Third screening in Season of World Cinema at RPC

Research and Publication Centre (RPC) in collaboration with Filmbar (on Instagram) announces the screening of the third film in its Season of World Cinema: Asghar Farhadi's 'The Salesman' (2016).

Amateur actors Emad and Rana prepare for opening night of their production of Arthur Miller's play Death of a Salesman. However, when the couple is forced to change apartments quickly when their building almost crumbles, a case of mistaken identity sees a shocking incident throw their lives into turmoil.

Timing: Friday, January 13, 2023, 5:00 pm at Research and Publication Centre (RPC), 2nd floor, 65 Main Boulevard Gulberg, Lahore (next to Standard Chartered Bank, above Indesign showroom).

Rashed Rahman

Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)

Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) (on Facebook)

The December 2022 issue of Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) is out

The December 2022 issue of Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) is out. Link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com

Contents:

1. From the Editor: Pakistan's political crisis.

2. Rashed Rahman: The Left in Pakistan.

3. Vijay Prashad: In Malay, Orangutans means 'People of the Forest', but those forests are disappearing.

Rashed Rahman

Editor Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)

Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) (on Facebook)

Business Recorder Column December 20, 2022

Has Imran Khan shot his bolt?

 

Rashed Rahman

 

Imran Khan finally announced the date for the dissolution of the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial Assemblies on December 17, 2022, after having threatened it for weeks. The date set for the dissolution is December 23, 2022. During his virtual address to the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) rally in Liberty Chowk, Gulberg, Lahore, he had seated Punjab Chief Minister (CM) Parvez Elahi and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) CM Mahmood Khan beside him. However, when Imran Khan once again lambasted his favourite hobby horse these days, former COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa, Parvez Elahi’s expression and body language betrayed his discomfort.

Sure enough, the very next day, December 18, 2022, the Punjab CM took Imran Khan to task for continuously criticizing General Bajwa and asserted that he and his party, Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) would no longer tolerate any such remarks against the former army chief, whom he described as our and PTI’s benefactor. That did not detract Imran Khan from once again on December 18, 2022 painting the former army chief as having no problem with corruption and therefore himself being corrupt. Parvez Elahi on the other hand, having just dashed to Rawalpindi for a meeting with the establishment, once again reiterated in a TV interview his relationship with the establishment, which he described as long-lasting and never broken under any circumstances even when times were rough in his interactions with the ubiquitous establishment.

Parvez Elahi’s angry rebuttal of Imran Khan’s continuing attacks on General Bajwa really put the cat among the pigeons as far as the PML-Q-PTI alliance is concerned. Prime Minister (PM) Shahbaz Sharif and Pakistan People’s Party co-chairperson Asif Ali Zardari, perhaps sensing an opening, wooed Chaudhry Shujaat by suggesting some form of accommodation of Parvez Elahi to continue as CM Punjab if he were to ditch Imran Khan and come over to the Pakistan Democratic Movement’s (PDM’s) side. If that fails, the two PDM leaders discussed all the options available to halt the dissolution, particularly Punjab’s provincial Assembly’s, including moving a no-confidence motion against Parvez Elahi and/or asking him to take a vote of confidence from the Punjab house.

In the meantime, Imran Khan’s insistent demand that the National Assembly (NA) Speaker, Raja Pervaiz Ashraf, accept the mass resignations of the PTI MNAs, does not seem to be going anywhere. The idea was that if the Punjab and KP Assemblies are dissolved along with the NA resignations being accepted, this would mount what the PTI hopes will be irresistible pressure on the government to announce early elections. However, the snag is that the NA secretariat has expressed doubts about the signatures on some of the PTI MNAs’ resignation letters, and Speaker Raja Pervaiz Ashraf has flatly refused to accept the resignations without first verifying from the PTI MNAs face-to-face that they stand by their resignation letters of their own free will and without any pressures or coercion.

Whichever way all these manoeuvres by both sides pan out, Imran Khan’s plan is clear. He wants to deny any further remaining legitimacy to the existing political structure in order to make early elections necessary. Will he succeed in this endeavour is at least open to question, given the very public ‘falling out’ with Parvez Elahi, the blockage of the NA mass resignations, and Imran Khan’s off-again, on-again assaults on General Bajwa and, by implication, on the institution of the military. It should perhaps be recalled that since his ouster in April 2022 through a no-confidence motion, Imran Khan has been railing about a foreign (US) conspiracy to get rid of his government. The cypher story never really took off nor was accepted by people. Now Imran Khan has joined General Bajwa’s name to the foreign conspiracy and, in his latest diatribe, accorded the honorific ‘corrupt’ on the former army chief’s name.

In the same breath, and ignoring or unaware of the implications and fallout of his anti-Bajwa attacks, Imran Khan expects the new COAS, General Asim Munir, to adhere to what General Bajwa in his farewell address had claimed: that the military had made mistakes and violated the Constitution in the past by intervening in politics, and had decided henceforth to remain neutral. However, Imran Khan will only be satisfied that the military has indeed become politically neutral if the new COAS ‘ensures’ early elections are held after the dissolution of two provincial Assemblies and the mass resignation of PTI MNAs. What kind of ‘neutrality’ would that be? Imran Khan’s weak grasp on logic in the interest of his self-serving daily propaganda blasts is exposed by this contradiction in his stance.

The fact is that with the failure of his street rallies and abortive long march (because of being wounded in the Wazirabad attack), Imran Khan seems frustrated and desperate. He is therefore flailing around, clutching at straws, and, in his inimitable style, contradicting himself almost with every breath (the famous U-turns). Such a desperate hankering for a return to power (with, he hopes, the support of a ‘neutral’ establishment) seems to have addled whatever political sense Imran Khan ever had.

Imran Khan’s political fate and future will probably be decided in the next few days if his dissolution gambit and denuding the NA of PTI MNAs does not work out. That would imply Imran Khan has shot his bolt and needs to return to the drawing board, realistically assess the lay of the land and the forces arraigned against him if he is to keep his and the PTI’s hopes for the future alive and credible.

 

 

 

 

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com

Inauguration of Season of world Cinema at RPC

 Research and Publication Centre (RPC) in collaboration with Filmbar (on Instagram) announces the inauguration of a Season of World Cinema beginning Friday, December 16, 2022 with the first screening of Ingmar Bergman's Persona.

In the first of a series of legendary performances for Bergman, Liv Ullmann plays a stage actor who has inexplicably gone mute. An equally mesmerising Bibi Andersson is the garrulous young nurse caring for her in a remote island cottage. While isolated, the two women undergo a mysterious spiritual and emotional transference. Performed with astonishing nuance and shot in stark contrast and soft light by Sven Nykvist, the film is a penetrating, dreamlike work of profound psychological depth.

Timing: 5:00 pm, Friday, December 16, 2022 at Research and Publication Centre (RPC), 2nd floor, 65 Main Boulevard Gulberg, Lahore (next to Standard Chartered Bank, above Indesign showroom).

All friends are welcome. Tea will be served after the show.

Rashed Rahman

Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)

Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) (on Facebook) 

Business Recorder Column December 13, 2022

Wages of the original sin

 

Rashed Rahman

 

The incident of unprovoked and indiscriminate shelling by Afghan Taliban forces at the Chaman border on December 11, 2022, in which one security man was killed and 16 others injured, may be considered the wages of the original sin of meddling in the neighbouring country’s affairs. Although the incident in question evoked counter-firing by our forces, ISPR did not dilate on casualties on the Afghan side. That was left to Mr Zaid, the Kandahar Governor’s spokesman to reveal. He said one Afghan security man was killed and 13 injured, which included 10 soldiers and three civilians. Reports say the Afghan forces took umbrage when some Afghan citizens were refused entry into Pakistan because of incomplete documents. Another report has it that some people from the Afghan side tried to cut a fence near the border village of Lala Mohammad, which resulted in the closing of the Friendship Gate at Chaman. Although the border was reopened after half an hour, soon after the Afghan forces started firing at two border posts, prompting a response by Pakistani forces. The Afghan troops then escalated the exchange by using artillery and mortars.

Traditionally, despite Pakistan emerging as an independent state in 1947, the Afghan border had remained porous for as long as memory serves. Document checking, in fact any checking at all was the exception rather than the rule, given nomadic Powindas crossing the line seasonally and the tribes on either side being linked through family and other ties. All this changed, gradually but incrementally, during the Afghan wars following the Communist coup in that country in 1978, the subsequent Soviet invasion in 1979, and the rest, as they say, is history. Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the resistance Mujahideen soon fell into a civil war, ending only when the Afghan Taliban took over in 1996. Ousted by the US invasion following 9/11, the Afghan Taliban retreated into and found safe havens in Pakistani territory, from where they waged a guerrilla resistance until the occupiers tired and called it quits in 2021.

The Afghan Taliban had thus, with more than a little help from Pakistan’s security establishment, come back to power triumphant. Islamabad is faulted for harbouring the wishful thinking that the Taliban regime in Kabul would take action against the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), whose forces had taken shelter with the Afghan Taliban on Afghan soil in the face of the irresistible pressure applied by Pakistani military offensives against them in the tribal areas. The TTP emerged as a result of the long Afghan wars, during which first the Afghan Mujahideen and later the Taliban lived cheek by jowl with local people in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Logistics and intelligence help from Pakistani tribesmen was exchanged for ideological indoctrination of the Pakistani Taliban, hence the TTP.

Pakistan had been resentful of Afghanistan’s refusal to accept the emergence of Pakistan as an independent successor state of the British Raj because of irredentist claims on Pakistani Pashtun territory. Such irredentist claims fly in the face of history, otherwise some people in Pakistan may have been tempted to claim suzerainty over Afghanistan, at least up to Kabul, which often remained within the acquisitions of Subcontinental empires that rose and fell in the past. Fortunately, no such claim ever saw the light of day on this side. Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan remained fraught because of such irredentism, despite the commonality of ethnicity and culture on either side of the new border. When Sardar Daoud overthrew the Afghan monarchy in 1973, this tipped the already strained Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship into a tailspin from which it never recovered. Daoud’s credentials as an ardent Pashtun nationalist had been well established in his earlier stint in power under the monarchy. His crackdown on Islamist militant organisations persuaded their leaders such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmed Shah Masoud to flee to Pakistan, where they were taken under the wing of the ISI during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government, trained, equipped and infiltrated back into Afghanistan as the embryonic beginnings of the Mujahideen. The rest, at the risk of repeating oneself, is history.

The Afghan Taliban in 2001 had clearly indicated that they were not Pakistani satraps when they rejected Musharraf’s plea to surrender Osama bin Laden to the US after 9/11. Having helped them come back to power after a 20-year guerrilla resistance, Pakistan could be forgiven for naivete despite the 9/11episode in thinking the Afghan Taliban would completely go along with Pakistan’s desire they act against the TTP. On the contrary, the Haqqani Network, to whom the TTP is close, persuaded Islamabad to hold negotiations with the TTP. Having learnt little from the futility of such negotiations with fanatical terrorists in the past, the Pakistani security establishment was misled and now finds the so-called ceasefire was little else but a ruse to allow the TTP time to regroup and infiltrate back into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In the erstwhile tribal areas as well as adjoining settled areas, this has aroused a storm of anxiety amongst the local people, who do not want a repetition of the terrorist wave of the past. In some areas, local jirgas are threatening to take up arms in self-defence against the TTP if the state does not protect them.

The wages of the original sin are now upon us. It is time the security establishment woke up to the resurgent terrorist threat and conducted necessary operations against them to, this time, scotch the snake for good.

 

 

 

 

 

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com

Inauguration of RPC Season of World Cinema

Research and Publication Centre (RPC) in collaboration with Filmbar (on Instagram) announces the inauguration of a Season of World Cinema beginning Friday, December 16, 2022 with the first screening of Ingmar Bergman's Persona.

In the first of a series of legendary performances for Bergman, Liv Ullmann plays a stage actor who has inexplicably gone mute. An equally mesmerising Bibi Andersson is the garrulous young nurse caring for her in a remote island cottage. While isolated, the two women undergo a mysterious spiritual and emotional transference. Performed with astonishing nuance and shot in stark contrast and soft light by Sven Nykvist, the film is a penetrating, dreamlike work of profound psychological depth.

Timing: 5:00 pm, Friday, December 16, 2022 at Research and Publication Centre (RPC), 2nd floor, 65 Main Boulevard Gulberg, Lahore (next to Standard Chartered Bank, above Indesign showroom).

All friends are welcome. Tea will be served after the show.

Rashed Rahman

Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)

Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) (on Facebook) 

The News on Sunday Column December 11, 2022

As written by me.

Political muddle

 

Rashed Rahman

 

Since Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) government’s ouster through a no-confidence motion in April 2022, the country’s political horizon has been exhibiting extremes of noise and confusion, with no end in sight so far. This muddle is the result of Imran Khan’s aggressive campaign against the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) government and the now retired COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa for ‘ditching’ Imran. The received wisdom is that Imran Khan lost the backing of the military establishment in 2021 over the appointment of a new ISI chief to replace Lt-General (now retired) Faiz Hameed, whom Imran insisted on retaining. The fact is that Lt-General (retd) Faiz Hameed had to take command of a corps in order to be eligible for appointment as COAS. He was thus appointed Peshawar Corps Commander over Imran’s objections and foot dragging on the new ISI incumbent’s decision. This episode was certainly a turning point in the Imran Khan-military establishment’s relationship, which is alleged to have been carefully crafted and nurtured from 2011 onwards.

However, it is arguable that while the ISI chief issue may have proved the last straw for the military establishment accused of manipulating the 2018 general elections to bring Imran Khan to power, a whole series of reservations about Imran Khan’s handling of the economy (e.g. 70 percent increase in borrowing in four years as compared to the previous 70 years), foreign relations (alienating the US, China, Saudi Arabia and the UAE), accountability (not a single case initiated by Imran Khan’s government through the National Accountability Bureau could be proved), and politics (virtually ignoring parliament, hitting new lows in language and conduct towards the opposition) may have fed into the military establishment’s growing alarm about the direction the country appeared to be heading in. Not the least of the military’s worries was the pressure on the defence budget because of bad economic performance.

Urban legend has it that once the establishment had decided it could no longer support Imran Khan, it may have ‘facilitated’ the jumping ship by 20 PTI MNAs during the no-confidence vote. Immediately after his ouster, Imran Khan came out with guns blazing against his erstwhile backers (and the US, claimed to be behind the ‘conspiracy’ to oust him). This unprecedented abusive diatribe against the now retired COAS General Bajwa and other top military commanders proved highly offensive to the institution, but its inability to put a stop to this abuse (allegedly because there was some support and sympathy for Imran Khan within the military) proved highly embarrassing. General Bajwa left under a cloud because of this denouement, and it is only now, when the change of command has been completed, that Imran Khan and the PTI have called a ‘ceasefire’ in a transparent attempt to mend fences with the new command.

Imran Khan’s attempts to turn the tables on the government and the establishment through street power (public rallies, the long march, now again street rallies) have not yielded the results he may have hoped for. The long march more or less fizzled out after the Wazirabad attack in which Imran Khan was wounded. Street rallies are unlikely in the prevailing atmosphere to pressurise an increasingly determined government to hold early general elections, as Imran Khan has been demanding.

Actually the main actors in the ouster of Imran Khan were not equally motivated to go ahead with the no-confidence move. Pakistan People’s Party chief Asif Zardari was determined to see the back of Imran Khan as was the Jamiat-i-Ulema-Islam-Fazl’s Maulana Fazlur Rehman. The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) was, however, arguably of two minds. Nawaz Sharif was of the view that it would be better to leave Imran Khan in place till the end of his term (August 2023) as his deteriorating political graph would by then have seen him fall totally flat on his face, providing the opposition as a whole a clear road to victory in the 2023 general elections. Zardari, and Shahbaz Sharif, were committed to get rid of the corruption cases filed against them during the PTI tenure. The latter may also have been motivated by the ambition (in the absence of the elder brother) to secure the prime ministership. However, despite their success in ousting Imran Khan, the PDM coalition has found itself burdened by the messy legacy of the PTI, contributing to a loss of political capital.

Imran Khan’s threat to dissolve the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assemblies if his demand for early elections is not met is proving harder to do than perhaps Imran had thought. Despite lip service to being bound by Imran Khan’s command, Punjab Chief Minister (CM) Pervaiz Elahi’s Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) seems reluctant to let go of power in the politically most important province. The rumour mill is also alleging the CM has initiated contacts with the new army top brass, a proclivity Pervaiz Elahi has revealed the other day, stretches back to 1983 (and perhaps even earlier).

Until now, the PML-N seemed not to be taking the Assemblies dissolution threat too seriously. However, after examining the constitutional, legal and political options to prevent the dissolution happening, the PML-N seems to have come to the conclusion that this is not an easy task. They have now decided, on Nawaz Sharif’s directive, to prepare for the possibility that a dissolution may occur. Nawaz has asked the party’s Punjab chief, Rana Sanaullah, to initiate homework to identify suitable candidates for Punjab, the PML-N’s traditional stronghold, in the event a dissolution and fresh election is unavoidable.

Whatever the role, past and present, of the main characters in this drama may have been, the country seems headed for a denouement that poses new, and at present unanswerable, dilemmas.

As printed by the paper.

Political muddle

 

Rashed Rahman

 

Since the ouster of Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) government through a no-confidence motion in April 2022, the country’s political horizon has been exhibiting extremes of noise and confusion, with no end in sight so far. This muddle is the result of Imran Khan’s aggressive campaign against the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) government and the now retired COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa for ‘ditching’ Imran. The received wisdom is that Imran Khan lost the backing of the military establishment in 2021 over the appointment of a new ISI chief to replace Lt-General (now retired) Faiz Hameed, whom Imran insisted on retaining. The fact is that Hameed had to take command of a corps in order to be eligible for appointment as COAS. He was thus appointed the Peshawar Corps Commander over Imran’s objections and foot dragging on the appointment of the new ISI chief. This episode was certainly a turning point in the Imran Khan-military establishment’s relationship.

However, it can be argued that while the ISI chief issue may have proved the last straw for the military establishment accused of manipulating the 2018 general elections to bring Imran Khan to power, a whole series of reservations about Imran Khan’s handling of the economy (e.g. 70 percent increase in borrowing in four years as compared to the previous 70 years), foreign relations (alienating the US, China, Saudi Arabia and the UAE), accountability (not a single case initiated by Imran Khan’s government through the National Accountability Bureau could be proved), and politics (virtually ignoring parliament, hitting new lows in language and conduct towards the opposition) may have fed into the military establishment’s growing alarm about the direction the country appeared to be heading in. Not the least of the military’s worries was the pressure on the defence budget because of bad economic performance.

Urban legend has it that once the establishment had decided it could no longer support Imran Khan, it may have ‘facilitated’ the jumping ship by 20 PTI MNAs during the no-confidence vote. Immediately after his ouster, Imran Khan came out with guns blazing against his erstwhile backers (and the US, claimed to be behind the ‘conspiracy’ to oust him). This unprecedented diatribe against the (now retired) COAS and other top military commanders was highly offensive to the institution and highly embarrassing. Gen Bajwa left under a cloud because of this denouement, and it is only now, after the change of command has been completed, that Imran Khan and the PTI have called a ‘ceasefire’ in a transparent attempt to mend fences with the new command.

Imran Khan’s attempts to turn the tables on the government and the establishment through street power (public rallies, the long march, street rallies once again) have not yielded the results he may have hoped for. The long march more or less fizzled out after the Wazirabad attack in which Imran Khan was wounded. Street rallies are unlikely in the prevailing atmosphere to mount enough pressure on an increasingly determined government to hold early general elections.

Actually, the main actors in the ouster of Imran Khan were not equally motivated to go ahead with the no-confidence move. The Pakistan Peoples Party chief Asif Zardari was determined to see the back of Imran Khan as was the Jamiat-i-Ulema-Islam-Fazl’s Maulana Fazlur Rehman. The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) was, however, arguably of two minds. Nawaz Sharif was of the view that it would be better to leave Imran Khan in place till the end of his term (August 2023) as his deteriorating political graph would by then have seen him fall totally flat on his place, providing the opposition as a whole a clear road to victory in the 2023 general elections. Zardari and Shahbaz Sharif were committed to get rid of the corruption cases filed against them during the PTI tenure. The latter may also have been motivated by the ambition (in the absence of the elder brother) to secure the prime ministership. However, despite their success in ousting Imran Khan, the PDM coalition has found itself burdened by the messy legacy of the PTI, contributing to a loss of political capital.

Imran Khan’s threat to dissolve the provincial assemblies in the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa if his demand for early elections is not met is proving harder to execute than perhaps Imran had believed. Despite lip service to being bound by Imran Khan’s command, Chief Minister Parvez Elahi’s Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) seems reluctant to let go of power in the politically most important province. The rumour mill is also alleging that the CM has initiated contacts with the new army top brass, a proclivity Elahi has revealed the other day and which stretches back at least to 1983.

Until recently, the PML-N seemed not to be taking the assemblies’ dissolution threat too seriously. However, after examining the constitutional, legal and political options to prevent the dissolution happening, the PML-N seems to have come to the conclusion that this is not an easy task. They have now decided, on Nawaz Sharif’s directive, to prepare for the possibility that a dissolution may occur. Nawaz has asked the party’s Punjab chief, Rana Sanaullah, to initiate homework to identify suitable candidates for the Punjab, the PML-N’s traditional stronghold, in the event a dissolution and fresh election are unavoidable.

Whatever the role, past and present, of the main characters in this drama may have been, the country seems headed for a denouement that poses new, and at present unanswerable, dilemmas.

 

The writer is a veteran journalist who has held senior editorial positions in several newspapers

Business Recorder Column December 6, 2022

Bajwa tales

 

Rashed Rahman

 

The fierce ping pong of statements by the government and the opposition Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) continues without any signs of abating in favour of a civilised, democratic exchange. Of late, these diatribes have centred on the role of former COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa. No sooner had General Bajwa laid down his uniform on November 29, 2022 that Imran Khan launched into a series of interviews and messages bemoaning his having trusted General Bajwa, whom he accused of playing a ‘double game’ (i.e. playing both sides against the middle). Predictably, Prime Minister (PM) Shahbaz Sharif and Federal Railways Minister Khwaja Saad Rafique whaled into Imran Khan in response, the PM accusing him of undermining the foundations of the country just to regain power, while Saad Rafique took up Imran’s statement admitting his giving General Bajwa an extension his biggest mistake. If so, asked Saad Rafique, why did Imran Khan repeat the offer later, when things had gone down the tube?

While these responses from the government fall within the ambit of the predictable, Punjab Chief Minister (CM) Pervaiz Elahi followed up on his son Moonis Elahi’s revelation the other day that General Bajwa nudged them towards the PTI in April 2022 during the build-up to the no-confidence motion against Imran Khan’s government. The father not only upheld the son’s statement, he virtually thanked God (and General Bajwa) for showing them the light and the better way forward: towards the PTI. Pervaiz Elahi went on to boast that he has smooth, cordial relations with the army (and judiciary) since 1983. He then dilated on the Sharifs’ untrustworthiness, claiming they had ditched him at least five times, without however explaining when and how. Sceptics may be inclined to view the statement about ‘smooth, cordial relations’ with the army as an admission of being part of the collaborationist political culture that has overtaken the country since the last three to four decades. And they would be justified in asking the CM about his and his family’s ditching the Sharifs after the 1999 military coup.

What Moonis and his father’s remarks point to is the distance between their perceptions and Imran Khan’s continuing bluster against his erstwhile supporter General Bajwa and, by extension, the institution of the military. Elder Chaudhry Shujaat refused to go along with Pervaiz Elahi’s joining PTI because of Imran Khan’s insulting behaviour towards the army and its top commanders. But Pervaiz says, despite and in refutation of Imran Khan’s claims, that General Bajwa did not play any double game. To soften the blow perhaps, Pervaiz Elahi in the next breath said neither did Imran Khan. CM Pervaiz Elahi expressed his preference for the Punjab Assembly to remain intact till at least March 2023, while hastening to add the ritual rider that he would not hesitate even a minute should Imran Khan command the dissolution. Pervaiz chided his political ‘boss’ for name calling the military top brass Mir Sadiq and Mir Jaffer. He also delivered the wisdom that Imran Khan’s team was ‘amateur’ and therefore could not deliver.

The father-son duo’s defence of General Bajwa and differing narrative from Imran Khan suggests distance, if not a gulf, between the two allies. Given CM Pervaiz Elahi’s boast about his relationship with the army since 1983, these differences revolve around keeping the military on board by not lambasting the previous top brass, a gambit seen as annoying to the institution as a whole. Admittedly, the unprecedented exposure of the military’s role in bringing Imran Khan to power through questionable if not dubious means, the saga of growing differences between the backers and the PTI government, and the eventual denouement points in the sorry direction of one more example of the military’s intervention in politics and, as it turns out, a disastrous one at that.

General Bajwa will no doubt have the time and leisure now to reflect on what has befallen him as a result of all these controversies. Some would see his departure as an unenviable end to his six years in power. General Bajwa must be rueing the fallout for his personal prestige and repute as well as for the institution he commanded. Perhaps the afterthought may strike him that he would have been better off and left behind a more honourable legacy had he not accepted the extension and gone home at the appointed time. He is of course not the only COAS who has enjoyed an extension, but each time the decision has proved controversial. For one, it disrupts the normal transition and promotion structure of the top command, engendering unnecessary bitterness amongst those who end up missing their best chances. Two, it militates in favour of the military’s intervention in politics, something General Bajwa says the institution has now decided to stay away from. If so, we should consider ways and means to stop this practice permanently in the interests of the country as well as the military.

The unremitting and shrill political confrontation between the two sides of the political divide shows no signs of abating or leading to a reasonable, democratic solution. However, since being ousted through a no-confidence motion in April 2022, Imran Khan has tried all the tricks up his sleeve to pave the path to his return to power. These include street power (rallies, long march) and the threat to disrupt the system by dissolving the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assemblies and precipitating provincial elections in over half the country (by population). However, this last threat now increasingly reveals itself as merely a pressure tactic to achieve the demand for early general elections. The government appears in no mood to buckle under to this demand. Therefore the likely scenario for the remainder of this year and the next seems to be more of the same: confrontation, statement ping pong and an unresolvable impasse. How long this pressure cooker can hold is beyond our powers to predict at this time.

 

 

 

 

 

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com

Business Recorder Column November 29, 2022

The season of swan songs

 

Rashed Rahman

 

Outgoing COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa in an address to the Defence and Martyrs Ceremony at GHQ on November 23, 2022 made an unprecedented admission about the army’s unconstitutional interference in politics for 70 years, while criticising the political parties for their errors, which include being intolerant towards rivals. Most of the latter criticism was aimed at the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) for crafting a “fake and false” narrative against the army and calling senior commanders names. In a rare show of magnanimity, General Bajwa said they were ready to forgive these trespasses and leave the controversy behind.

General Bajwa underlined the fact that the army often faced criticism because of “unconstitutional” “interference in politics” in various ways over the last seven decades. What General Bajwa admitted regarding the (dominant) role of the army in interfering in politics has remained a widespread phenomenon. Such interference includes dislodging civilian governments through coups and indirectly controlling weak dispensations. Political leaders are not blameless either. They readily ceded space to the military due to their weaknesses (and collaborationist tendencies to attain power), thereby allowing a breach of institutional boundaries (i.e. kowtowing to the real seat of power). General Bajwa even revealed the (recent) date of the military’s decision after intense deliberations no longer to interfere in politics. He put this at February 2022. It may be recalled that this was a period of intense open and behind the scenes political manoeuvring in the backdrop of then Prime Minister (PM) Imran Khan’s falling out with his erstwhile military backers (who brought him to power in 2018 as the third alternative to the two mainstream parties that had dominated politics since the 1990s) over the appointment of the new ISI chief and the buildup to the vote of no-confidence that removed Imran Khan and the PTI government from power.

While General Bajwa went on to say that the military was strictly adhering to its decision and would continue to do so, knowledgeable commentators by and large preferred to reserve judgement, saying only time will tell or the jury is still out on this development. Needless to say, even this declared stance of political ‘neutrality’ was enough to incense the deposed ex-PM Imran Khan into unleashing a torrent of abuse on the military leadership, steeped no doubt in his disappointment that the ‘lift’ into power hitherto available to him had now come to a grinding halt. Hence also the cries of ‘betrayal’ by Imran Khan and the PTI.

Dilating on the so-called foreign conspiracy to bring about regime change, he questioned if this were the case, would the military stand by and do nothing? The question seems logical, but with due respect, the military could theoretically go along with any such conspiracy if it accords with its own plans. That is not to say that was the case in this instance. General Bajwa referred to the wind being taken out of the sails of this leaky foreign conspiracy boat by none other than the authors themselves by now. No doubt obliquely referring to the unprecedented abuse the military top brass has been subjected to by Imran Khan and the PTI, General Bajwa said the army exercised restraint in the larger national interest despite having the resources and opportunities to respond to this barrage, but there is a limit. Even if we take General Bajwa at his word, he did not care to explicate whether the ‘limit’ had already been reached or what may constitute the unacceptable.

General Bajwa’s readiness to forgive errant parties such as the PTI may also, if reports and commentary in the media are to be believed, be motivated by the alleged risk of internal dissent within the military if Imran Khan is harshly dealt with. It appears the latter has been relying on supposed support within the military as a guarantee that his brinkmanship will not evoke an adverse reaction. But as on so many other issues, this may be the self-serving delusion of Imran Khan. If there is one thing the Pakistan military is known for, it is its internal cohesiveness, unity and discipline, especially when the institution itself, in the shape of its top commanders, comes under such verbal assault.

While there would be few dissenters with General Bajwa’s formulations in general, the fact is that the military has dictated matters in the country almost since Independence. If for this purpose in the early 1950s it relied on its unholy alliance with the bureaucracy, by 1958 it had assumed direct command of the affairs of state (to be repeatedly resorted to in subsequent years). The 1956 Constitution had already promulgated One Unit and since Independence, the military-bureaucratic oligarchy had conspired against a representative, genuine democracy that took due account of the undeniable reality that Pakistan was a multi-national state requiring a different state structure than a domineering Centre. Add to this the peculiarity of the new state having two wings separated by a thousand miles of hostile Indian territory. Instead of taking due account of these realities, the state attempted, again and again, to impose a unitary structure that militated against the rights of the smaller nationalities and even the majority Bengali majority!

General Bajwa’s attempt to whitewash the military’s role in the 1971 debacle by calling it a political, not military failure, fails to convince. General Yahya Khan was in power at the time, and despite Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s role arguably in ensuring the debacle, the military cannot, force imbalance with the enemy notwithstanding, justify its genocidal massacre and women’s rape on a mass scale. If anything, it is a reason for all of us to hang our heads in shame.

Whether 1971, before or after, the military’s penchant for running the country directly or from behind the scenes has yielded nothing but disaster. If the appropriate lessons have been learnt without shrinking from the truth, and General Bajwa’s successors in the military’s command adhere to his statement of policy of no more interference in politics, that may offer a glimmer of hope that Pakistan may finally be headed for civilian, democratic supremacy. But sceptics will not so easily be convinced, given our history and the military’s track record in this respect. They will no doubt be watching closely and relying only on the judgement of time.

 

 

 

 

 

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com

Business Recorder Column November 22, 2022

Historic accord

 

Rashed Rahman

 

The climate summit COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, has produced a historic accord on funding to help vulnerable countries cope with the devastating impacts of global warming. This positive outcome was not arrived at easily. The negotiations dragged on for two weeks, appearing at times to be teetering on the brink of a collapse, with the last two days seeing round-the-clock efforts. The major breakthrough is on setting up a fund for “loss and damage”, which Pakistan has been advocating for three decades. Pakistan has hailed the outcome as the UN conference responding to the “voices of the damaged”. However, all was not sweetness and honey despite this breakthrough as there was anger at the failure to push further on cutting emissions, believed to be the main culprit fuelling global warming and climate change.

Credit must go to Prime Minister (PM) Shahbaz Sharif, Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari and Climate Minister Sherry Rahman for the success of the effort. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres must also be lauded for his support to the climate talks, although he too bemoaned the lack of consensus on the urgent carbon cutting needed to tackle global warming. “Our planet is still in the emergency room,” is how he characterised the threat facing the whole world.

So while we celebrate the setting up of the loss and damage fund, we should note that the world is still far from the desirable commitment to reducing, and finally phasing out, fossil fuels that are the main culprits upsetting the delicate ecological balance of our living planet. At best COP27 held to the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius over pre-industrial levels. Scientists say global warming is at 1.2 degrees Celsius so far, and even at this level the world has been afflicted by a cascade of climate-driven extremes that threaten developing countries with escalating disasters, energy and food prices crises, and ballooning debt. Imagine if their forecast of the world heading for 2.5 degrees Celsius at present comes true.

The loss and damage fund will be geared towards developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. Examples of such countries are island and coastal areas threatened by rising sea levels because of the melting of the polar ice caps and other disturbances in weather patterns. Pakistan has this year suffered devastating floods brought on by enhanced melting of mountain glaciers and above normal monsoon rains that have drowned one third of the country and destroyed the lives and livelihoods of 33 million people. Pakistan, with a struggling economy even before the natural catastrophe, fought hard at COP27 for help to mitigate the effects of the disaster. Some 134 countries are expected to benefit from the fund. However, many thorny questions still remain unanswered, which will be dealt with by a transitional committee, expected to report to next year’s climate meeting in Dubai to get the funding operational.

Inevitably, these unanswered questions include who will contribute how much, what is the desired size of the fund, what will be the criteria to disburse funds in what priority to the most stricken countries? That indicates there may still be many a slip between the cup and the lip. Interestingly, the ‘resistance’ of developed countries to any notion of liability and compensation was acceded to.

The fact is that the unbridled exploitation of natural resources and fossil fuels for capitalist industrialisation and its unlimited appetite for maximising profit even at the expense of the world’s natural habitats for the last three centuries has rendered the globe ecologically disturbed. And because developed countries too share the same planetary home, they have not been spared extreme climate change and accompanying natural catastrophes. Were that not the case, perhaps the developed world would not have acceded to the worldwide demand for help to vulnerable developing countries like Pakistan. The issue of emissions cutting, which is at the heart of the effort to rescue the planet from the adverse effects of three centuries of unbridled fossil fuel burning, deforestation and the destruction of natural habitats that has rendered many species extinct or threatened with extinction, is a tough nut to crack because it involves the switchover from fossil fuels to non-polluting renewable energy sources. Although the technology to bring this about now exists, the costs of the switchover, possible disruptions to economies and other roadblocks make the target not easy to accomplish. First, there has to be a global agreement or plan how this will be carried out, in what timeframe, who will pay (or share) the costs involved. It seems logical that the greatest resistance and attempts to slow down and delay the phases of this process will come from the developed world and their corporate sector.

However, the globe can no longer be left to the ‘tender’ mercies of global corporate capitalism, not only but also because the people of the entire world, including the developed world, now lie in the path of the destruction already caused, and that will continue till a final change in the way industry and commerce functions, how it obtains its energy, etc, are sorted out. This promises a fairly lengthy process of international conferences, negotiations, hard bargaining and, hopefully, in the end, agreement in the interests of all peoples of the world. Anything short of this spells doom-laden scenarios of incrementally catastrophic natural disasters and their concomitant human and material cost.

 

 

 

 

 

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com

The November 2022 issue of Pakistan Monthly Review is out

The November 2022 issue of Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) is out. Link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com

Contents:

1. Tapan Bose: Widening inequality, increasing human suffering and Human Rights.

2. Sara Kazmi: The Marxist Punjabi Movement: Language and Literary Radicalism in Pakistan.

Rashed Rahman

Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)

Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) (on Facebook)

Business Recorder Column November 15, 2022

Master of U-turns

 

Rashed Rahman

 

Whatever other foibles Imran Khan may be accused of, consistency is not amongst them. Ever since his ouster through a no-confidence motion in April 2022, he has attempted to craft a narrative of a foreign conspiracy, backed if not initiated by the US, to bring about regime change. As proof of his allegations, he brandished a piece of paper at a rally, purportedly a cipher (coded) message sent by our ambassador in Washington reporting on a conversation with a senior US official. Veteran Pakistani diplomats when asked have weighed in with the view that such conversations and ciphers do not necessarily mean much and are better ignored.

Imran Khan, however, in his bullheaded approach to all matters, constructed his conspiracy theory around the cipher. Despite resort to the typical Goebbelsian tactic of repeating a lie enough times to make it appear true, Imran Khan has failed to convince anyone other than his fanatical following of the verity of the charge of a foreign regime change conspiracy against him. In the process, the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) coalition government has been attempting to redress some of the damage Imran Khan’s government inflicted on our relationship with the US (and other countries).

Now, in one more of his by now familiar U-turns, he has disavowed the foreign conspiracy theory to the extent of wanting to leave it in the past and move on to repairing his relationship with Washington. This he has stated in an interview to the Financial Times. He now claims in the next breath that the US-Pakistan relationship is a master-servant or even master-slave relationship, and that he ‘only’ sought a dignified one in Pakistan’s best interests. It is amazing how Imran Khan selectively picks points to argue his case without a nod even to the facts of life that are no secret from anyone. Who does not know that Pakistan is dependent on US goodwill, not only for bilateral advantage, but also to clear the decks for the IMF and other international lenders to provide Pakistan’s sick economy with the ‘drip’ of loans and finance to stay afloat (in addition, it may be added, to other multilateral and bilateral borrowing without which Pakistan’s economy would likely collapse). Of course, economics is not all there is to the US-Pakistan relationship, which encompasses strategic, and therefore military ties. To arrive at the destination of an honourable relationship with the US (and all other lenders) would require a complete departure from the model of dependent development pursued by Pakistan almost from its inception.

Addicted to stirring up the political pot every day, Imran Khan then goes on to assert that Nawaz Sharif is ‘not allowing’ his younger brother Prime Minister (PM) Shahbaz Sharif to hold early elections, the demand around which Imran Khan’s politics has now converged after many detours since his fall from power. Is there any evidence that the PM disagrees with Nawaz Sharif’s (presumed) opinion that early elections are not in the interests of the ruling PDM coalition? None that one can see. The PDM coalition government, despite, or even because of, having lost political capital because it inherited an economy devastated by the Imran Khan government’s incompetence and faulty policies, sees no alternative to sticking to the course of serving out its term till August 2023, in the hope that by then economic indicators may improve and bolster its political position going into the next general elections.

Meanwhile Imran Khan’s dual policy of at the same time attacking the establishment and wooing it to restore him to power has produced contradictory effects. On the one hand, speculation revolves around the ‘division’ in the establishment (pro- and anti-Imran) that seems to be at work in the relatively kid glove treatment being handed out Imran Khan. On the other, division or no division, the establishment, as is its wont, has closed ranks in the face of Imran Khan’s unremitting attacks to safeguard the internal unity and discipline of the state institution at the heart of the establishment, i.e. the military. Much hullaballoo has also been created by Imran Khan around the question of the next army chief. Institutional and government views may or may not be coinciding so far in this regard. If so, the decision will probably also reflect the desire of the military establishment to control the damage to its reputation at the hands of the wild accusations of Imran Khan. The attack on him in Wazirabad is condemnable, but to fling wild accusations without a shred of evidence or proof against the PM, Interior Minister and a serving General does no service to even Imran’s own cause. His ally, Punjab Chief Minister Parvez Elahi has tried to persuade Khan of the error of such tactics, but it seems to no avail. The Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) has now approached the Supreme Court (SC) in all its principal seats to have an FIR of the attack registered along the lines Khan wants. This is yet another example of the burgeoning trend of the judicialisation of politics that has been in play for years now.

If Imran Khan and the PTI continue on their present aggressive course, civil strife and possible bloodshed looms. That would bring extra-political forces into play, who may, even reluctantly, have to reverse outgoing COAS General Bajwa’s pledge that the military intends to retreat from interfering in politics. If, as is familiar from the past, the perception grows that the impasse between the two sides of the political divide is an impassable obstacle, the establishment may feel compelled to intervene in some form or the other. If that unfortunately transpires, the damage to democracy and civilian rule can and will be placed squarely at the door of the right wing, populist, proto-fascist PTI and its leader Imran Khan.

 

 

 

 

 

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com

Commemorative Conference for Hasan Nasir at RPC

 Progressive Writers Association (PWA) is holding a Commemorative Conference to pay respect to Communist revolutionary Hasan Nasir on the anniversary of his martyrdom.

Place and time: Research and Publication Centre (RPC), 2nd floor, 65 Main Boulevard Gulberg, Lahore (next to Standard Chartered Bank, above Indesign showroom) at 3:30 pm, Saturday, November 12, 2022.

Rashed Rahman

Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)

Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) (on Facebook)

Business Recorder Column November 8, 2022

Twists and turns

 

Rashed Rahman

 

The gun attack on Imran Khan’s container during the Long March in Wazirabad evoked condemnation across the political divide as well as by all right thinking people in the country. Pakistan has been witness to assassinations of political leaders from 1951 (Liaquat Ali Khan) to 2007 (Benazir Bhutto). The truth behind these assassinations is still not known. By their very nature, such ‘enterprises’ are shrouded in layers and layers of obfuscation. In the present circumstances, one can only thank God that Imran Khan was only wounded, along with other Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) leaders on his container truck, although one worker paid with his life.

But this ‘consensus’ did not last long. For one, Imran Khan came out guns blazing against Prime Minister (PM) Shahbaz Sharif, Interior Minister Rana Sanaullah, and Major General Faisal Naseer, the last named currently reportedly seconded to the ISI. Not surprisingly, Imran Khan’s accusing the three without any investigation or proof immediately soured the short-lived across the board condemnation of the attack. Things rapidly reverted to conflict mode, with both sides of the political divide once again going hammer and tongs at each other, an unfortunate phenomenon introduced into our politics by none other than Imran Khan and the PTI.

Before things reverted to the familiar, and by now sickening, diatribes against each other by both sides, the government and the opposition, PM Shahbaz Sharif had suggested writing to the Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) to set up a full court judicial commission to probe the attack on Imran Khan. The latter too endorsed the suggestion but with the proviso that the three accused named by him resign before a credible investigation can be mounted. That of course is unlikely to happen. Reports suggest CJP Umar Atta Bandial is deliberating on the matter with his brother Supreme Court (SC) judges. However, obstacles in the path of a full court commission include the workload of the apex court, which may not afford the diversion of the entire court’s time and attention to one, albeit important, matter. Other paths to approach the SC, as well as suo motu jurisdictions do exist, however. The idea behind the PM’s suggestion was meant to take the wind out of the PTI’s ferocious accusation sails by reference to the highest judicial forum, whose word, irrespective of past controversial decisions in our history, still commands respect and obedience, if not always concurrence.

The military’s ISPR has bristled at the naming of a senior military officer amongst the names being touted by Imran Khan. It has asked the government to take appropriate action against the accuser/s for defaming the institution by such tactics. So far at least, it is not clear how the government intends to proceed in this matter.

Meanwhile Imran Khan has announced soon after being discharged from hospital and retiring to his Zaman Park residence in Lahore that the PTI’s Long March will recommence from the exact same point where it was attacked in Wazirabad, led by Senior Vice President Shah Mahmood Qureshi. The march is expected to reach Rawalpindi in about two weeks, from where Imran Khan is scheduled to lead it into Islamabad, hopefully by then having recovered from his injuries. The Islamabad police was a tad too quick in declaring one day that the extra police forces it had deployed from Sindh, etc, were no longer needed (implying the long march may be delayed or even peter out), only to reverse itself the very next day in anticipation now of the march being resumed. Neither the Islamabad administration nor the judiciary have as yet allowed the PTI to hold a rally/sit-in anywhere in the capital, pending perhaps the outcome of the tussle in the SC regarding the May 25, 2022 PTI ‘offensive’ against Islamabad, which potentially could attract contempt of court.

One very interesting aspect of the episode is the video ‘confession’ of the attack perpetrator, which was leaked and led to the suspension of the entire police station in question. He appeared disconcertingly calm, without a crease on his brow as he confessed to a ‘lone wolf’ attack on religious grounds. The whole show lacked credibility and added further layers of mystery and unanswered questions surrounding the whole episode. Inevitably, such lack of clarity and even confusion added its own conspiracy theories to further thicken the thicket of unknowns around the author/s of the attack and his/their real motivation.

Well meaning commentators have been bleating for seeking middle ground for a peaceful solution of the dangerous collision course the country seems embarked upon, but all their well reasoned pleas have gone abegging so far. On the contrary, Imran Khan and the PTI’s unrelenting attacks on political opponents and the military establishment are indicative of the ‘system’, such as it is, imploding into an ugly, perhaps violent path whose end outcome is extremely unpredictable. None of the possible scenarios post-collision promise a good result. The political rules of engagement of a parliamentary democracy have been shredded by Imran Khan and the PTI. He seems bent upon what he has described as a ‘revolution’, either through the ballot box (early elections, which he seems confident he will win) or through bloodshed. However, if the protests mounted by the PTI after Imran Khan was attacked are any indicator, the PTI badly lacks the political organisation or even theoretical understanding of what a revolution is really about. It is a total change after the overthrow of the existing order, not a reinstatement by a military establishment that is by now embarrassed at having brought Imran Khan to power in the first place, and seemingly at a loss to counter his rhetorical and unprecedented assault on it, perhaps, it is being suggested, because Imran Khan enjoys some support within the institution.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com

Seminar: "Critique of current European politics" at RPC

Seminar: "Critique of current European politics"

at Research and Publication Centre (RPC), 2nd Floor, 65 Main Boulevard Gulberg, Lahore.

Time and date: 6:30 pm, Wednesday, November 2, 2022.

Speakers: 

1. Michael Wallace, Member of the European Parliament (MEP) from the Independents 4 Change party in Ireland. Wallace is considered one of the most eccentric and unconventional figures in European politics. He is an uncompromising critic of neoliberal austerity and has advocated the abolition of NATO. "The people of Europe must campaign for the abolition of NATO, it has nothing good to offer anyone that prefers peace to war."

2. Clare Daly, MEP from the Independents 4 Change party in Ireland. She is an outspoken advocate of socialist and anti-imperialist causes and has condemned the use of drone warfare in third world countries. Daly is also a trenchant critic of the war in Iraq and has opposed Western military intervention in the third world. 

Wallace and Daly are part of the Left in the European Parliament – GUE/NGL. 

Rashed Rahman

Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)

Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) (on Facebook).

Business Recorder Column October 18, 2022

Even six swallows may not a spring make

 

Rashed Rahman

 

Imran Khan and the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) are feeling extremely chuffed at his winning six of the seven National Assembly (NA) seats he stood on in the by-elections held on October 16, 2022. And despite the (usual) charges of ‘rigging’, they do not seem too perturbed at the loss of two NA seats that they held previously. On the other hand, most of the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) coalition parties have been left red-faced for their lacklustre showing in failing to win even a single NA seat. These worthies include the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F), Muttahida Qaumi Movement-Pakistan (MQM-P) and the Awami National Party (ANP). The exception to this ‘honour roll’ is the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), which has managed to wrest two NA seats, one against Imran Khan in Karachi, the other against the PTI in Multan.

The ANP’s Ghulam Ahmed Bilour has proclaimed that he will challenge his loss by 25,000 votes to Imran Khan in Peshawar NA-31. He claims it was the PTI government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) that helped defeat him through foul means. Bilour garnered 32,252 votes to Imran Khan’s 57,814. The turnout in this constituency was 20.28 percent, a low figure typical of by-elections generally, and these by-elections too. No other losing PDM candidate has challenged the results.

Imran Khan won by 76,681 votes to JUI-F’s Maulana Qasim’s 68,181 from Mardan NA-22. The turnout was a comparatively better 32.9 percent. In Karachi’s Malir NA-237, Imran Khan suffered his only loss to the PPP’s Abdul Hakim Baloch by 32,567 votes to 22,493 with a turnout of 20 percent. In the same city’s Korangi NA-239, Imran Khan defeated the MQM-P’s Syed Nayyar Raza by 50,104 votes to 18,116. With an even lower turnout of 14.8 percent, the result in this constituency reflects the decline of MQM-P in both mobilising voters as well as obtaining their support. Imran Khan also won in Faisalabad NA-108, defeating the PML-N’s Abid Sher Ali by 99,841 votes to 75,226, and the PML-N’s Shezra Mansab Ali Khan Kharal by 90,180 votes to 78,024 in Nankana Sahib NA-118.

In a battle of heirs apparent, the PPP’s Ali Musa Gilani, son of former Prime Minister and currently Senate Leader of the Opposition Yousaf Raza Gilani, defeated the PTI’s Shah Mahmood Qureshi’s daughter Meher Bano Qureshi by a margin of 107,327 votes to 82,141. Imran Khan refrained from contesting this seat, no doubt in deference to Shah Mahmood’s desire to secure the seat for his family and heirs. However, this reversal gave the PPP something to celebrate, given that this was the first Punjab NA seat they had won in four years, and only the second Punjab one in the last 10 years. How far this single victory will help in reviving the once mighty PPP’s fortunes in Punjab, only time will tell, but it does seem a long way to go yet to restore the PPP’s once unassailable hold on Punjab.

Speaking of holds on Punjab, the once immovable PML-N in the province came out looking rather lame on the NA front, while only managing to win one seat out of the three being contested for the Punjab Provincial Assembly. Although in the aftermath of this underwhelming performance the PML-N has been busy dishing out its mea culpa, the outcome has not pleased PML-N supremo Nawaz Sharif in London.

The usual post-polling charges and counter-charges of ‘rigging’ aside, the by-elections were by and large peaceful except for a few clashes between the rival parties in Karachi, Khanewal, Sheikhupura, Faisalabad and Peshawar. The heavy security forces deployment managed to scotch such violence fairly quickly and easily, and made a few arrests. The Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) has firmly rebutted all suggestion of ‘rigging’ no matter from where it has emanated, but particularly the PTI’s claims, which appear strange considering their ‘triumph’.

On the basis of these by-election results, is the post-polling ‘triumphalism’ of the PTI justified? A few considerations must be kept in view. One, by-elections normally produce low turnouts, rendering them an unreliable barometer of the electorate’s overall mood, both in individual constituencies as well as the country as a whole. So too much should not be read into the PTI’s wins. Second, given that Imran Khan ran on seven out of the eight NA seats being contested, and despite his strong showing in winning six out of the seven he stood in, does it not colour the PTI as a ‘one man show’? In a sense Imran Khan’s victories are logical and to be expected since his opponents, veteran and new, did not enjoy the same high profile as him, especially in the light of his relentless pursuit of the rally trail since being ousted from power. To that extent the PTI’s satisfaction if not triumphalism may be justified, since it points in the direction of the PTI winning the battle of narratives. But on the other hand, as admitted by Rana Sanaullah, the PML-N was unable to mount a cohesive, effective election campaign in any constituency it was contesting. The losing PML-N candidates for these seats have attempted to shift the blame onto Maryam Nawaz’s departure to London instead of being available to lead the campaigning. So on the one hand we appear to have the one man show of Imran Khan, and on the other the one woman show of the PML-N. Somewhat pathetic, is it not?

It may be recalled that these by-elections were triggered by the acceptance of nine PTI MNAs’ resignations by the Speaker of the National Assembly, Raja Pervaiz Ashraf, out of the entire mass resignations submitted by the PTI MNAs following the defeat of Imran Khan in the no-confidence motion. The PTI seems to have set aside its irritation at this ‘selective’ acceptance of its MNAs’ resignations and decided to turn the tables on the government by fielding their trump card, Imran Khan, on seven vacant seats. Victory aside, the PTI may have to go back to the drawing board once Imran Khan has to surrender five of the six seats he has won, a prospect that invites a better organised campaign and showing by the PML-N if it hopes to generate some momentum to win back its erstwhile stronghold Punjab.

Despite the ‘feel good’ of PTI’s victory, the government is still not buying into the former’s demand for immediate general elections. That implies the PTI twisting in the wind till at least August 2023, while the PML-N and its PDM coalition allies will have to get their act together to combat what appears to be Imran Khan’s political momentum.

 

 

 

 

 

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com

The October 2022 issue of Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) is out

The October 2022 issue of Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) is out. Link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com

Contents:

1. Rashed Rahman: Revolutions: past and present.

2. Vijay Prashad: We will march, even if we have to wade through the Pakistani floodwaters.

Rashed Rahman

Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)

Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) (on Facebook) 

Business Recorder Column October 11, 2022

Terrorist hydra raises its head/s again

 

Rashed Rahman

 

Since the victory of the Afghan Taliban in August 2021, and contrary to the fond hopes of our establishment that their ‘friends’ now ensconced in Kabul would help restrain the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Pakistan has seen an uptick in terrorist attacks and show of armed force by the group in Swat and the former FATA tribal regions. In the light of this development, one must question COAS General Qamar Bajwa’s claim in his address at the Pakistan Military Academy Kakul that the army had successfully turned the tide against terrorism. In 2014, in the wake of the massacre of children and teachers in the terrorist attack on the Army Public School Peshawar, the military’s Zarb-e-Azb offensive, as this writer had pointed out at the time, had merely ‘exported’ the problem (to Afghanistan), not scotched the snake. The many-headed hydra of terrorism with which Pakistan has been afflicted for decades since our involvement in the Afghan wars, now appears to be raising its head/s again with a vengeance.

First some  historical perspective. TTP came into being in 2007 in reaction to the Lal Masjid incident in Islamabad. It was composed of tribal areas Pashtun groups closely associated with the Afghan wars, first with the Mujahideen, later the Taliban. There is also some evidence of an alliance with, and mentoring by, al Qaeda. When so-called Islamic extremism first reared its ugly head in the former FATA after 9/11 and the US invasion of Afghanistan, these Pakistani jihadists fell out with the Pakistani state for whom they had previously fought in Afghanistan and Kashmir over its support for the US’s War on Terror. They provided safe havens and sanctuary to al Qaeda, Afghan Taliban and other militant elements fleeing Afghanistan. Under US pressure, General Musharraf’s regime started a crackdown on such groups starting 2004. These suppression efforts proved halting and contradictory, and were often punctuated by ‘peace’ agreements with the militant groups that more often than not were broken by the latter. In their early campaigns, the terrorists did not hesitate to carry out indiscriminate attacks on civilians and religious minorities such as Shias. They also killed hundreds of tribal maliks(chieftains) who constituted the state’s ‘political management’ structure in the tribal areas, an arrangement inherited from British colonialism.

Reportedly on al Qaeda's advice, by 2018 the TTP had changed tack to the extent of ‘abandoning’ pan-Islamism (i.e. denying any ‘expansionist’ plans for other regions, concentrating on Pakistan alone) and redirecting their attacks away from civilians and religious minorities and towards military and intelligence personnel. They have also, particularly since the Afghan Taliban’s ascent to power last year, redoubled their attacks on the border and inside the country as a whole, as well as conducting a show of arms in areas such as Swat and the tribal areas. Given this resurgence, it was exceedingly strange that the military establishment entered into negotiations with the TTP (with the Haqqani Network’s facilitation). These talks were neither officially announced nor was parliament or the public taken into confidence. A tentative ceasefire soon broke down on the unacceptability of the TTP’s demands for their version of shariato be enforced in Pakistan, a reversal of the merger of FATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, release of TTP prisoners and, as icing on the cake, no sports for women. Although these demands were inherently unacceptable to the state, the last demand rendered a women’s sports festival in Gilgit-Baltistan ‘suspect’, and it could only be held in muted fashion after it was renamed a ‘gala’.

As part of its refashioned strategy, the TTP has issued statements of support for the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) and the Tehreek-e-Labaiq Pakistan (TLP), despite the fact that the latter is a Barelvi movement while the TTP is Deobandi. This flexibility is an effort on the part of the TTP to remain relevant in the mainstream political discourse.

Negotiations with the TTP began under Imran Khan’s government, in line with his long held view that terrorist militancy could not be handled by military means and had to rely on negotiations. However, what Imran Khan failed to realise, and has yet to realise, is that religious extremists, terrorists and fanatics are impervious to reason. In the past, if they have negotiated agreements for ceasefires, these proved to be mere tactical measures that were abandoned as soon as the religious extremists felt they could return to the offensive. This has been the pattern since 2004, including such edifying episodes as the terrorists playing football with decapitated soldiers’ heads.

The critical mistake the military establishment made during the Afghan wars was to allow the Pashtun tribesmen to act as facilitators if not fighters for the Afghan Mujahideen and then Taliban. It was inevitable that cross-border Pashtun solidarity, not to mention closeness of political views would radicalise our tribesmen in the same vein as the Mujahideen and Taliban. Pakistan is having to potentially pay the price for this error in horrendous terms once again, given that we are currently experiencing the highest rate of terrorist attacks for the last 5-6 years. The people of Swat and other regions that have experienced TTP terrorism in the past are literally up in arms at the seeming neglect of the threat once again posed by the resurgent TTP and are demanding action by the state, failing which they say they will be compelled to take up arms themselves against the ‘intruders’. The military establishment would be well advised  to take parliament and the country into confidence on the state of affairs surrounding the resurgence of the TTP and chalk out a fresh plan to nip the evil in the bud, something neglected in the past, exacting a horrendous cost, and likely to exact an even higher cost if not carried out today.

 

 

 

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