Business Recorder Column August 24, 2021

Anti-Taliban resistance

 

Rashed Rahman

 

As the full impact and import of the US-led west’s departure from Afghanistan unfolds, there is no dearth of handwringing and a blame game in western capitals. Former US President Donald Trump has rounded on his successor and the current incumbent Joe Biden for the manner in which the withdrawal has misfired into an astonishingly rapid and virtually bloodless victory for the Taliban. But Trump cannot so easily shrug off responsibility for the debacle. It was the Doha agreement on withdrawal that set the stage for what has followed, having kept the Kabul government out of the loop, which for all intents and purposes meant it had been thrown to the wolves.

The Biden administration’s deliberations on following through on the agreed withdrawal indicate how badly out of touch the officially certified truth in Washington was with the ground realities in Afghanistan. All the military and intelligence prognoses predicted a possible Taliban victory in about a year to 18 months after the US’s departure. There appears to have been little if any contingency planning if this timeline did not hold or was foreshortened. Dissenting voices went unheard or were marginalised in the deliberations, such was the almost entire focus on just getting out.

The Taliban were able to demonstrate during their military offensive on isolated outposts and border crossings that an already demoralised Afghan government military could not rely on supplies and reinforcements when facing Taliban attacks. The Taliban rubbed this home by messaging the soldiers in the field that as was the case over years (when the US was still on ground), corruption and inefficiency, rife in the Afghan military, would not only continue but also deprive them of any hope of succour or support. Why, the Taliban messaging underlined, continue to fight and die for a regime that did not care enough for its soldiers to even provide adequate food, ammunition, reinforcements and (dwindling) air power? Many soldiers succumbed to the logic of this narrative and surrendered without firing a shot. Those that did not, either sought refuge across the borders of neighbouring countries or simply melted away into the countryside. The battlefield momentum these peripheral victories engendered encouraged the Taliban to lay siege to provincial capitals, first the most distant and isolated from Kabul, later more and more important ones closer to Kabul, laying the foundations for the taking of the national capital. Whatever organised resistance still existed in Kabul completely collapsed after the ignominious fleeing of President Ashraf Ghani to save his skin. It hardly needs reiteration that when the supreme commander flees the battlefield on the eve of the decisive battle, his forces collapse. In the event, Kabul fell without a shot being fired in its defence.

The Taliban are now in control of all of Afghanistan except a sliver of territory called Panjsher, north of Kabul. This was the redoubt of Ahmed Shah Massoud against the Communist regime (1978-79) and the Soviet occupation (1979-1989). It could not be overrun by either opponent. From Panjsher, the Northern Alliance in a lightning move took Kabul in 1992 when the Communist Najib regime fell. The rest of the Mujahideen groups who had fought against the Soviets then fought a civil war that ended in the triumph of the Taliban in 1996. September 11, 2001 was presaged by Massoud’s assassination just days before. Some analysts at the time considered it the opening act of 9/11.

Today, his son, Ahmad Massoud leads the Panjsheri guerrilla forces, which are daily being strengthened by former Afghan troops and leaders who have refused to surrender before the Taliban plus ethnic militia leaders such as Dostum. The Panjsheris claim the capture of three district capitals near their base in recent days. Thousands of people are reportedly voting with their feet to join this incipient resistance in Panjsher. Ahmad Massoud hopes to build a force of some 9,000 guerrillas from this influx. They will benefit from arms and equipment left behind by the US. However, their opponents, the Taliban, have benefited even more from the treasure trove of weapons and equipment that has fallen into their lap after the ignominious US retreat. They also field some 60-70,000 fighters, which gives some indication of the odds the anti-Taliban resistance faces. The Taliban have announced that hundreds of their fighters are being dispatched to Panjsher. We can therefore expect a long drawn out guerrilla war between the two sides.

Redoubtable as the Panjsheris have proved themselves in the past, and despite the increasing flow of anti-Taliban fighters to their ranks since the Taliban takeover, their chances of successfully resisting the Taliban onslaught that is certain to come lie in the hope that the Tajiks and Uzbeks can call upon their co-ethnics across the borders for support. Both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as is the case with all of Central Asia and even Russia, are wary of the possibility of fundamentalist terrorist movements based on Afghan soil spilling over Afghanistan’s borders and spreading mayhem throughout the region despite the Taliban’s repeated assurances they will never again allow anyone to use their soil against other countries. If nothing else, the Central Asian states most insecure may see purchase in pre-empting any such adverse development by supporting the anti-Taliban resistance.

It is too early to say how this overall scenario will play out. But the wishful thinking in many world capitals (Beijing and Moscow for example) that the Taliban will continue to ‘play nice’ may well be severely tested in the days to come.

 

 

 

 

 

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com

 Proposed regular meeting of like-minded friends every Thursday at Research and Publication Centre (RPC), 2nd floor, 65 Main Boulevard Gulberg, Lahore at 5:00 pm to discuss domestic Pakistani, regional and international politics. Interested friends are requested to respond on my blog, RPC's Facebook page, my email and WhatsApp groups. Thank you.

Rashed Rahman

Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)

Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC) 

Business Recorder Column August 17, 2021

Chronicle of a debacle foretold

 

Rashed Rahman

 

The collapse of the Afghan government’s military and security forces in the face of the Taliban offensive in motion since May 2021 is not a surprise. What is confounding for most people is the speed and suddenness of the collapse. People are left wondering why an army and security forces built by the US with expenditure of $ 83 billion, the latest weapons, supplies and training over 20 years could melt away virtually without firing a shot.

The answer lies not in the sophisticated weaponry and equipment or numbers of the Afghan military. After all the balance of forces in the field was 300,000 Afghan military contending against some 80,000 insurgent Taliban equipped largely with small arms. The real reason the Afghan military collapsed in such rapid and dramatic fashion within literally weeks or months is the age-old military wisdom culled from experience. A larger, more heavily armed force can be defeated by a smaller, less equipped one if the former lacks morale, will, belief in the cause it is ostensibly fighting for, commitment and discipline.

On all these counts, the Afghan army was badly lacking. Reports after the fall of Kabul to the Taliban, signalling their complete control over the country, speak of the strategy pursued by the Taliban in their final blitz. First, they nibbled away at isolated military posts and captured important border crossing points. The inability of the Afghan government to provide logistical support or reinforcements to these areas sent a strong signal through the ranks of the Afghan government soldiery that they were on their own. Often short of food, ammunition, air support and reinforcements anyway, many considered whether it was worth dying for a dubious cause, that of Ashraf Ghani’s government. Not only that government, even the ranks of the Afghan army were riddled with corruption and inefficiency, dealing a devastating blow to morale over the years and long before the Taliban launched their final offensive.

Reports also speak of a subtle, backdoor channel opened up by regional Taliban commanders in the north and west of the country, areas ethnically non-Pashtun and which continued armed resistance against the last Taliban regime between 1996 and 2001, to persuade the already demoralised defenders not to throw away their lives for no good cause. Such channels were reportedly even in existence with seemingly hardline anti-Taliban elements in the Ashraf Ghani government. These reports help explain why many soldiers surrendered or fled to adjoining countries rather than confront the advancing Taliban. It also may help explain the Taliban’s peaceful entry into Kabul, thereby avoiding the potential bloodbath used by a fleeing Ashraf Ghani as his mea culpa. That has not washed with members of his own government, who have accused him of betraying his people by abandoning them to their own fate in order to save his own skin. Ashraf Ghani’s family is already reportedly in the US, and no doubt he will be joining them from Tajikistan where he has reportedly fled with close aides.

The Taliban victory has been in plain sight for long, especially after former US President Donald Trump signed a US/NATO forces withdrawal agreement with the Taliban in Doha. That agreement basically worked in the US’s interest, weary of what had been termed ‘the forever war’. However, it threw the Ashraf Ghani government and the Afghan people to the wolves (the Taliban). The insurgents have developed over time a sophisticated narrative aimed at reassuring the world that they have learnt from their past mistakes and adopted a more ‘inclusive’ posture. This narrative is aimed at demolishing whatever remains of resistance because of fear of the past harsh hardline attitudes of the Taliban in 1996-2001. It appears ever so rational, objective, and acceptable. Apart from wearing down residual fear and resistance, the narrative is also aimed at providing their regime legitimacy and recognition in the eyes of the world. This is critical since governing a war-devastated Afghanistan would require help, aid, and financial flows at a considerable level if the country is not to sink into more chaos. Any such development, i.e. the inability of the now installed Taliban government to govern in a manner that brings at least minimum succour to the long suffering Afghan people could fuel resistance.

Is there a likelihood of resistance now? The immediate reaction of the Afghan people appears to be a mixture of relief (that the Taliban takeover has occurred relatively peacefully) and fear (because of mistrust in the Taliban’s assurances of better behaviour towards women, ethic minorities and past or future opponents). However, after the crumbling of the Afghan military and security forces, the ethnic minority militias too have suffered a mixed fate. Ismail Khan of Herat fame has been captured by the Taliban and apparently struck a deal that has allowed him to walk free, no doubt on guarantees of ‘good behaviour’. But Abdul Rashid Dostum and Atta Noor have fled the country and the Panjsher militia under the late Ahmed Shah Massoud’s son seems still to be in the field.

Nevertheless, it will take time even if the remaining resistance is to be revived. In the meantime, the Taliban’s policies and even more their implementation in practice will be closely watched by the US-led west in order to come to a conclusion on recognition of the Taliban regime, the key to economic survival of the fundamentalists’ government. Russia and China seem inclined to keep an open mind regarding the Taliban regime, more in the hope of staving off any Taliban encouragement to their respective areas of potential conflict than any love or admiration of the outfit. Moscow and Beijing hope thereby to diplomatically persuade the Taliban not to allow co-ethnic fundamentalist movements aimed at Central Asia (Uzbeks, Tajiks, etc) and Xinjiang (Uighurs) respectively to use their presence on Afghan soil against these neighbouring countries and regions.

As for Pakistan, widely accused of being the mainstay of the Taliban since 2001, the Taliban victory may turn out to be pyrrhic. The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is already back in action at a low level that could rise. The Taliban’s reassuring and soothing noises may have stemmed any outward refugee flows towards Pakistan for the moment, but if a fresh civil war breaks out after some time to regroup, such a development cannot be ruled out, border fencing or no fencing.

And as a last word, one can only contemplate the wisdom of Pakistani Foreign Minster Shah Mahmood Qureshi, whose needle is stuck in the groove of ‘there is no military solution in Afghanistan’. What is it then that has transpired there?

 

 

 

 

 

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com

The August 2021 issue of Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) is out

 The August 2021 issue of Pakistan Monthly Review (PMR) is out (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com).

Contents:

1. Rashed Rahman: The National Question in Marxism.

2. Dr Maqsudul Hasan Nuri: Rise in Global 'Populism'?

3. Changez Ali: Diversity and imperialism.

Rashed Rahman

Editor, Pakistan Monthly Review (link: pakistanmonthlyreview.com)

Director, Research and Publication Centre (RPC)

Business Recorder Editorial August 7, 2021

Other options!

 

National Security Adviser (NSA) Moeed Yusuf met his US counterpart Jake Sullivan in Washington to discuss the situation in Afghanistan and US-Pakistan relations going forward. Reports speak of a ‘tough’ conversation on the former issue, which meant the latter could only be improved if there is a political settlement in Afghanistan, a prospect that seems dim considering the situation on the ground amidst a fierce Taliban offensive. Whether the tough talking got Moeed Yusuf’s goat or there was some purpose in mind, his interview with The Financial Times seemed to throw down the gauntlet to a US seemingly less than warm towards Pakistan. Moeed Yusuf was particularly peeved by the fact that US President Joe Biden had not so far called and spoken to Prime Minister Imran Khan. In response to this diplomatic affront, he said Pakistan has “other options” if the US President continues to ‘ignore’ the Pakistani leadership. Although he declined to elaborate, most observers saw this as a less than subtle hint at Pakistan’s relationship with its ‘iron brother’ China. While it is true that Pakistan and China enjoy close and friendly relations that are likely to benefit Pakistan, including the flagship CPEC project, ‘veiled threats’ to a superpower are neither good diplomacy nor likely to advance Pakistan’s interests. China may be our go-to friend in times of dire need, but it is unlikely to be able, or willing, to replace Pakistan’s global donors or lenders or help Pakistan get out of the FATF grip and demolish the (spurious) charge that the country is guilty of using child soldiers. The clout that Washington wields in the world, not only in military terms, but also in its leverage over institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, etc, and its influence in the FATF process, etc, could prove crucial to Pakistan’s chances of gaining the financial flows it requires to keep its economy afloat. A less challenging posture therefore may have been the greater wisdom, not a seeming cocking a snook.

Ironically, Washington in public has spoken softly and diplomatically regarding Pakistan’s role in facilitating the US troops withdrawal and efforts to forge a negotiated political settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban despite their suspicions about Islamabad’s role in the Taliban insurgency. To illustrate, former US President Donald Trump, not known for diplomatic finesse, severed some $ 2 billion in security assistance to Pakistan, accusing it of peddling “nothing but lies and deceit” vis-à-vis Afghanistan. But even Trump reversed himself and invited Prime Minister Imran Khan to the White House once the Doha process between the US and the Taliban, lubricated by Pakistani efforts, got rolling. Even today, amidst the Taliban’s rapid successes in taking isolated military posts, important border crossings and now laying siege to at least three provincial capitals, Lashkar Gah, Kandahar and Herat, and even attacking Kabul, the State Department and various other voices continue to heap praise on Pakistan for ‘helping out’ in Afghanistan. Now all this could of course be double speak, but that is how intelligent diplomacy is conducted in the state’s interests, not by bellicose sounding challenges such as ‘Pakistan is too important to be ignored by the US’. If Zalmay Khalilzad, the US Special Ambassador who pulled off the Doha deal is heard at a conference in Aspen, Colorado, he has explicated the distance that still divides the Afghan government, which wants to offer the Taliban a share in its ranks, and the Taliban, who want a ‘lion’s share of power’. The gulf between these two positions bodes ill for any peace process, howsoever described. Unfortunately, however, it appears guns, not words, are the currency that is deciding the fate of Afghanistan, an outcome that may have its inevitable negative fallout for US-Pakistan relations, with all the attendant difficulties Pakistan may land in.

Business Recorder Column August 3, 2021

The ‘peace’ mantra

 

Rashed Rahman

 

Pakistan’s leaders, civilian and military, have been piping the ‘peace in Afghanistan’ tune for some time now, and certainly since the US signed an agreement with the Taliban to withdraw troops from the country. Islamabad has been trying hard to take credit for facilitating the meetings between Zalmay Khalilzad and the Taliban in Doha that broke the ice between the two protagonists. Further, after the Doha withdrawal agreement, Pakistan’s leadership has been stressing an ‘inclusive’ power sharing arrangement to prevent a continuation of the civil war, peace in and around Afghanistan, and escape any fallout or spillover of the Afghan conflict.

While these policy pronouncements from the highest to the lowest in Pakistan’s top echelons of power sound eminently rational, reasonable and sweet, what is happening on the ground and on the battlefield in Afghanistan appears to run contrary to all this. One does not have to search far to find critical reporting and research on how Pakistan under Musharraf played a double game of ostensibly supporting the US in Afghanistan while also nurturing back to life Washington’s (now clearly established) nemesis in the form of the Taliban. This duality continues, with speculation whirling around Pakistan’s ‘facilitating’ the Taliban’s current offensive since May 2021 when the US started its withdrawal, which is now approaching completion.

The contradiction at the heart of Pakistan’s policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan is that it is pursuing contrary goals. Can peace be attained in Afghanistan in the teeth of the ruthless offensive by the Taliban? Can such a gambit provide the circumstances for a peaceful political settlement between the warring sides? Needless to say, these appear to be rhetorical questions.

As anticipated by informed observers, there is a noticeable uptick in Tehreek-i-Taliban (TTP) attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and its erstwhile tribal areas. Every day brings fresh news of policemen and soldiers being killed or wounded in gun and bomb attacks, including land mines. Whether the ‘sleeper cells’ of the TTP have woken up or its presence just across the Afghan border is responsible is a moot choice.

From all accounts and appearances, for all the fancy talk about peace, reconciliation, power sharing, a reformed Taliban and what have you, the issue is actually being decided on the battlefield. Having captured some strategic border crossings and isolated posts (largely in the non-Pashtun north, northwest and west of Afghanistan), the Taliban are now escalating to the siege of cities. Thus the provincial capitals of Herat and Lashkar Gah are under siege, with street-to-street fighting in progress in the former. Bombardment, from artillery or the air, is being employed by the hard-pressed Afghan government forces and their allied militias such as Ismail Khan’s forces in Herat. This comes as a surprise since it was widely assumed that the Afghan air force had been reduced to a lame duck after the US withdrawal for lack of spares and maintenance. It could also be that the US, despite being denied air bases in Pakistan, has found ways to pound the Taliban from the air wherever they appear to be pressing the Afghan government side too hard. Kandahar airport was briefly put out of commission by Taliban rocket fire on August 1, 2021, but soon restored. Its importance in terms of an air bridge between Kabul and the southwestern provincial capital cannot be overestimated.

Meanwhile Pakistani National security Adviser Moeed Yusuf and ISI chief Leiutenant-General Faiz Hameed visited Washington recently to, amongst other things, ‘sweet talk’ the US into not ‘abandoning’ Afghanistan (or Pakistan?). The issue revolves around the likely scenario of the Taliban paying lip service to talks and a political settlement with the Afghan government while pursuing an all out military victory on the ground through a guerrilla strategy of indirect approach, which implies attacking and taking the weakest points first, and then nibbling away until the relatively fortified and heavily defended cities can be made to tumble one after the other like dominos. Since the Taliban seem bent on an outright military victory, there is concern in Islamabad that even if they succeed, the Taliban government that emerges as a result will struggle to be recognised, let alone legitimised, in the world. It could face even greater isolation than even its previous regime in 1996-2001, which was recognised by just three countries, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. So, Moeed and company are trilling, don’t ‘abandon’ a Taliban ruled Afghanistan.

Regional powers such as Russia, China and Iran (not to mention the neighbouring Central Asian States) are attempting a pragmatic engagement with the prospective ‘new’ rulers of Afghanistan casting a long shadow on the country’s horizon. They are basically arguing ‘let and let live’, meaning restrain the inimical religious fundamentalist movements located in Afghanistan from attacking us and we may be inclined to ‘do business’ with you. Pakistan too has similar concerns regarding the TTP. Can the Taliban be taken at their word about not allowing Afghan soil to be used in future against neighbouring countries? Given their ideological and political proclivities and closeness to some of these movements, particularly the TTP, that is a stretch too far.

 

 

 

 

 

rashed.rahman1@gmail.com

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com