If anything, the unjust bloody actions of the Israeli state have stiffened the resistance to its inhumane settler colonialist apartheid policies.
The Palestinians have been betrayed by the Arab states who have, or are in the process of recognising Israel and making peace with it (and more). The Muslim world that never tires of parroting rhetoric about unity with their co-religionists has fallen silent. So what awaits the forlorn hopes of the Palestinian people for a better future?
This question cannot be answered without being aware of how things have come to such a pass. Zionism, an ideology wedded to the return of the Jewish diaspora scattered all over the world (an historic event dating back to Roman times), found a sympathetic ear in imperial Britain towards the end of World War I. The Balfour Declaration accepted the ‘right’ of Jews to return to their historical homeland, ignoring all that history had wrought between the Jews’ departure from Israel and the 20th century. Britain, the pre-eminent imperial power of the day, saw the Balfour Declaration’s support to the Zionist programme of setting up the state of Israel on Palestinian land as the thin edge of the wedge to control the strategic Middle East (and later its oil wealth). Jewish immigration to Palestine under the British Mandate between the two world wars succeeded in providing a considerable, and growing, Jewish populace on Palestinian soil. Following the Nazi Holocaust against the Jews during World War II, the west succeeded in taking advantage of the mood of the times to establish the state of Israel on Palestinian soil after a brief, and on the side of the Arabs, ill-prepared resistance.
Since its founding in 1948, Israel has revealed its expansionist nature by successively expanding its territory after the Arab-Israeli wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973. The Zionist entity therefore has in practice justified its description as a ‘dagger in the heart of the Middle East’. After 1973, Arab regimes at regular intervals have recognised the Zionist entity and signed peace treaties with it. Some are even now on the verge of taking the plunge.
And what of the Palestinian struggle to reclaim their land from the clutches of a Zionist state that ironically, has shifted the fallout of the Holocaust in Europe onto the shoulders and fates of the Palestinian people who had nothing to do with that horrible abomination? From 1948 to 1968, the Palestinian movement remained under the shadow of, and within the control of, Israel’s neighbouring Arab regimes. Particularly after the Free Officers’ seizure of power in a coup in Egypt in 1952, the Palestinian resistance was housed in and subject to the policies of that country and regime. To his credit, Nasser never betrayed the Palestinians, despite the setbacks in the 1956 and (especially) 1967 wars. His successor Anwar Sadat used the relatively better military performance of the Arab armies against Israel in 1973 to lubricate and justify selling out the Palestinian cause at the altar of perceived Egyptian interests.
After the 1967 war, in which Israel captured (and later illegally annexed) the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the Sinai Peninsula, the Palestinian struggle emerged in a new light in the shape of Al Fatah led by Yasser Arafat. The latter’s wisdom in recognising the concrete peculiarities of Palestine’s dilemma informed and convinced all the Palestinian armed resistance groups to unite under the banner of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). The exception perhaps was George Habbash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which while recognising the problem of the Palestinian struggle having to make do without secure bases of its own either inside or outside Palestine, saw the solution in capturing power (first?) in Jordan, which hosted then some 40 percent Palestinians among its population. This deviation by the PFLP was captured in their slogan: “The road to Tel Aviv lies through Amman”. PFLP carried out spectacular actions during the 1970s, including the decisive ‘Black September’ 1970 hijacking of two airliners to Amman, where they were eventually blown up. This incident provided pro-western King Hussein of Jordan the excuse and opportunity to crack down on the Palestinian resistance in his country as a whole. To our eternal shame and embarrassment, a certain Brigadier Ziaul Haq commanded the tank brigade deployed in Jordan to safeguard the monarchy against helpless Palestinian refugees in their camps as part of a bloody massacre.
These cataclysmic events forced the PLO to relocate to Lebanon, from where too it was finally displaced by Israeli attacks and invasion after a whole period of civil war that aligned the progressive Lebanese forces with the Palestinians against the fascist Phalange and similar groups. Having been exiled to Tunisia, Arafat embarked on a pragmatic course of diplomatic and political efforts in the face of this catastrophic defeat and retreat. The US, as the chief and most powerful backer of Israel in the western bloc, became the focus of this strategy based on the idea of a two state solution to the Palestinian issue, i.e. Israel and a suggested Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. The 1993 Oslo Accords provided the legitimacy to this idea, but it never bore fruit because of extreme right resistance to it within Israel. After Arafat was poisoned to death by suspected Israeli agents, the PLO under Mahmood Abbas has presented the spectacle of a helpless satrap of Israel, often clashing with, and even attempting to repress, other Palestinian groups still wedded to armed resistance. Desperate as the Palestinians under Israel’s occupation are, the credibility of the PLO under Abbas is today a precarious commodity.
The lesson? What is right, just and better cannot always be had, and certainly not easily. The Palestinian people today are faced with a stark choice: either surrender to Israel’s rule or continue with their armed resistance to the extent possible, diplomacy having failed and left them alone and in the lurch. We in Pakistan need to raise our voice consistently at the atrocities visited in the past, and continuing to be visited in the foreseeable future, on the beleaguered people of Palestine.
rashed-rahman.blogspot.com
Research and Publication Centre (RPC) in collaboration with Filmbar (on Instagram) announces the screening of the fifth film in its Season of World Cinema: Wong Kar Wai's "Chungking Express".
The whiplash, double-pronged Chungking Express is one of the defining works of 1990s cinema and the film that made Wong Kar Wai an instant icon. Two heartsick Hong Kong cops (Takeshi Kaneshiro and Tony Leung Chiu Wai), both jilted by ex-lovers, cross paths at the Midnight Express take-out food stand, where the ethereal pixie waitress Faye (Faye Wong) works. Anything goes in Wong’s gloriously shot and utterly unexpected charmer, which cemented the sex appeal of its gorgeous stars and forever turned canned pineapple and the Mamas & the Papas’ "California Dreamin" into tokens of romantic longing.
Timing: Friday, January 27, 2023, 5:00 pm at Research and Publication Centre (RPC), 2nd floor, 65 Main Boulevard Gulberg, Lahore (next to Standard Chartered Bank, above Indesign showroom).
Rashed Rahman
Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)
Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) (on Facebook)
RPC and Filmbar's Season of World Cinema is intended to bring to Pakistani audiences films that are otherwise not available in Pakistan. Screenings are normally held every Friday, 5:00 pm. Entry is free. Tea is served after the show. All friends are welcome.
As written by me.
Political parties and the establishment
Rashed Rahman
It has become a commonplace that the practice of political parties cannot be understood without taking into account the role of the military establishment. Pakistan having endured more than half of its existence under military rule since Independence, by now the deep state has formulated strategies and tactics to manipulate and influence politics through leaning on the political parties. Some background history may shed light on the situation.
Pakistan suffered military-bureaucratic domination soon after Independence. Aligning the country with the US-led west’s campaign against communism, this military-bureaucratic oligarchy benefited from western aid, particularly military aid, by joining the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), thus earning the accolade of the ‘most allied ally’ of the west’s anti-communist project. However, the contradiction at the heart of this arrangement was the different expectations of the two sides. Whereas the west focused on defeating communism worldwide through such alliances, Pakistan a little too cleverly thought it could use the west’s military aid to safeguard the country and advance its ambition to wrest Indian-Occupied Jammu and Kashmir from New Delhi’s grasp. The full implications of these differing aims was revealed during the 1965 war with India, when the US-led west banned weapons supplies and even fuel to Pakistan for breaching its undertaking that western supplied weapons would not be used against India.
That 1965 stalemate paved the path for the overthrow by a popular uprising throughout the country against the seemingly immovable Ayub regime. The 1968-69 uprising did not succeed in ushering in civilian democratic rule immediately since Ayub handed over power to another martial law dictator, General Yahya. The latter combined repression against the mobilised masses with concessions such as the ceasefire with Baloch nationalist insurgents, breaking up One Unit, and announcing the country’s first free and fair democratic elections in the country’s history in 1970. The refusal of the Yahya regime to hand over power to the victorious Awami League of Shaikh Mujibur Rehman (commanding a majority of seats exclusively from East Pakistan) and the military crackdown against it led eventually to the breaking away of East Pakistan to re-emerge as Bangladesh with the help of Indian military intervention in 1971.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, accused widely of collaborating with Yahya to deny the outcome of the 1970 elections, was installed, first as the only civilian martial law administrator, later as President and finally as Prime Minister. Bhutto’s radical Islamic Socialism platform soon revealed itself as anti-people, accompanied as it was by severe repression and another military crackdown in Balochistan. When the opposition Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) launched a countrywide protest movement against rigging in the 1977 general elections, negotiations between the two sides of the political divide having arrived at a last minute consensus, the military under General Ziaul Haq overthrew Bhutto in a coup. It soon became apparent to Zia that his actions had pitted his neck against Bhutto’s, who still retained widespread political support, reinforced by his new status as a victim of the military establishment. In the aftermath of Bhutto’s hanging in 1979, the political parties resisted Zia’s regime until his death in 1988, but without being able to dislodge him.
From the post-Zia 1988 elections can be discerned the not new but reinforced trend of opportunism and collaboration with the military establishment by political parties across the board, a recognition that such collaboration was unavoidable for gaining access to power. The establishment remaining wary of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) under Benazir Bhutto, activated its plan in gestation since the early 1980s to cut the PPP down to size, central to which was its promotion of Nawaz Sharif as the force to deprive the PPP of its formidable Punjab base. Given the size, population and domination of Punjab in the country’s affairs, the 1990s witnessed the see-saw conflict between the PPP and Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), resulting in no government being able to complete its tenure because of the establishment’s manoeuvrings and the draconian presidential power bequeathed by the 8th Amendment to the Constitution to dismiss elected governments. It was not until Musharraf’s 1999 coup that overthrew Nawaz Sharif, imprisoned him and then allowed him to go into exile, that the wisdom dawned on both the PPP and the PML-N that they had each been ‘played’ against each other by the establishment. That realisation led to the signing in exile in London in 2007 of the Charter of Democracy between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, whose main thrust was not to allow themselves to be used against each other in this manner.
This reconciliation between the two major political parties, which resulted in the first transfer of power through the ballot box in 2013, now engaged the attention of the deep state, since its leverage over these parties had weakened. Thus appears Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) as a serious player in 2011 with the support of the deep state, a party that had struggled to be heard till then. Central to the new strategy was wresting Punjab from the PML-N, just as earlier it had been wrested from the PPP. This was achieved through the rigged general elections of 2018, after Nawaz Sharif was disqualified by the Supreme Court in the Panama Papers case. Imran Khan’s government was clueless how to run the country, substituting in its place a blitz of borrowing to keep the country afloat. This, however, ended up sinking the country economically for any government to follow, as has been proved by the Pakistan Democratic Movement’s (PDM’s) troubles since coming to power through a no-confidence motion against Imran Khan in 2022 (another democratic first).
The blow hot, blow cold criticisms against and appeals to the establishment by Imran Khan after losing power indicate that the culture of collaboration with the establishment as the road to power remains alive and kicking. The ostensible ‘neutrality’ declared by outgoing COAS General Bajwa has played out in tacit support to the PML-N-led federal government, while staying aloof apparently from taking any action against Imran Khan. This implies they may want to keep Imran Khan in ‘reserve’, despite reservations about his behaviour in and out of power (the attacks on Bajwa not going down well in the military institutionally).
The dissolution of the Punjab Assembly (and now the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly) by the PTI and its ally, the Pervaiz Elahi faction of the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q), did not on the surface at least show obvious signs of the establishment’s imprimatur. But that fact leads to even more intriguing chains of thought as to what the establishment is thinking or planning. The manner in which the PTI-PML-Q combine has conducted itself smacks more of political manipulation rather than adherence to democratic norms. The provincial Assemblies’ dissolutions may be intended to increase pressure on the federal government to hold early general elections. But the latter has dug its heels in in recognition of its weaker political position in the wake of the PTI-PML-Q’s unremitting attacks. The PDM government is hoping it can better the economic essentials before returning to face the electorate in October-November 2023. Whether this pious hope will come to pass still looks difficult, given the foot dragging and shifting goal posts of the IMF and other international lenders, without whose cooperation even our friends like Saudi Arabia and the UAE are reluctant to commit aid or further loans.
Could the game plan of the establishment today be to sit quiet while the two sides of the political class tear each other apart, creating a congenial atmosphere for another unconstitutional intervention? Given the history of such interventions, it cannot simply be wished away. If only the civilian political protagonists could recognize this looming danger before it is too late. A pious wish, but unlikely.
As published by the paper.
Learning the hard way
Rashed Rahman
It has become a commonplace that the practices of political parties cannot be understood without taking into account the role of the military establishment. As Pakistan has endured more than half of its existence since independence under military rule, the deep state has formulated and honed strategies and tactics to manipulate and influence politics through leaning on political parties. Some background history may shed light on the situation.
Pakistan suffered military-bureaucratic domination soon after independence. Aligning the country with the US-led West’s campaign against communism, this military-bureaucratic oligarchy benefitted from Western aid, particularly military aid, by joining the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), thus earning the accolade of the ‘most allied ally’ of the West’s anti-communist project. However, the contradiction at the heart of this arrangement was the different expectations of the two sides. Whereas the West focused on defeating communism worldwide through such alliances, Pakistan seemed to think it could use the West’s military aid to safeguard the country and advance its ambition to wrest Indian-Occupied Jammu and Kashmir from New Delhi’s grasp. The full implications of these differing aims was revealed during the 1965 war with India, when the US-led West banned weapons supplies, even fuel, to Pakistan for breaching its undertaking that the weapons supplied by the West would not be used against India.
That 1965 stalemate paved the path for the overthrow by a popular uprising throughout the country against the seemingly immovable Ayub regime. The 1968-69 uprising did not succeed in ushering in civilian democratic rule immediately since Ayub handed over power to another martial law dictator, General Yahya. The latter combined repression against the mobilised masses with concessions such as a ceasefire with Baloch nationalist insurgents, breaking up One Unit, and announcing the country’s first free and fair democratic elections in the country’s history in 1970. The refusal of the Yahya regime to hand over power to the victorious Awami League of Shaikh Mujibur Rehman (commanding a majority of seats exclusively from East Pakistan) and the military crackdown against it eventually led to the breaking away of East Pakistan to re-emerge as Bangladesh with the help of an Indian military intervention in 1971.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, accused widely of collaborating with Yahya to deny the outcome of the 1970 elections, was installed, first as the only civilian martial law administrator, later as president and finally, as prime minister. Bhutto’s radical Islamic Socialism platform soon revealed itself as anti-people, accompanied as it was by severe repression and another military crackdown in Balochistan. When the opposition Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) launched a countrywide protest movement against rigging in the 1977 general elections, negotiations between the two sides of the political divide having arrived at a last-minute consensus, the military under Gen Zia-ul Haq overthrew Bhutto in a coup. It soon became apparent to Zia that his actions had pitted his neck against Bhutto’s, who still retained widespread political support, reinforced by his new status as a victim of the military establishment. In the aftermath of Bhutto’s hanging in 1979, the political parties resisted Zia’s regime until his death in 1988, but without being able to dislodge him.
From the post-Zia 1988 elections can be discerned the not new but reinforced trend of opportunism and collaboration with the military establishment by political parties across the board, a recognition that such collaboration was unavoidable for gaining access to power. The establishment, wary of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) under Benazir Bhutto, activated its plan in gestation since the early 1980s to cut the PPP down to size, central to which was its promotion of Nawaz Sharif as the force to deprive the PPP of its formidable Punjab base. Given the size, population and domination of the Punjab in the country’s affairs, the 1990s witnessed the see-saw conflict between the PPP and Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), resulting in no government being able to complete its tenure because of the establishment’s manoeuvrings and the draconian presidential power bequeathed by the 8th Amendment to the constitution to dismiss elected governments. It was not until Musharraf’s 1999 coup that overthrew Nawaz Sharif, imprisoned him and then allowed him to go into exile, that the wisdom dawned on both the PPP and the PML-N that they had each been ‘played’ against the other by the establishment. That realisation led to the signing in exile in London in 2007 of the Charter of Democracy between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Its main thrust was not to allow themselves to be used against each other in this manner.
This reconciliation between the two major political parties, which resulted in the first transfer of power through the ballot box in 2013, now engaged the attention of the deep state, since its leverage over these parties had weakened. Thus, with the support of the deep state in 2011, appeared Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) as a serious player. Till then, the party had struggled to be heard. Central to the new strategy was wresting the Punjab from the PML-N, just as earlier it had been wrested from the PPP. This was achieved through the rigged general elections of 2018, after Nawaz Sharif was disqualified by the Supreme Court in the Panama Papers case. Imran Khan’s government, clueless about how to run the country, substituted a vision with a blitz of borrowing to keep the country afloat. This, however, ended up sinking the country economically for any government to follow, as has been proved by the Pakistan Democratic Movement’s (PDM’s) troubles since coming to power through a no-confidence motion against Imran Khan in 2022 (another democratic first).
The blow hot, blow cold criticisms against and appeals to the establishment by Imran Khan after losing power indicate that the culture of collaboration with the establishment as the road to power remains alive and kicking. The ostensible ‘neutrality’ declared by outgoing COAS, Gen Bajwa, has played out in tacit support to the PML-N-led federal government, while staying aloof apparently from taking any action against Imran Khan. This implies that they may want to keep Imran Khan in ‘reserve’, despite reservations about his behaviour in and out of power (the attacks on Bajwa not going down well in the military institutionally).
The dissolution of the Punjab Assembly (and now the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly) by the PTI and its ally, the Parvez Elahi faction of the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q), did not, on the surface at least, show signs of the establishment’s imprimatur. But that fact leads to even more intriguing chains of thought as to what the establishment is thinking or planning. The manner in which the PTI-PML-Q combine has conducted itself smacks more of political manipulation rather than adherence to democratic norms. The provincial Assemblies’ dissolutions may be intended to increase pressure on the federal government to hold early general elections, but the latter has dug its heels in recognition of its weaker political position in the wake of unremitting PTI-PML-Q attacks. The PDM government is hoping it can improve the economic essentials before returning to face the electorate in October-November 2023. This still looks difficult, given the foot dragging and the shifting of goal posts by the IMF and other international lenders, without whose cooperation even our friends like Saudi Arabia and the UAE are reluctant to commit aid or more loans.
Could the establishment game plan today be to sit quiet while the two sides of the political class tear each other apart, creating a congenial atmosphere for another unconstitutional intervention? Given the history of such interventions, it cannot simply be wished away. If only the civilian political protagonists could recognise the looming danger before it is too late. A pious wish, but unlikely.
Research and Publication Centre (RPC) in collaboration with Filmbar (on Instagram) announces the screening of the fourth film in its Season of World Cinema: Jean Cocteau's "Orpheus" (1950).
At the Cafe des Poetes in Paris, a fight breaks out between the poet Orphee and a group of resentful upstarts. A rival poet, Celeste, is killed, and a mysterious princess insists on taking Orpheus and the body away in her Rolls Royce. Orphee soon finds himself in the underworld, where the Princess announces that she is, in fact, Death. Orpheus escapes in the car back to the land of the living, only to become obsessed with the car radio. This film is the central part of Cocteau's Orphic Trilogy, which consists of "The Blood of a Poet" (1930), "Orpheus" (1950) and "Testament of Orpheus" (1960).
Timing: Friday, January 20, 2023, 5:00 pm at Research and Publication Centre (RPC), 2nd floor, 65 Main Boulevard Gulberg, Lahore (next to Standard Chartered Bank, above Indesign showroom).
Rashed Rahman
Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)
Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) (on Facebook)
Two PAs’ dissolution and after?
Rashed Rahman
The kerfuffle regarding the dissolution of the Punjab Assembly has finally been laid to rest after Chief Minister (CM) Pervaiz Elahi moved a summary to the effect to Punjab Governor Balighur Rehman on January 12, 2023. Since the Governor refused to be part of the dissolution and did not sign the summary, the Assembly stood automatically dissolved after 48 hours. Next in line is the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Assembly, expected today, January 17, 2023, if CM Mahmood Khan is to be believed. Similar to Punjab, the KP Governor Ghulam Ali has refused to put his name to the dissolution.
If both provincial Assemblies (and therefore governments) have been ‘sacrificed’ by the Pakistan Tehreek-Insaaf (PTI), it has to be seen as the fallback tactic after the resort to street power failed to nudge the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) federal government to accept the PTI’s persistent demand for early general elections. As things stand, however, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)-led PDM government shows no signs of caving in to the pressure built up thereby by the PTI. It follows therefore that two provincial elections are now on the cards, a process mandated for completion within 90 days. During this period, caretaker CMs and cabinets will be installed. In Punjab, the process of selection of a caretaker CM has already kicked off, with the favoured names of each side doing the rounds in the media. The process of selection of a caretaker CM involves putting forward the names of two possible candidates by either side. If parliamentary and constitutional norms are upheld, the outgoing CM and the Leader of the Opposition are supposed to meet to agree on a consensus candidate, but given the state of political polarisation and confrontation between the two sides, this is unlikely to yield the desired result. The next step in case of no agreement is to send the two names of each side to a parliamentary committee, but for the same reason as above, this too is unlikely to yield anything positive. The greater likelihood therefore is the resort to the last option, i.e. sending the names to the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and letting it decide the caretaker incumbent.
The current political saga shows no signs of resting there. PTI and its ‘valuable’ ally Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q, or at least the Pervaiz Elahi faction) have decided to pay Prime Minister (PM) Shahbaz Sharif in the same coin by asking him soon to get a vote of confidence from the National Assembly (NA). This PTI move has found encouragement in the distance that has opened up between a reunited Muttahida Qaumi Movement-Pakistan (MQM-P) and the federal government of which it is a part over the just completed local bodies (LBs) elections in Sindh. The ECP having rejected the MQM-P’s objections over the delimitation of constituencies in Sindh, particularly in its political base Karachi and Hyderabad, the boycott by the MQM-P of the LBs polls produced a pale shadow of past such exercises, particularly reflected in a low voter turnout, lacklustre proceedings, largely peaceful but punctuated by a few instances of violence between political rivals. However, despite its threats of quitting the PDM coalition government in the Centre if the LBs polls went ahead despite its objections, pragmatic political wisdom seems to have persuaded the MQM-P not to forego its toehold in the corridors of power in Islamabad.
This development may go against the PTI-PML-Q combine’s move to ask PM Shahbaz Sharif to obtain a vote of confidence from the NA. If its numbers are indeed intact, the PMD government should theoretically sail through any such ‘test’. PTI is also floating balloons about the ‘split’ in the PML-N between the home and ‘London’ groups of the party. There may be aspirations and ambitions at work within the ranks of the PML-N’s leadership, particularly in the next generation, but given the family culture of the Sharifs, a ‘split’ is a tall ask. Nawaz Sharif remains the undisputed leader and the frequent calls from his party to return and lead the upcoming election challenges is an indication not only of this fact, but the perception within the PML-N that only Nawaz Sharif can effectively combat the Imran Khan political juggernaut. Maryam Nawaz may have to fill her father’s considerable shoes unless and until Nawaz Sharif gets relief in the cases against him, particularly the Al-Azizia case in which he has been sentenced to seven years imprisonment. The PML-N hopes for a similar outcome in this case as the Avenfield Apartments reference in which Maryam Nawaz has been given a clean chit. Uncomfortable as it is, the political fortunes of the PML-N may well rest on the attitude of the judiciary.
In the meantime, Nawaz Sharif has assumed command from London and tasked senior party leaders with framing a comprehensive chargesheet against Imran Khan, his establishment facilitators (General Bajwa and two ex-spy chiefs), and the judiciary (a former Chief Justice of Pakistan). The PML-N’s ‘vote ko izzat do’ (respect the vote) narrative is to be recrafted to match and defeat Imran Khan’s bluster against ‘foreign masters’ and the establishment. So far, despite their best efforts, the PML-N has not seen the fruits of its Toshakhana and audio leaks efforts against Imran Khan (some observers would argue because the latter enjoys a sympathetic tilt from the judiciary). Clearly the PML-N has been pushed onto the backfoot after its removal from power of Imran Khan through a vote of no-confidence in April 2022. Two political disasters therefore can be pointed to in the last four years. First, General Bajwa’s ‘love affair’ with Imran Khan, which turned sour in the third year of his incumbency and arguably authored the current political and economic crisis confronting the country; second, the haste by the PML-N to unseat Imran Khan, despite the reported view of Nawaz Sharif that it would be more politically prudent to leave him in power, let him continue to fall flat on his face, thereby weakening him and paving the way for the PML-N and its PDM allies to romp home in the general elections this year. The haste was fuelled by Asif Zardari’s advice and the ambition of Shahbaz Sharif to enjoy the premiership being handed to him on a platter in the absence of Nawaz Sharif. Even the no-confidence movers and shakers seemed to have no clue what a quagmire they were landing themselves in. Apart from a floundering economy, they confronted a PTI that was still firmly embedded in support of Imran Khan, some sympathy that usually accrues in our political culture for perceived or actual victims of the shenanigans of the establishment, and despite the failure of street power as a tactic, the PTI’s superior political messaging.
Populist politics the world over, and certainly in Pakistan’s case, usually sports a narrative free of adherence to the facts (or even logic). The fact that it finds resonance amongst the public is a reflection of the degrading in recent years of the political understanding by the masses, more concerned about their lives and livelihood problems and therefore easily swayed emotionally. Objective thought is conspicuous by its absence, as is largely a progressive agenda. Both voids must be filled if Pakistan, and indeed the world, is not to hurtle to the edge of the precipice.
rashed-rahman.blogspot.com
Pakistan’s deepening crisis
Rashed Rahman
Pakistan’s crisis is deepening by the day. First and foremost, it’s the economy stupid! Pakistan has throughout its history been critically dependent on aid dollops from international and bilateral lenders to keep afloat. The country’s joining the US-led west soon after Independence ensured it would keep being propped up as a necessary adjunct of the Cold War. That Cold War is long over, and the current Cold War (the US-led west against Russia and China) does not offer anywhere near the largesse of the past.
It is understandable why each economic downturn or crisis induces a return to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Without the lender of last resort’s imprimatur, the international markets look askance at our efforts to raise funds through floating bonds, etc. By now, given our chequered record of agreeing to the IMF’s terms and then abandoning them when one or two tranches have been received, there is not only considerable scepticism in the IMF about our promises and commitments, even our friendly ‘bailout’ countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE are waiting for the outcome of our interaction with the IMF before offering relief on old debts or indeed new loans. The exception in this regard is China, but its contributions to our economy largely rest in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and direct investment, neither of which support our chronic current account balance deficit or our foreign exchange reserves, critical for imports. It is the restriction of imports by the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) government that is leading to industries shutting down left, right and centre for lack of raw materials and spare parts. Hardly an inspiring scenario.
The PDM government has lost an enormous amount of political capital after coming into power last year. Their pleas that they inherited an economic mess from the previous Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) government led by Imran Khan are increasingly falling on deaf ears, given the travails of the public facing unprecedented inflation. Foodstuffs, including the staple wheat flour, are increasingly beyond the reach of ordinary mortals, compounded by distribution roadblocks of controlled price wheat and flour.
The economic development model adopted by Pakistan in the early 1950s consisted of the state setting up industries and then gifting them to favourites at low prices. What was created as a result was not an entrepreneurial class as understood commonly, but a rentier bourgeoisie, especially in the major industry textiles, which to this day cannot compete internationally and is therefore addicted to concessions from the state. If the historical trajectory of the development of industry worldwide is taken account of, mass consumer goods industry should have been followed by the setting up of capital goods industry in order to move towards being able to fulfil the need for plant and machinery internally. Far from this, Pakistan is still, 75 years on, critically dependent on imports not only for raw materials, but also indispensable plant and machinery. One index of the creation of a capital goods industry is the amount of steel and iron a country produces. Just mentioning this reminds of the fate of the shut Pakistan Steel Mills, the largest and potentially most important steel unit.
In other developing countries, especially India, heavy capital goods industry was set up in the public sector since private capital was reluctant to invest in a sector requiring heavy investment, and offering relatively low, long gestation returns. The logic of private capital is maximisation of profit, not national needs or concerns. Our flawed experiment of nationalisation of industry (with the exception of textiles) under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was followed since 1977 by the mantra of privatisation. Arguably that has proved a disaster, favouring the real estate sector and starting the process of deindustrialisation that still has us in its grip. Reflect on the fact that not one big industry has been set up in the 46 years since 1977.
What Pakistan needs is to revisit the assumptions of our (now neoliberal) economic development framework in the light of the fruits it has yielded. Ouyr exports are around a third of our imports. Industry as at present constituted cannot function without the bulk (around 90 percent) of these imports since we are wholly dependent on imported raw material and spare parts. Our mentionable export surpluses (apart from textiles) are few and far between. Our energy import dependence is crippling. What should seriously be considered in the light of these facts is an industrial policy of ‘walking on two legs’. That implies import substitution to the extent possible by setting up manufacturing enterprises that can at least reduce our dependence on imported spare parts and even capital goods (plant and machinery). At the same time, export-oriented industry needs to be expanded to reduce our trade and current account deficits.
Agriculture too needs a rethink. The famed ‘bread basket’ of the Subcontinent before Partition is today critically dependent on food imports. The much touted ‘green revolution’ of the 1960s rested on the base of capitalist farming, incrementally using machinery for cultivation. But this inevitably had the consequence of throwing tenants off the land in favour of ‘self-cultivation’, thereby adding to the army of the landless rural workers. A concomitant and hoped for increase in agricultural production has failed to arrive. Rather than relying on this failed capitalist agriculture strategy, we should seriously consider redistribution of lands from the large (feudal) landowners to small holders who would be then expected to practice intensive cultivation. This would increase agricultural production and serve the ends of equity.
Is this all pie-in-the-sky? Am I just dreaming? If so, worse may follow.
rashed-rahman.blogspot.com
Research and Publication Centre (RPC) in collaboration with Filmbar (on Instagram) announces the screening of the third film in its Season of World Cinema: Asghar Farhadi's 'The Salesman' (2016).
Amateur actors Emad and Rana prepare for opening night of their production of Arthur Miller's play Death of a Salesman. However, when the couple is forced to change apartments quickly when their building almost crumbles, a case of mistaken identity sees a shocking incident throw their lives into turmoil.
Timing: Friday, January 13, 2023, 5:00 pm at Research and Publication Centre (RPC), 2nd floor, 65 Main Boulevard Gulberg, Lahore (next to Standard Chartered Bank, above Indesign showroom).
Rashed Rahman
Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)
Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) (on Facebook)
Terrorism hydra, again
Rashed Rahman
A pale sun greeted a troubled Pakistan on the first day of the new year. Traditional greetings wishing friends and family a Happy New Year sounded like the aspired for triumph of hope over reality, given the plethora of crises gripping the state and society. Amongst these, a short list necessarily would have to include the political impasse, struggling economy, flood relief and rehabilitation, and the hydra of terrorism raising its head again.
Of all these, it is terrorism that poses an increasingly serious threat to peace. The tendency to relax and go to sleep amongst our state institutions after partial successes is what has led to the resurgence of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Forced to relocate to Afghan soil under the irresistible pressure of the military operations in the tribal areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), the TTP left behind sleeper cells awaiting just the present turn. The coming into power of their Afghan brothers last year opened the floodgates to infiltration back into Pakistan and attacks on the security forces, assassinations of tribal elders who are opposed to the TTP, and the emergence of alarm at these developments amongst the population of the whole of KP, whose memories of past suffering at the hands of these terrorists are still fresh.
While wrestling with the other crises afflicting Pakistan, Prime Minister (PM) Shahbaz Sharif pledged to crush terrorism. The National Security Committee (NSC) is meeting as these lines are being written to chalk out the strategy, tactics and measures required to scotch the terrorist snake. The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)-led Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) coalition government blames Imran Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) government for the uptick in TTP terrorism inside the country. The latter’s mistake was not to have learnt anything from the experience of negotiating with the religiously-inspired fanatics, which since 2004 resulted in every agreement being broken by the terrorists. Imran Khan still bleats on about military means ‘never’ being a solution, without admitting his responsibility for relying on our Afghan Taliban ‘friends’ (now in power in Kabul) to bring about a rapprochement with the TTP. No ceasefire, negotiations or any means other than military force can budge the TTP from its unacceptable demands, one of which is the restoration of FATA so they can once again enjoy their original base area in the merged tribal districts.
It may be jumping the gun to anticipate what the NSC will decide, but a few pointers, gleaned from experience, may be useful. First and foremost, counterinsurgency is not simply a military effort. That effort needs to be coordinated with on ground intelligence. And that intelligence, its gathering and analysis requires a degree of the missing coordination between all the intelligence and security agencies of the state, especially between the military and civilian wings of our intelligence and security structure. That was the missing element throughout our history, and even after the 2014 military operations were launched in the wake of the Army Public School, Peshawar, massacre of children and teachers by the TTP. The National Action Plan formulated to bolster those military operations by coordinating all the data of the intelligence agencies never took off, and the much touted National Counter-Terrorism Coordination Authority (NACTA) remains a dead letter to this day. Perhaps the NSC can now help fill that void.
The Bannu detention centre incident, in which TTP prisoners were able to seize weapons from their guards, take over the centre and only be winkled out after a serious assault on their positions, offers lessons. Vigilance, vigilance, vigilance. Our guard cannot be lowered at any time or place where the struggle against terrorism is concerned.
The uptick in terrorism, including a suicide blast in Islamabad, persuaded many foreign embassies in the federal capital to issue advisories to their officials and citizens to restrict their movements for fear of terrorist attacks. The major bombing of the Islamabad Marriot Hotel came back to haunt the foreign diplomats and evoked an advisory to avoid visiting the popular hotel. All hotels in Islamabad have reportedly beefed up their security, as have the security agencies through increased road checks, etc. The suicide bomber in Islamabad reportedly travelled from KP, pointing to the need to strengthen checks at the entrances to Islamabad.
In the reporting of the mainstream media, the series of attacks by nationalist guerrillas in Balochistan, which too have experienced an uptick of late, is being lumped as usual in the ‘terrorist’ basket, including the allegation that Baloch insurgent groups have forged a nexus with TTP. This lack of nuance or ‘one size fits all’ approach negates any possibility of finding a political solution to an entirely different problem – a nationalist insurgency fuelled by the sense of injustice and oppression since Independence common amongst the people of Balochistan. If, as is the riposte of the military establishment every time this more nuanced approach is suggested, it is indeed true that India is supporting the Baloch guerrilla struggle, does it not make sense to douse the fire in our house by accommodating Baloch grievances within the four corners of the Constitution so as to deny any hostile power the opportunity to fish in troubled waters?
Food for thought.
rashed-rahman.blogspot.com
