Naya Daur TV Interview With
Rashed Rahman – Part II (of three):
“Reversing The 18th Amendment
Will Be A Grave Error”
Rashed Rahman is a
veteran editor and journalist, intellectual and committed activist for the
Left. With a career spanning some 40 years, he is presently Director of the
Lahore-based Research and Publication Centre (RPC) and Editor of Pakistan
Monthly Review (PMR). Earlier this month, he sat down with Miranda Husain to
discuss PTI’s record, the role of both the Army and judiciary in the current
political set-up, as well as the talk supporting a presidential system. This is
the second of a three-part interview.
Miranda Husain: Pakistan has
enjoyed 10 years of uninterrupted parliamentary democracy. There’s talk in the
corridors of power about changing the goalposts and embracing a presidential
system. Why now?
Rashed Rahman: I don’t think the
presidential system is acceptable to political opinion across the board. What
we’ve seen in recent years is a trend that militates against a strong
centralised state. The 18th Amendment has devolved all those subjects that were
due to be devolved to the provinces 10 years after the 1973 Constitution was
promulgated but never happened because we landed up in various crises,
including the overthrow of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. There are some things, however,
that couldn’t be done, such as repealing some insertions effected by military
dictators, e.g. Articles 62 and 63 and the blasphemy laws. These are, of
course, controversial subjects but I think the political will within mainstream
political parties to overcome the resistance of the religious right is absent.
So, the 18th Amendment basically did what could be done through
consensus across the board. And it’s considerable. I don’t want to
underestimate it. But the fear is now that it may be a target for reversal.
This would be a grave error because what’s needed — and wasn’t done at the time
— is building the capacity of the provinces to deal with the new subjects that
they’ve been given and for which they were seemingly ill-prepared.
There are two issues troubling the federal government. Firstly,
increased debt servicing, especially external debt, due to escalating loans and
that means dollars. And earning dollars isn’t so easy. Secondly, military
expenditure is going up because of the tensions on the eastern border. So,
these two priorities, which are relatively inelastic and liable to rise
incrementally, are behind the current efforts to change the resource sharing
arrangements.
MH: Much of the current cabinet comprises those who served under
the country’s last military dictator. There are concerns that Pakistan is
returning to the Musharraf era minus Enlightened Moderation. Should minority
communities be worried by the idea of a presidential system?
RR: I think the minorities should be worried under the current
mechanism. The reason being, the kind of rights that in theory and on paper are
promised in the Constitution and under the law are practised more in the breach.
In addition, the intolerance, hatred and othering of religious minorities is a
hangover from the state’s flirtation with proxy wars and jihadis in particular.
Thus minorities have plenty to worry about as it is. Hindu girls appear to be
particularly vulnerable to forced conversions and then being married off
straightaway. Arguably, these communities would have even less voice in a
presidential system. At least a parliamentary federal system presents conduits,
both at the provincial and federal level, for them to air their grievances and
try to have these addressed.
On the question of those who served under Pervez Musharraf, I
would go further and say that there are many in this government who come from a
religious right-wing background, including parties like the Jamaat, for
example. The case of Fayazul Hasan Chohan [former Punjab Information Minister]
who had to be turfed out because of anti-Hindu remarks indicates that there are
people within this regime who hold those kind of extreme views.
But on the whole, I don’t think there is a strong current of
anti-minority sentiment within this government. In fact, those who have come
from other parties or backgrounds are now likely to be a little more cautious
after the Chohan case, at least in terms of public statements and the optics.
MH: Pakistan has seen the rapid rise of a resurgent and violent
religious right. One consequence of this is that Asia Bibi is still not free
despite being acquitted of blasphemy twice by the highest court in the land. Is
this government a friend of the minorities?
RR: Asia Bibi’s case was the favourite whipping boy of really only
one sect: the Barelvis. Admittedly, they’re the overwhelming majority of Sunni
Muslims here in Pakistan. Meaning that the weight of their voice is
considerable. And the Tehreek Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) has represented them and
elevated Mumtaz Qadri [the man who gunned down Salmaan Taseer, the then
Governor Punjab, over moves to reform the blasphemy laws] to the level of
martyr while building a shrine in his memory. Nevertheless, the unrest
following the Supreme Court (SC) verdict was likely a brief and chaotic attempt
to assert Barelvi muscle.
When the PTI took to the helm, it looked as though both the
government and the military came together on the same page to prevent the
situation from spiralling out of control and creating fresh problems. Thus
there was a crackdown against the TLP.
Their leaders are still either under house arrest or in jail and
are being asked for guarantees of good behaviour before they are released. I
think the wisdom sank in that such unrest had to be quelled because the
Barelvis are everywhere. Thus the potential threat from such an upsurge is what
finally persuaded the authorities to bring the agitators to heel. Having said
that, I don’t see that this issue — apart from at a local level — incites the
kind of anger and passion that it used to in the religious right as a whole.
Yes, there are local incidents and a local maulvi or someone will get
in on the act and create a problem. Asia Bibi’s case is a classic example in
that respect. It was a local maulvi who, when it was brought to his
notice long after the event, suddenly became the main complainant.
That the SC acquitted her twice is a credit to the country’s
judiciary. The judges resisted all pressure — obvious or not so obvious — and
delivered a fair and outstanding judgement. The TLP clearly had an axe to grind
but their views failed to sway the court.
Yes, there was a review petition. But this is very much a legal
instrument available to any aggrieved party who feels justice hasn’t been done.
MH: You have talked about how the government and military
appear, in large part, to be on the same page. But there is a perception among
a section of commentators that the military is calling the shots?
RR: I believe it’s in power behind-the-scenes and is the
mentor and supporter of this government. In fact, it’s hard to imagine Prime
Minister Imran Khan making the kind of rational, reasonable gestures towards
India [during the recent Indo-Pak skirmish at the beginning of the year]
without the military’s backing. Yes, we keep hearing that the Army and the
ruling party are on the same page, always an important litmus test for any
government, especially when it comes to relations with India. The PPP fell out
with the top brass over its India policy and the nuclear programme. The same
thing happened to the PML-N when it reached out to Narendra Modi, though that’s
an old problem between Nawaz Sharif and the military, not a new one.
The logic behind those initiatives which cause so much ire in
GHQ (General Headquarters) is that of the necessity of co-existence of two
nuclear armed nations who, if they don’t handle their tensions and their
differences in a rational and objective manner, may end up not only
obliterating each other but also large parts of the world.
So, if the military has come round to the view that the
relationship with India must be managed — even if bilateral talks are frozen on
New Delhi’s side — this must be done in a way that doesn’t escalate beyond what
is doable. So, I think that describes what happened in the Pulwama attack and
after.
Also, the Pakistani state has been attempting for a long time,
particularly since 9/11, to have plausible deniability as far as its involvement
in proxy wars in the region go. Afghanistan is the prime example. India and
Kashmir, the other. How far the struggle in Kashmir is still funded and fuelled
by support from Pakistan and how far it has taken on an indigenous hue — I
don’t know. But the fact is that groups operating in Kashmir and even further
afield in India are still functioning here, remaining relatively untouched.
As long as these groups exist on Pakistani soil in one form or
the other, fingers will continue to point towards this country. With these two
proxy wars what sort of a profile does that afford the country on the
international stage? And if all this is happening under the cover of the
nuclear umbrella — well, that’s a very high risk game, plausible deniability
notwithstanding.
If the Army is, indeed, keen to ease tensions with India there
may be some cogent factors that are bringing about a 90 degree — if not 180
degree — turn in terms of security policy. Because the negative consequences of
past proxy wars are chickens coming home to roost. After all, no nation can
hope to progress and prosper in an interconnected globalised world if it’s at
odds with the great powers, one side or the other side. For it risks being left
out in the cold. And I think that’s worrying the military.
MH: The PTI is known for taking U-turns. One of the most
significant being the question of dealing with Modi. The PM has now decided
that his counterpart is, indeed, the best man with whom to do business. Is this
a case of realpolitik or sheer recklessness?
RR: This has long been part of received wisdom. For example,
Yitzhak Rabin, a former Israeli prime minster and military commander, made
peace with Yasser Arafat. This was seen as a positive move because his
credentials vis-a-vis the Israeli state were unassailable. He was a war hero.
So, the consensus was that whatever he was doing was in the country’s best
interests. That this didn’t stop him from being assassinated is another matter
because there are fanatics there too. But that’s the argument I think that PM
Khan was trying to make.
Modi enjoys less of the constraints in domestic politics in
India than does the Congress. The latter, after all, will be more vulnerable to
attack from the right if it reaches out to Pakistan or attempts to arrive at some
kind of modus vivendi.
Of course, as usual, this was misinterpreted in India, with the
Congress subsequently accusing Modi of being pro-Pakistan. Vajpayee’s example
is also a very good one. It’s a separate issue that he felt betrayed. Yet
despite that, the very architect of the Kargil War who sabotaged the peace
initiative is whom he met in Agra and came very close to an agreement with.
This reinforces the argument that people with the credentials on the right have
more room to manoeuvre.